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Cinq années d'application du 
règlement "concentrations" 
par Karel VAN MIERT, Commissaire en charge de la politique de 
concurrence 
Le règlement (CEE) n' 4064/89 du 
Conseil, du 21 décembre 1989, relatif cm 
contrôle des opérations de concentration 
entre entreprises est entré en vigueur le 21 
septembre 1990. Cela fait donc environ 
cinq ans que ce règlement est appliqué par 
la Commission et une telle période de 
temps m'autorise à dresser un premier 
bilan et à définir un certain nombre 
d'orientations pour l'avenir. 
BILAN STATISTIQUE 
Un bilan, dans un tel domaine, se doit 
d'abord d'être statistique. Au 30 octobre 
1995, la Commission avait examiné 376 
opérations notifiées. Elle avait adopté, 
compte tenu des affaires abandonnées par 
les entreprises concernées après notification 
et des affaires encore en cours à ladite date 
du 30 octobre, 360 décisions finales. Elles 
se répartissent entre 31 décisions déclarant 
que l'opération ne relève pas du règlement, 
322 décisions d'approbation de l'opération 
et 4 interdictions (ainsi que 3 décisions de 
renvoi à un Etat membre; cf infra.). Parmi 
les 322 décisions d'approbation, 24 étaient 
assorties de charges et conditions, dont 12 
à l'issue d'une seconde phase d'examen 
approfondi. Ces statistiques montrent que 
la Commission a su s'acquitter d'une 
charge de travail considérable. Elles 
mettent également en évidence, mais j 'y 
ferai allusion ultérieurement, le fait que la 
Commission applique le règlement avec 
rigueur mais sans sevente excessive à 
l'égard des entreprises: en effet, le nombre 
d'interdictions, sans être négligeable 
(environ une par an) reste limité; quant 
aux décisions d'approbation sous charges 
et conditions, elles représentent moins de 
8% de l'ensemble des concentrations 
examinées, dont la moitié ont été adoptées 
sans recourir à une seconde phase 
d'examen approfondi, c'est-à-dire avec un 
minimum de contraintes pour les 
entreprises. 
TROIS DEFIS A RELEVER 
Il incombait à la Commission de relever 
plusieurs défis dans le cadre de 
l ' a p p l i c a t i o n du r è g l e m e n t 
"concentrations": d'abord, clairement 
affirmer la compétence exclusive que lui 
confère le règlement pour examiner les 
concentrations qui tombent dans son 
champ d'application tout en maintenant, 
selon les termes mêmes du règlement, une 
liaison étroite et constante avec les 
autorités nationales: ensuite, faire preuve 
d'efficacité et de rapidité dans la mise en 
oeuvre de procédures lourdes et 
complexes; enfin, adopter des décisions 
qui soient reconnues pour la qualité de 
leur motivation, fondées sur les critères du 
règlement et prenant en compte 
l'ensemble des politiques communautaires. 
Sur ces trois aspects, nombreux étaient 
ceux qui, lors de l'adoption du règlement. 
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mettaient en cause la capacité de la 
Commission à relever de tels défis: force est 
toutefois de reconnaître, à la lumière des 
développements intervenus depuis cinq ans, 
qu'ils s'étaient largement fourvoyés. 
UN SYSTEME DE REPARTITION 
DES COMPETENCES ENTRE 
COMMISSION ET ETATS 
MEMBRES 
Le règlement est fondé sur une répartition 
des compétences entre la Commission et les 
Etats membres. Un système de seuils, 
exprimés en termes de chiffre d'affaires des 
entreprises parties à la concentration, 
concrétise cette répartition: si la 
concentration répond à ces seuils, elle relève 
du règlement et par conséquent de la 
compétence exclusive de la Commission; 
dans le cas inverse, l'opération ne relève 
pas du règlement et sera traitée par les 
autorités nationales compétentes. Je 
reviendrai par la suite sur la pertinence des 
seuils actuels qui me semblent trop élevés 
pour refléter convenablement l'intérêt 
communautaire d'une opération et qui 
conduisent par conséquent les autorités 
nationales à traiter d'opérations qui seraient 
appréhendées plus efficacement par la 
Commission. Qu'il me soit simplement 
permis dans l'immédiat d'affirmer que la 
répartition des compétences, fruit du 
principe de subsidiarité, a bien fonctionné 
dans la pratique: aucun conflit n'a surgi, 
dans des cas concrets, entre la Commission 
et les Etats membres. 
La Commission a tenu à publier au Journal 
officiel du 31 décembre 1994 deux 
communications interprétatives qui résument 
sa pratique antérieure et relatives, l'une au 
calcul du chiffre d'affaires, l'autre à la 
notion d'entreprise concernée et qui 
permettent aux entreprises de déterminer si 
leur concentration relève du règlement. Les 
entreprises tiennent particulièrement au 
respect de ce principe de répartition des 
compétences, qui a comme corollaire le 
système du guichet unique selon lequel une 
seule autorité ­la Commission­ rend une 
décision unique valable pour l'ensemble de 
la Communauté. 
Une interprétation stricte des 
exceptions 
C'est une des raisons qui est à l'origine 
d'une interprétation stricte par la 
Commission des exceptions et des 
atténuations à ce principe que sont les 
articles 9 et 21 paragraphe 3 du règlement. 
L'article 9 qui autorise la Commission à 
renvoyer, sur demande, un cas notifié 
lorsque l'opération de concentration menace 
de créer ou de renforcer une position 
dominante à l'intérieur d'un Etat membre a 
été invoqué à neuf reprises, mais la 
Commission n'a accepté le renvoi qu'à trois 
occasions: dans l'affaire Steetley/Tarmac 
(marché des briques et des tuiles) à la 
demande du gouvernement britannique, dans 
l'affaire Me Cormick/CPC/Rabobank/OSTM 
(marché des épices et herbes culinaires) à la 
demande du gouvernement allemand et dans 
l'affaire Holdercim/Cedest (marché du 
béton) à la demande du gouvernement 
français. Ce faisant, la Commission a refusé 
de renvoyer des affaires, même lorsque le 
marché géographique pertinent était 
national, chaque fois que l'opération revêtait 
un intérêt communautaire ou bien parce que 
le marché de produit était émergent ou bien 
parce que la législation communautaire en 
vigueur en matière de marchés publics ou 
de normalisation devait conduire à terme à 
une ouverture des marchés. Tel fut 
notamment le cas dans les affaires récentes 
MSG Media Service et ABB/Daimler Benz. 
Une approche similaire prudente a été 
retenue par la Commission en ce qui 
concerne l'article 21 paragraphe 3 du 
règlement lequel permet à un Etat membre 
de prendre vis­à­vis d'une concentration 
notifiée des mesures additionnelles à celles 
envisagées par la Commission de manière à 
sauvegarder un intérêt légitime distinct de la 
protection de la concurrence. A deux 
reprises seulement un Etat membre a 
effectivement adopté de telles mesures: ce 
fut le cas du gouvernement français dans 
l'affaire IBM/CGI (protection de la sécurité 
publique) et du gouvernement britannique 
d a n s l ' a f f a i r e L y o n n a i s e d e s 
Eaux/Northumbrian Water (application de la 
législation spécifique en matière de 
distribution d'eau). Dans ces affaires, la 
Commission a en outre tenu à avoir 
communication des mesures adoptées par 
les Etats membres de manière à vérifier 
qu'elles répondaient aux principes 
d'adéquation, de proportionnalité et de non­
discrimination et étaient par ailleurs 
conformes au droit communautaire. 
De même, la Commission a, contrairement à 
d'autres domaines du droit communautaire, 
retenu une interprétation stricte de l'article 
223 du traité (protection des intérêts 
essentiels de la sécurité d'un Etat membre), 
lorsque celui­ci est invoqué pour soustraire 
une concent ra t ion de d imens ion 
communautaire de la compétence de la 
Commission: sur onze opérations relevant du 
règlement et relatives exclusivement ou 
principalement à la production de matériel 
militaire, seules trois n'ont pas été notifiées 
en raison de cette disposition, sur la base de 
critères clairement définis. Enfin, l'article 22 
du règlement permet à l'inverse à un Etat 
membre de demander à la Commission de 
traiter d'une concentration sans dimension 
communautaire. Si une telle disposition peut 
dans certains cas se révéler utile, notamment 
en l'absence de système de contrôle des 
concentrations dans 1' Etat membre concerné, 
il n'en reste pas moins qu'elle ne doit 
trouver application que dans des cas 
exceptionnels, compte tenu en particulier de 
l'insécurité juridique dans laquelle elle place 
les entreprises parties à l'opération. Seules 
deux concentrations ont été à ce titre 
examinées par la Commission à ce jour: la 
reprise de Dan Air par British Airways à la 
demande du gouvernement belge et la 
création d'une entreprise commune par RTL, 
Veronica et Endemol à la demande du 
gouvernement néerlandais. 
Coopération entre Commission et 
Etats membres 
Le strict respect du principe de répartition 
des compétences ne doit toutefois pas 
occulter la nécessité d'une coopération 
étroite entre la Commission et les autorités 
nationales. Dans sa pratique quotidienne, la 
Commission est bien souvent allée, dans ce 
domaine, très au­delà de ce que les textes lui 
imposaient. Les contacts informels entre les 
administrations compétentes des Etats 
membres et la Task Force "concentrations" 
se sont multipliés. La totalité des dossiers 
ont pu être consultés par les fonctionnaires 
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des Etats membres lorsqu'ils l'ont jugé 
nécessaire. La Commission a tiré parti des 
multiples observations qui ont pu être 
formulées dans le contexte de l'instruction 
des dossiers. Elle a quasiment toujours suivi 
l'avis du comité consultatif composé 
d'experts des Etats membres qui est 
obligatoirement réuni lorsqu'une seconde 
phase d'examen est ouverte. Elle a toujours 
choisi de publier cet avis en même temps 
que la décision finale. Elle continuera, dans 
le même esprit d'ouverture, de maintenir 
cette liaison étroite et constante avec les 
Etats membres qui est source 
d'enrichissement mutuel et qui concourt à la 
nécessaire transparence du processus 
décisionnel. 
UNE APPLICATION EFFICACE 
DES PROCEDURES DU 
REGLEMENT 
Le second défi auquel la Commission devait 
faire face était la nécessité d'appliquer avec 
efficacité des procédures lourdes et 
complexes. Sur ce plan aussi, il me semble 
que la Commission s'est convenablement 
acquitée de sa tâche. Si l'on exclut une 
erreur d'autant plus notable qu'elle fut 
dûment reconnue et assumée comme telle, 
toutes les décisions adoptées jusqu'à ce jour 
l'ont été dans le plein respect des brefs 
délais imposés, et ceci sans recourir à des 
artifices de procédure. Les entreprises 
disposent donc rapidement d'une complète 
sécurité juridique. La disponibilité et le 
professionnalisme des fonctionnaires en 
charge des dossiers sont en général 
unanimement reconnues. Lorsqu'elle le 
peut, la Commission tente de limiter 
l'ampleur des informations demandées: la 
pratique de la prénotification, qui donne 
l'occasion aux entreprises concernées 
d'avoir des entretiens informels et 
strictement confidentiels dès avant la 
notification permet en particulier de 
circonscrire les informations au strict 
nécessaire: la récente refonte du formulaire 
CO a prévu un système de notification 
simplifiée pour les opérations de moindre 
importance, l'allégement de certaines 
obligations de renseignements pour les 
aspects congloméraux et verticaux et 
l'obligation de fournir des documents déjà 
existants au sein des entreprises concernées. 
Dans un souci de transparence, la 
Commission rend systématiquement 
publiques toutes les décisions finales 
lesquelles font en outre l'objet d'un 
communiqué de presse et d'un résumé dans 
le bulletin mensuel d'activités des 
Communautés. C'est aussi notamment un 
souci de transparence qui a conduit la 
Commission à élargir les possibilités 
d'intervention des tiers, et en particulier des 
concurrents: ils reçoivent copie de la 
communication des griefs adressée aux 
parties, ont accès au dossier et peuvent 
demander à être conviés à l'audition, le tout, 
bien entendu, dans le plein respect du secret 
des affaires; ils sont en outre consultés 
lorsque des engagements sont susceptibles 
d'être demandés et, de manière à donner à 
cette consultation tout son sens, la 
Commission exige dorénavant des parties 
qu'elles formulent leurs propositions en 
matière d'engagements au plus tard un mois 
avant la date ultime de prise de décision. 
Par ailleurs, la Commission a codifié ces 
pratiques dans le cadre du nouveau 
règlement d'application et à l'occasion de 
l'élargissement du mandat du Conseiller 
auditeur. La Commission a également eu 
l'occasion d'accepter les engagements 
d'entreprises en première phase, c'est-à-dire 
sans recourir à la procédure longue des 
investigations approfondies, lorsque le 
problème de concurrence identifié s'est 
révélé clair, relativement limité par rapport 
à l'opération dans son ensemble et qu'il 
pouvait être résolu par des mesures simples. 
Toutefois, pour sauvegarder les droits des 
tiers et des Etats membres, la Commission 
prend soin ou bien de leur communiquer les 
projets d'engagements ou bien de les 
publier au Journal officiel suite au retrait de 
l'opération et de sa renotification sous une 
forme amendée. Les récentes affaires 
Repola/Kymenne et Swissair/Sabena 
illustrent la démarche de la Commission 
dans ce cadre. 
EVITER LA CREATION OU LE 
RENFORCEMENT D'UNE 
POSITION DOMINANTE 
Le but principal du règlement 
"concentrations" est d'empêcher la 
domination d'un marché par une ou 
plusieurs entreprises aux dépens, en dernière 
analyse, du consommateur final. Dans ce 
contexte, même si telle ou telle décision a pu 
être ponctuellement critiquée, il me semble 
que, dans l'ensemble, l'application du 
règlement faite par la Commission, a été 
généralement perçue comme positive. 
Un processus décisionnel adéquat 
Ceci est dû à mon avis en premier lieu au 
processus d'élaboration des décisions. En 
effet, loin de travailler en vase clos, la DG 
IV nourrit ses analyses d'enquêtes et 
d'investigations auprès des concurrents, 
clients et fournisseurs des parties à la 
concentration; en outre, elle intègre 
également les préoccupations des autres 
directions générales de telle manière à ce que 
le projet de décision soit cohérent avec 
l'ensemble des politiques communautaires 
pertinentes; enfin, l'adoption de la décision 
au niveau du commissaire responsable ou de 
l'ensemble des commissaires réunis en 
collège pour les affaires les plus importantes 
garantit qu'une appréciation politique des 
mesures proposées a été effectuée. Un tel 
système décisionnel est à mon sens le seul 
possible à l'heure actuelle compte tenu des 
sensibilités différentes des Etats membres en 
matière de droit de la concurrence. Il est 
essentiel en outre pour ne pas faire de ce 
droit une fin en soi mais un instrument au 
service du marché unique. Enfin, comme l'a 
reconnu le Tribunal de Première Instance 
dans ses arrêts récents dans les affaires T-
96/92 et T-12/93 (relatives à la décision 
Nestlé/Perrier), la priorité accordée, dans le 
cadre du règlement, à l'instauration d'un 
régime de libre concurrence peut, dans 
certains cas, être conciliée, dans le cadre de 
l'appréciation de la compatibilité d'une 
opération de concentration avec le marché 
commun, avec la prise en considération 
d'incidences de caractère social. 
Une analyse approfondie des 
conditions de concurrence 
On ne saurait toutefois en déduire que les 
décisions adoptées sont pauvres en matière 
d'analyse concurrentielle: bien au contraire, 
elles font preuve d'une connaissance 
approfondie des secteurs industriels ou de 
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services concernés et les notions sur 
lesquelles elles sont fondées (par exemple le 
concept de dominance oligopolistique 
depuis l'affaire Nestlé/Perrier ou celui de 
failing firm defence depuis le cas Kali und 
Salz/MdK/Treuhand) n'ont rien à envier aux 
systèmes de contrôle des concentrations les 
plus avancés. En revanche, il est exact que 
la Commission, contrairement peut­être à 
certaines autorités nationales, a une vision 
plus dynamique et moins figée du marché 
géographique pertinent, c'est­à­dire de la 
zone géographique sur laquelle s'exerce la 
concurrence: elle tient compte, dans ses 
analyses, de la concurrence potentielle des 
entreprises extérieures au marché 
géographique et des effets de la législation 
communautaire en matière de normalisation, 
de marchés publics et de liberté 
d'établissement, pour autant, bien entendu, 
que leur impact réel soit confirmé par les 
enquêtes effectuées. Tel a été le cas par 
exemple dans les affaires récentes 
Mercedes/Kassbhorer pour le marché des 
autobus et autocars et ABB/Daimler Benz 
pour le marché du matériel ferroviaire. Ce 
faisant, la Commission attache une 
importance moindre à une position 
dominante transitoire qu'à l'existence de 
barrières à l'entrée de toutes sortes qui 
verrouillent définitivement un marché. C'est 
ce qui explique que les décisions récentes 
d'interdiction dans les trois affaires MSG, 
Nordic Satellite et RTL/Veronica/Endemol 
soient intervenues là où l'intégration 
verticale des parties conduisait à de 
multiples positions dominantes, empêchant 
pour longtemps toute concurrence réelle sur 
des marchés émergents où de nouvelles 
technologies sont développées et dont la 
libéralisation est en cours. De même, dans 
les affaires aériennes, et singulièrement dans 
le cas Swissair/Sabena, la Commission a­t­
elle cherché, sur les routes où un monopole 
était créé, à permettre l'entrée de nouveaux 
concurrents. Enfin, il convient de signaler 
que la Commission s'attache à rechercher 
des remèdes adéquats et proportionnels aux 
problèmes rencontrés et, dans toute la 
mesure du possible, simples et structurels. 
Toutefois, si la complexité des situations 
rencontrées et la volonté de ne pas dans la 
mesure du possible remettre en cause une 
opération, rendent parfois difficile de 
qualifier de 'simples' et 'structurels' les 
engagements donnés par les entreprises, cela 
ne saurait être mis sur le compte d'une soi­
disant volonté de faire du "meccano 
industriel". 
LES AMELIORATIONS A 
APPORTER 
Le bilan auquel je viens de procéder serait 
toutefois incomplet s'il ignorait un certain 
nombre d'éléments insatisfaisants: les 
premiers relèvent uniquement de la 
Commission et c'est donc elle qui doit y 
porter remède; les seconds sont inhérents à 
la rédaction actuelle du règlement et il 
conviendrait donc de modifier ce dernier. A 
l'heure actuelle, une administration publique 
peut être considérée comme exerçant une 
autorité légitime que pour autant que son 
activité soit transparente, ce qui suppose une 
certaine prédictibilité de ses actes, que son 
processus décisionnel soit rapide et que ses 
décisions soient fondées. L'application, par 
la Commission, du règlement 
"concentrations" répond à ces exigences: 
toutefois, la Commission est consciente de 
certaines critiques en ces domaines et il 
convient de faire mieux encore. En ce qui 
concerne la transparence, la Commission 
envisage de publier, après consultations 
internes et externes à l'institution, de 
nouvelles communications interprétatives 
relatives à la méthodologie d'appréciation 
des opérations. En ce qui concerne la 
rapidité du processus décisionnel, elle pense 
réduire le délai d'adoption des décisions 
pour les opérations d'importance mineure. 
En ce qui concerne la motivation des 
décisions, la Commission recourra, plus que 
par le passé, aux techniques statistiques et 
économétriques. 
La révision du règlement 
Cependant, force est de constater, après cinq 
ans d'application du règlement, que c'est 
par des modifications législatives que le 
contrôle des concentrations communautaire 
pourrait être amélioré. En premier lieu, les 
seuils actuels reflètent imparfaitement 
l'intérêt communautaire d'une opération 
dans le sens où, pour des raisons de 
compromis politique, ils furent fixés 
arbitrairement à un niveau trop élevé lors de 
l'adoption du règlement. La Commission 
souhaiterait par conséquent les voir ramenés 
à 2 milliards d'écus en ce qui concerne le 
chiffre d'affaires mondial et à 100 millions 
d'écus en ce qui concerne le chiffre 
d'affaires communautaire. Ainsi seraient par 
conséquent évitées les notifications multiples 
que les entreprises sont parfois conduites à 
faire auprès des autorités nationales des Etats 
membres. Quoi qu'il en soit, si un 
abaissement des seuils n'était pas 
envisageable, il conviendrait de mettre en 
oeuvre un système qui permette d'éviter la 
notification d'une même opération à 
plusieurs autorités d'Etats membres et faire 
en sorte que, dans un tel cas, le régime de 
notification unique du règlement soit 
applicable. En second lieu, d'autres aspects 
du règlement mériteraient d'être revus: tel est 
le cas de la distinction entre entreprises 
communes concentratives et coopératives qui 
est d'un maniement délicat et qui a donné 
lieu, malgré les efforts de clarification 
récents à travers une nouvelle 
communication interprétative, à tant de 
critiques de la part de l'industrie; tel est 
également le cas du chiffre d'affaires des 
institutions financières dont la détermination 
est actuellement insatisfaisante; tel est enfin 
le cas d'autres dispositions plus mineures 
comme le renvoi d'un cas à une autorité 
nationale lorsque le marché géographique est 
local ou encore la période de suspension de 
la concentration. Enfin, la pratique des 
engagements de première phase mériterait 
d'être consacrée par une disposition 
explicite. Sur tous ces points, je proposerai 
prochainement à la Commission d'adopter un 
Livre vert destiné aux autres institutions 
communautaires, aux Etats membres et au 
monde des affaires. J'espère que les 
réactions que ne manquera pas de susciter ce 
Livre vert confirmeront le succès du 
règlement et aideront la Commission à 
élaborer des propositions concrètes 
permettant, au bénéfice de toutes les parties 
en présence, de remédier aux imperfections 
actuelles. 
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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS 
In this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important to 
recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. 
They have not been adopted or in any way approuved by the Commission and should not be relied upon 
as a statement of the Commission's or DG IV's views. 
The New Regulation on 
Motor Vehicle Distribution 
by Dieter SCHWARZ, Head of Unit, DG IV-F-2 
The new Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1475/95 (OJ L 145 of 29.6.1995, 
p.25) on the application of Article 85 
(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
motor vehicle distribution and servicing 
agreements has become applicable from 
1 October 1995 to all agreements on 
vehicle distribution and servicing 
existing on that day. The undertakings 
are given a period of one year to adapt 
their contracts to this Regulation. 
Therefore, after from 1 October 1996 
onwards, all selective and exclusive 
distribution agreements have to comply 
with the new Regulation. 
Experience has shown that the most 
important objectives of the old 
Regulation, namely the opening of 
national markets and the establishment 
of flexible and efficient distribution and 
servicing systems, has only been 
partially attained. In order to 
overcome the obvious weaknesses and 
to promote compet i t ion, the 
Commission decided not to create a 
entirely new Regulation, but to amend 
the existing Regulation (EEC) N° 
123/85, taking into account the 
requirements of the internal market and 
the European Union. 
The elaboration of the new Regulation 
by the Commission took place with 
wide-ranging public consultation from 
an early stage. This involved a long 
discussion with a broad range of 
interested parties, the Member States, 
which were in fact consulted twice, and 
the other institutions. In the course of 
this procedure the services of the 
Commission received a large number of 
submissions from European and national 
associations, undertakings including car 
manufacturers and dealers, as well as 
distributors of spare parts, resellers, 
independent repairers and consumer 
organizations. It also received comments 
from Members of Parliament, lawyers 
and other advisers. 
The European Parliament held a hearing 
at which various interested parties were 
invited to make their opinions known, 
and provided a Resolution to the 
Commission, in which it explicitly 
called on the Commission to ensure that 
the market for the supply of original 
spare parts be liberalized in tandem with 
the market for cars themselves, and the 
Economic and Social Committee 
communicated their positions on the 
draft of the new draft Regulation. 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the new Regulation is 
indeed to open up markets in terms of 
geography, products and competitors. In 
order to attain this aim, the Commission 
seeks above all: 
- to assure a greater commercial 
independence for dealers, most of 
which are small and medium-sized 
u n d e r t a k i n g s , as a g a i n s t 
manufacturers; 
- to facilitate access by independent 
spare-part manufacturers and dealers 
to the different markets and 
distribution channels, namely the 
official networks of the manufacturers; 
- to improve the situation of the final 
consumer pursuant to the principles of 
the interi il market; 
- to make the dividing line between 
permitted and prohibited clauses or 
behaviour clearer, and to reinforce the 
provisions of the Regulation in case of 
abuse. 
Some of these aims may already be 
commercial practice in certain Member 
states, in particular in those with less 
restrictions on multi-make dealerships 
and distribution of spare parts. 
MOST IMPORTANT 
AMENDMENTS CONTAINED IN 
REGULATION 1475/95 
The scope of the exemption 
First of all, it should be made clear thai 
the Regulation applies to the distribution 
and servicing of new motor vehicles and 
to the distribution of spare parts 
associated therewith. However, the 
separate distribution of replacement parts 
without any connection to the 
distribution of vehicles, is not covered 
by the Regulation. 
Forbidden clauses and practices 
As an important amendment, the 
Regulation contains, in its Article 6, a 
list of so-called "black clauses" which 
are prohibited and which, if included in 
an agreement, lead to the automatic loss 
of the benefit of the exemption. This 
would be the case if, for example, an 
dealer's agreement contains restrictions 
which go beyond those permitted, or if 
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the manufacturer has the unilateral right 
to alter the contract territory during the 
term of the agreement, or the right to 
appoint other dealers within the contract 
territory. 
The Regulation also enumerates so-
called "black practices", which, if 
committed systematically or repeatedly, 
lead to the automatic loss of the 
exemption. Such practices are, for 
example, where manufacturers fix, 
instead of merely recommend, resale 
prices, or where final consumers are 
directly or indirectly prevented from 
buying a vehicle whereever they wish in 
the Common Market, or where the 
manufacturer, without objective reason, 
makes the dealer's rebate dependent on 
the destination of the sale, or where the 
manufacturer interferes with the dealer 
buying spare parts of equal quality from 
a supplier of his choice, or where the 
manufacturer refuses to pass on 
technical information, required for the 
maintenance or repair of its vehicles, to 
independent repairers without justified 
reasons. I will come back to some of 
these examples later. 
Provisions in cases of abuse 
Experience has shown that the old 
Regulation did not always specify, in an 
appropriate manner, sanctions in the 
event of abuse. So as to overcome this 
problem and to bring the provisions into 
line with those in other block exemption 
Regulations, the new Regulation 
clarifies and reinforces the legal 
consequences of an abuse, which 
depend on whether it concerns "black 
clauses" or "black behaviour". 
In the event that a prohibited "black 
clause" is agreed by the parties, the 
exemption becomes automatically lost 
with regard to all restrictions of 
competition contained in the agreement, 
irrespective of whether they are in 
favour of the manufacturer or the 
dealer. These restrictions, which would 
normally be allowed under Articles 1 to 
4 of the Regulation, become 
automatically prohibited under Article 
85 (1) of the EC Treaty from the date 
of the agreement, and the parties can be 
fined by the Commission. 
The parties may notify an agreement 
containing "black clauses" and request 
an individual exemption. However, such 
exemption will only be granted in an 
exceptional situation, where it can be 
justified by the specific circumstances 
of an individual case. Such notification 
provides immunity from fines, unless 
and until the Commission finds that the 
agreement falls under the prohibition of 
Article 85 (1), and that an individual 
exemption under Article 85 (3) is not 
justified and decides to lift immunity 
from fines. 
In the case of "black behaviour", all 
restrictive clauses which benefit the 
party responsible for the black 
behaviour become void. The 
consequences are limited to the contract 
territory where the distortion of 
competition takes place; if a larger area 
is concerned, the exemption becomes 
lost for all distribution contracts 
concluded for this area. The benefit of 
the Regulation is lost as long as the 
misconduct lasts. 
This means in practice that, in cases 
where the manufacturer or importer is 
responsible for the "black behaviour", 
the dealers are released from all 
obligations which have been imposed 
on them. If prohibited practices have 
been imposed by one party (for example 
the manufacturer), but accepted by the 
other party (for example the dealer), 
such behaviour is considered as 
concerted practice prohibited under 
Article 85 ( 1 ). As in the case of "black 
clauses", the Commission can fine the 
parties, which may, again, request an 
individual exemption, which however is 
unlikely to be granted. 
Price differentials 
There are other circumstances in which 
the Commission may withdraw the 
benefit of the exemption. An example 
is where the distribution system leads, 
over a considerable period, to substantial 
differences in prices and sales conditions 
between Member s ta tes . The 
Commission has already published a 
Notice which explains what are 
acceptable and unacceptable price 
differentials. This note remains valid. 
Price differentials are partly a reflection 
of the particular play of supply and 
demand in the regions concerned. 
However, where price differentials are 
substantial, there is reason to suspect that 
national measures or private restrictive 
practices lie behind them. With this 
Regulation, the Commission has 
confirmed the conditions for intervention 
where price distortions are chiefly 
caused by restrictions of competition 
contained in distribution agreements. 
Where price differentials are chiefly 
caused by other factors, there will be no 
direct and automatic repercussion on the 
legal standing of the dealer contracts. An 
example of such factors are extremely 
high taxes and charges payable in a 
Member state, forcing manufacturers to 
keep net list prices low. However, 
European consumers should be free to 
buy in such countries any vehicle 
obtainable from dealers, in the 
specification required. If they are 
hindered in their freedom, a Commission 
proceeding for abuse of the exemption 
may follow. 
Multi-make approach 
With the aim of promoting 
competiveness of dealers, the new 
Regulation determines that the dealer 
must be given the right to sell more than 
one make. The manufacturer can 
however oblige the dealer to do this in 
separate sales premises, under separate 
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management, in the form of a distinct 
legal entity and in a manner which 
avoids confusion between the different 
makes. There may however be 
exceptions from these obligations if the 
dealer shows objective reasons 
justifying same. Such a reason would be 
where the obligations prevent the dealer 
from operating on an economically 
viable basis. 
Beside this, dealers are entitled to own, 
or to invest into, companies which 
belong to the network of competing 
manufacturers. A dealer may also 
appoint sub-agents, provided the 
manufacturer gives his prior consent, 
which he can only refuse by objectively 
valid reasons. Finally, it is not allowed 
that an agreement contains a clause 
imposing on the dealer to cooperate 
with a specific finance or insurance 
company. 
As concerns repair of different makes, 
the dealer cannot be obliged to have 
separate workshops. On the other hand, 
a manufacturer may request his dealers 
to assure that third parties 
(e.g.competitors) do not unduly benefit 
from investments made by him in 
equipment or personnel. 
Sales targets, and purchase and 
stock requirements 
The new Regulation lays down that 
sales targets, the number of exposition 
vehicles and purchase and stock 
requirements can only be fixed by 
agreement between the manufacturer 
and the dealer. In the case of 
disagreement on the annual figures of 
such minimum requirements, the matter 
must be referred to an expert third 
party. Minimum requirements for a 
shorter period may only be of an 
indicative nature. If they are made 
binding, this may result in an automatic 
loss of the benefit of the group 
exemption. 
Parallel trade in new motor vehicles 
by dealers 
Currently, motor vehicle distribution is 
still based on a national concept. This is 
illustrated by the persistence of price 
differences between Member states, 
which cannot only be attributed to 
differences in consumer taste or 
behaviour or to exchanges rate 
flucatuations. Furthermore, there is 
virtually no trade between members of 
one and the same network. 
In order to promote intra-brand 
competition within distribution 
networks, the Regulation prohibits any 
restrictions on dealers on selling to, or 
purchasing from, other authorised 
dealers within the Common Market. 
Consequently, the dealer may not be 
obliged to purchase exclusively from 
the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
may however oblige his dealers not to 
sell vehicles to a reseller who does not 
belong to its distribution network. 
Conditions for the duration, and 
for regular and early termination 
of dealer's agreements 
The provisions of the old Regulation 
have created a serious imbalances to the 
detriment of dealers, above all in 
countries where contracts were 
concluded for an indefinite period and 
with a one year's period of notice and 
without compensation in case of regular 
termination. Consequently, dealers had 
no sufficient protection for their 
investments and manufacturers were not 
obliged to give reasons for a 
termination. 
In order to improve the balance, the 
new Regulation provides that 
distribution agreements may be 
concluded for a definite, or for an 
indefinite, period. The minimum term of 
the former is five years. The fixed term 
agreement should contain a clause 
requiring each party to give the other at 
least six months notice if one of the 
parties does not want to renew the 
contract. If the term of the agreement is 
indefinite, the period of notice for 
termination is two years. Agreements can 
be terminated on one year's notice, if the 
manufacturer undertakes to pay damages 
or if the agreement is concluded with a 
newcomer to the network. 
The new Regulation also provides for an 
early termination of dealer's contracts 
in two cases: the manufacturer may 
terminate the agreement by one year's 
notice (instead of two years in case of 
regular termination) when he sees the 
need for a substantial restructuring of his 
network. However, it is required that the 
parties agree on the necessity of 
restructuring (including on whether it is 
substantial), either voluntarily or by an 
expert third party or an arbitrator. In 
case the manufacturer provides for 
himself unilateral rights of early 
termination which exceed the limits set 
by the Regulation, he automatically loses 
the benefit of the exemption. 
The possibility of early termination has 
been introduced to provide the 
manufacturer with an instrument for 
flexible adaptation to changes in 
distribution structures. This may be 
required if competitors alter their 
behaviour, or due to other economic 
developments affecting the contract 
territory. 
Secondly, the new Regulation maintains 
the right for either party to terminate an 
agreement at any time without prior 
notice, where the other party fails to 
perform one of its basic obligations. One 
reason for early termination might be 
where a party infringes contractual 
obligations allowed under Articles 1 to 4 
of the Regulation. 
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Referral to an expert third party or 
an arbitrator, and the respective 
procedure 
Both parties should refer to an expert 
third party or an arbitrator when they 
disagree on annual sales targets, 
permanent stock requirements, or the 
number of demonstration vehicles. 
Recourse to an expert third party or an 
arbitrator is also provided for in the 
case of an early termination of an 
agreement. The parties are free to 
decide whether they wish to refer to an 
expert third party or an arbitrator, and 
to choose such a procedure also in other 
cases of dispute. 
Any qualified person (or persons) 
accepted by both parties may be 
appointed as expert third party or 
arbitrator. It seems advisable that the 
contract specifies what kind of 
nomination procedure is to be used in 
cases of dispute. The procedure of using 
first an expert third party or an 
arbitrator, which, in the Commission's 
opinion, should assure a quick an 
efficient dispute settlement, does 
however not prevent either party of 
applying to a national court to the 
extent that this is allowed under national 
law. 
Direct sales to final consumers 
Manufacturers remain free to supply 
final customers in the contract territory 
with vehicles, and to provide servicing, 
unless the contract contains a clause 
obliging the manufacturer not to do so. 
On the other hand, customer restrictions 
may not be imposed on the dealer and 
would, if contained in an agreement, 
lead to the automatic loss of the 
exemption. Moreover, manufacturers 
should take care not to affect, by such 
direct sales, the economic viability of 
the dealers' businesses. 
Market access for independent 
spare part producers and 
extension of dealers' sources of 
supply 
The Commission's experience shows 
that manufacturers may try to preserve 
the markets for spare-parts. In order to 
assure that independent spare-part 
producers can effectively compete on 
maintenance and repair markets, which 
is in the interest of both dealers and 
consumers, the Regulation entitles 
dealers to out-source spare-part 
supplies, provided that those spare parts 
match the quality of the original parts. 
Accordingly, manufacturers may prevent 
dealers from using spare parts of lower 
quality for repair or maintenance of 
vehicles. Dealers are however free to 
buy spare parts which do not compete 
with the manufacturer's original parts. 
The manufacturer may oblige its dealers 
to inform customers about the use of 
spare parts from other sources, in repair 
and maintenance work; in a general 
manner before repair work has been 
undertaken and in a more specific 
manner after completion of the repair 
and maintenance work. 
Pursuant to the Regulation, all spare 
parts coming from the same source of 
production are deemed to have the same 
quality, irrespective of whether they are 
supplied to the manufacturer or to other 
parties. Should a dealer have doubts in 
certain cases, he should ask the spare-
part supplier for clarification. For 
guarantee work, free servicing and 
vehicle-recall work, the manufacturer 
may oblige its dealers to use original 
parts. 
It has to be noted that oil and other 
liquids, as well as accessories, are not 
considered as spare parts in the meaning 
of the Regulation. Consequently, dealers 
are free to obtain such items whereever 
they wish, and any restriction imposed 
by the manufacturer on his dealers, or 
any inclusion of those parts in their 
dealer's agreement, will result in the 
automatic loss of the group exemption. 
For the purpose of calculating discounts 
to be granted to their dealers, the 
manufacturer must distinguish between 
discounts given: a) for the sale of motor 
vehicles, b) for spare parts which the 
dealer can only obtain through the 
distribution network, and c) for other 
spare parts which are also available from 
independent suppliers. This is to avoid 
that manufacturers give higher discounts 
on aggregated quantities of goods 
purchased, so that no other spare-part 
producer or supplier could compete. 
The rights granted by the Regulation to 
independent suppliers of spare parts, to 
resellers belonging to the same 
distribution network, and to resellers 
using spare parts for repair and 
maintenance, are safeguarded by the 
"black list" of Article 6. The 
manufacturer may not restrict spare-part 
producers from supplying products of 
matching quality to dealers and resellers, 
nor hinder such producers to place their 
trade mark or logo on their products. 
Easier access by independent 
repairers to technical information 
In order to enable independent garage 
owners to better compete with members 
of the manufacturer's network in the 
area of repair and maintenance, the 
manufacturers will now be obliged to 
make relevant technical information 
accessible, provided that this information 
is not protected by intellectual property 
rights, and does not constitute identified, 
substantial and secret know-how. The 
necessary technical information may not 
be withheld in a discriminatory or 
abusive manner. The manufacturer may 
request a reasonable payment for this 
information. 
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Right of a consumer to buy a motor 
vehicle in any Member state 
The consumers' freedom to purchase 
anywhere in the Common Market is one 
of the fundamental achievements of the 
E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y . T h e 
Commission's experience shows, 
however, that consumers often face 
difficulties in buying a car elsewhere in 
the Common market. Intra-brand 
competition has therefore remained 
largely non-efficient. 
Since it should be in the interest of any 
dealer to maximise sales, a dealer may 
not refuse to sell, or ask for a higher 
price, simply because the consumer is a 
resident of another Member state. The 
consumer may also not be obliged to 
complete more documentation than is 
normally and lawfully required in the 
Member state where the vehicle is to be 
bought. A final consumer who 
authorises an intermediary to act on his 
behalf, is given the same rights as if he 
personnally concluded a contract. The 
required written mandate must enable 
the dealer to identify the final 
consumer, and shall, on the dealer's 
request, enable identification of the 
intermediary. 
The manufacturer, supplier or other 
undertaking within the manufacturer's 
network who directly or indirectly 
restricts the freedom of final consumers, 
authorised intermediaries or authorised 
dealers to obtain a new motor vehicle 
from whichever authorised dealer they 
choose within the Common Market will 
automatically lose the benefit of the 
exemption. A final consumer may sell 
the motor vehicle at any time, provided 
that he is not a disguised independent 
reseller. A manufacturer may 
consequently not impose any restrictions 
on the consumer in this respect. 
Dealers are free to fix resale prices and 
discounts. If a manufacturer interferes 
with such freedom, he automatically 
loses the benefit of the exemption. 
Additionally, a manufacturer may not 
base rebates or other discounts to the 
dealer on the destination of the sale, 
without having objective reasons. 
As one of the basic aims of the new 
Regulation is the promotion of flexible 
supply and demand, dealers must be 
free to attract customers from outside 
their contract terr i tory. The 
manufacturer may only prevent the 
dealer from personalised advertising 
outside his contract territory. 
Finally, the dealer is entitled to offer 
leasing contracts to customers under the 
provisions of the Regulation. The 
manufacturer may however prevent the 
dealer from supplying vehicles to 
leasing companies which are disguised 
resellers. Since leasing contracts which 
involve a transfer of ownership are in 
reality sales contracts, the leasing 
company are in such cases treated as a 
reseller. 
Honouring of producer's warranty 
and normal servicing 
Any undertaking belonging to the 
network which distributes a vehicle has 
to carry out warranty and servicing 
works, irrespective of where the vehicle 
was bought, provided it originated from 
the network within the Common 
Market. It has to be noted that the 
manufacturer's warranty begins to run 
after the vehicle has left the distribution 
network. Consequently, a consumer 
purchasing a vehicle from an 
independent reseller should be aware 
that part of the warranty period may 
already have expired. Any impedement 
to honour warranty and normal 
servicing leads to the automatic loss of 
the benefit of the exemption. 
Explanatory Brochure 
Finally, attention shall be drawn to the 
"Explanatory Brochure" on the new 
Regulation, available in all Community 
languages from DG IV/F-2 and the 
Commission Offices in the different 
Member States. This guide is designed to 
promote a better understanding of the 
provisions of the new Regulation by all 
interested parties, and to facilitate the 
adaptation of existing contracts or the 
drafting of new contract in accordance 
with the requirements of the new 
Regulation. To date, about 6,800 copies 
of the brochure have been sent out. 
It is also intended to provide consumers 
with information on how the Regulation 
guarantees their freedom to buy a car 
anywhere in the Common Market in 
accordance with the principles of the 
single market. 
The brochure has been prepared in a 40 
questions-and-answers format in non-
technical language intended to respond 
to practical questions which may arise 
while applying the Regulation. 
Comments made by interested parties, 
who were invited by the Commission to 
send in their queries, were very helpful 
in the preparation of the brochure (to 
obtain the brochure see the 
Documentation Section for details). 
Future outlook 
The Commission will regularly monitor 
the implementation of the Regulation, 
notably as to its effects on car price 
differences between Member states. In 
any event, the Commission is required to 
produce a report on the functioning of 
the Regulation at the latest by 31 
December 2000, that is two years before 
its expiry. 
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Application of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between 1st August and 31st December 1995 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Joos STRAGIER, DG IV-A-1 
(1) cannot therefore be justified solely on 
the grounds that the introduction of a 
certification system as such fits in with 
the Commission certification policy. 
CERTIFICATION : THE DUTCH 
CRANE-HIRE CASE 
In its decision of 29 November 1995, the 
Commission imposed fines (The 
immunity from fines resulting from the 
notifications by FNK and SCK in early 
1992 was withdrawn under Articles 15 
(6) by Commission Decision 94/272/EC 
of 13 April 1994, OJ L 117 of 7.5.1994) 
on FNK and SCK for infringements of 
Article 85 (1) on the Dutch crane-hire 
market. 
FNK (Federatie van Nederlandse 
Kraanverhuurbedrijven - Federation of 
Dutch Crane-hire companies) is an 
association of Dutch firms which hire out 
mobile cranes. SCK (Stichting 
Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf 
Foundation Certification crane-hire 
business) was set up on the initiative of 
FNK in order to guarantee, through a 
certification system, the quality of cranes 
and equipment used in the crane-hire 
business. Most of the near 200 firms 
which participate in SCK, are also 
members of FNK. 
Crane-hirers hire themselves at a large 
scale extra cranes from other crane-hirers 
as a means of equipment rationalization 
and optimum capacity utilization. FNK 
members and SCK certificate-holders 
represent between 50% and 80% of the 
Dutch market. 
The Commission has been concerned 
about two elements of FNK/SCK's crane-
hire business. 
In the first place, until 1992, FNK's rules 
contained a system of recommended 
prices for the hiring out of cranes. 
Furthermore, these prices and the prices 
which were applied between members for 
the hiring of extra cranes, were regularly 
discussed between companies hiring out 
cranes of certain categories. FNK was 
involved in these discussions. The 
Commission found that FNK's system of 
jointly recommended and internal prices 
clearly infringes Article 85 (1). 
Secondly, the SCK certificate-holders 
were prohibited to hire cranes from firms 
which are not affiliated to SCK. The 
Commission considered that if such a ban 
is associated with a certification system 
which is completely open, independent 
and transparent and provides for the 
acceptance of equivalent guarantees from 
other systems, it may be argued that it 
has no restrictive effects on competition 
but is simply aimed at fully guaranteeing 
the quality of the certified goods or 
services. However, it was found that, in 
this case, the hiring ban is caught by the 
prohibition of Article 85 (1) since the 
SCK system was not really open and 
does not permit the acceptance of 
equivalent guarantees of other systems. 
The Commission concluded that the ban 
not only restricted the freedom of action 
of affiliated firms, but also considerably 
impeded access by third parties to the 
Dutch market. 
In its decision, the Commission indicated 
that while the Commission's policy on 
certification allows scope for private-law 
certification systems that are designed to 
provide supplementary monitoring of 
compliance with statutory provisions, 
such systems should be in accordance 
with the competition rules. Restrictions of 
competition that are caught by Article 85 
PARALLEL IMPORTS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
ORGANON 
ORGANON is a British subsidiary of 
AKZO (Netherlands) which specializes in 
the manufacture and marketing of 
contraceptive pills. 
On 4 Mai 1994, ORGANON changed the 
price regime applicable to MERCILON 
and MARVELON, the latter being one of 
the best known contraceptive pills in the 
world with substantial market shares 
throughout the European Union. Before 
that date, ORGANON applied a discount 
of 12.5 % on all products supplied to its 
customers irrespective of their final 
destination. The new price regime 
differentiated between those pills to be 
sold in the UK and those intended for 
export. Only the former ones could further 
benefit from the 12.5 % discount rate. 
ORGANON informed all British 
wholesalers with export activities of these 
new price conditions. In fact, wholesalers 
could only receive the rebate if they were 
able to prove that the relevant orders were 
destinated for the local market and that 
they would not be reexported. Wholesalers 
with distribution activities mainly on the 
sole British market, were also invited by 
letter not to supply products at the British 
price including the rebate to other 
wholesalers which may reexport these 
products. 
Following three complaints and 
ORGANON's notification of the new 
pricing system, the Commission initiated 
proceedings against Organon on 24 
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August 1995 and sent a Statement of 
Objections. In particular, the Commission 
found that the new price regime, which 
forms part of continuous business 
relations between ORGANON and its 
wholesalers, and therefore constitutes an 
agreement in the meaning of Article 85 
(1), clearly constitutes a serious 
infringement of Community competition 
rules in that it created a discrimination in 
the prices of the products according to 
their geographical destination. The 
Commission indicated that it intends to 
adopt a decision pursuant to Article 15 
(6) of Regulation 17 withdrawing the 
immunity from fines brought about by 
notification. 
For the Commission, the discriminatory 
pricing behaviour of ORGANON has 
important effects, in particular on the 
sales of MARVELON in the Netherlands. 
In this country, the MARVELON pill of 
Dutch origin is not fully reimbursed by 
the social security scheme, while the 
British MARVELON pill, given its lower 
price, is fully reimbursable. Dutch 
consumers can take advantage of this 
price difference by opting for UK 
MARVELON, which relieves them from 
paying an extra amount above the 
reimbursement price. 
However, by letter of 28 September 
1995, ORGANON informed the 
Commission that it was withdrawing the 
new price regime which the Commission 
had opposed to and that the previous 
price conditions would apply from 1 
October 1995. While disagreeing with the 
Commission's findings, the company 
indicated that, in the meantime, it is in 
the process of preparing a future new 
pricing system. 
The Commission therefore suspended its 
proceedings and reserved the right to 
examine ORGANON's forthcoming 
pricing system with the competition rules. 
By its proceedings, the Commission has 
been able to restore the status quo ante. 
Consumers can thus once again enjoy the 
benefits of parallel trade within the 
European Union, as they were able to do 
before Organon introduced its 
discriminatory pricing scheme. 
COMMISSION APPROVES 
REGIONAL AIRCRAFT JOINT 
VENTURE 
Aérospatiale and Alenia, already 
integrated within ATR, and British 
Aerospace notified to the Commission an 
agreement on the setting-up of a joint 
venture. The ultimate objective of the 
project is to merge the parties' regional-
aircraft activities. These include the 
product range manufactured by ATR 
(Avions de Transport Régional), in 
particular the ATR 42 and 72 turboprops, 
and BAe's Jetstream turboprop operation 
and the Avrò regional jets business. 
The Commission concluded first that the 
operation was not a concentration 
covered by the Merger Regulation, but 
that it would be examined under 
Regulation 17. 
In the first stage of the operation, the 
parties will pool and rationalize services 
provided direct to customers, such as 
marketing and after-sales service. In 
addition, the parties have set up a single 
pilot-instruction centre in Naples and 
will jointly carry out feasibility studies 
for new aircraft in this sector. The joint 
venture is also responsable for R&D 
activities. 
The Commission authorized the joint 
venture agreement on 18 August by 
means of a comfort letter which is valid 
for a period of five years. 
Improvement of production or 
distribution and promotion of 
technical or economic progress 
The improvement of production and 
distribution and the promotion of 
technical or economic progress is 
essentially linked with the final stage of 
full financial and industrial integration of 
the parties' businesses, and the 
development and production of new 
regional aircraft. 
In that respect, the joint venture represents 
an important stage in the process of 
restructuring the regional aircraft industry 
in Europe which is characterised by 
existing overcapacity. The joint venture 
will present an industrial and financial 
structure which is healthier and better 
adapted to the exigencies of the market. 
The unified and rationalised marketing, 
sales and customer support teams for the 
existing regional aircraft of the parties and 
the creation of a single integrated 
European training centre for pilots, 
together with the rationalisation of spare 
logistics services during the pre-merger 
period are to be considered as important 
steps to the proposed merger. Already in 
that stage the development of technical 
progress will be attained by the pooling of 
engineering and technical knowledge from 
different design offices for the preliminary 
design, which will be managed by the 
engineering team of the joint venture in 
the predevelopment phase. 
Fair share of the resulting benefit for 
consumers 
The level of customer service will 
improve through integration of the 
existing teams and through assimilation of 
"best practice" operations, which will also 
enhance the safety of the passengers. 
A wider package of aircraft types will be 
offered which presents opportunities for 
consequential commercial benefits in 
negotiations between the sales force and 
their customers. Moreover the customer 
will benefit from the harmonisation of 
training systems in a single facility, the 
harmonised spare logistics system, the 
larger experience in product development 
and support activities and a wider network 
of market representation. 
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Indispensable restrictions 
The integration of the marketing aspects 
of the existing businesses is necessary to 
create the operating structure needed for 
gradual full industrial integration, 
including the development and production 
in common of new aircraft, which the 
parties plan for a later stage of the joint 
venture. As such, the commercial 
integration in the first stage is an 
indispensable restriction of competition 
for the attainment of the benefits which 
will result from the fuller integration 
process. 
The same is valid for the non-competition 
clause, whereby the parties refrain from 
activities competing with the joint 
venture in the regional aircraft business. 
Elimination of competition 
The formation of the joint venture does 
not significantly change the existing 
market situation, as the product range of 
the parties is complementary. Hence, no 
elimination of competition arises in 
relation to the overall market. 
However, in the 60+ seat turboprop 
segment the joint venture will be offering 
100% of the planes now available, 
because the only model now offered in 
this segment is the ATR 72. This is the 
result of the announcement by BAe in 
January 1995 of the cessation of the 
ATP/J61 programme. The evidence given 
to the Commission allows it to conclude 
that the withdrawal of British 
Aerospace's ATP/J6I aircraft was, for 
commercial reasons, unavoidable. 
Furthermore, it should be taken into 
consideration that this segment accounts 
for only 10% of the orders for 
lurboprops. In the segment itself, new 
entries into the market arc expected. One 
prospective entrant was present at the last 
Paris Airshow (Dc Havilland Dash 
8-400). 
For all these reasons, the Commission 
authorized the cooperation for a limited 
period ending on 6 June 2000, thus 
allowing itself to review the situation if, 
following the feasibility studies, the 
parties decide not to develop, produce or 
launch the programmes for new aircraft, 
maintaining their cooperation in the areas 
of sales and after-sales service. 
TELECOMS 
The ongoing liberalisation and 
deregulation processes of the 
telecommunications sector, together with 
the increasing convergence of 
telecommunications, information 
technologies and media, have resulted in 
a wave of new alliances and partnerships 
that have been announced or 
implemented. 
Strategic alliances, between incumbent 
Telecommunications Operators (TOs) 
moving into global markets, are one type 
of such alliances. The Concert joint 
v e n t u r e b e t w e e n B r i t i s h 
Telecommunications and the US MCI 
Corporation was the first major télécoms 
strategic alliance which the Commission 
dealt with and it was granted an 
exemption under Article 85 (3). 
[Commission Decision of 27 July 1994, 
OJ L 223 of 27.8.94] 
ATLAS/PHOENIX 
On 15 December 1995, the Commission 
published two Notices pursuant to Article 
19 (3) of Regulation 17 [OJ C 337 of 
15.12.95] indicating that it intends to take 
a favourable position and inviting third 
parties to send their observations with 
respect to the Atlas and Phoenix strategic 
alliances. 
The Atlas agreement, notified to the 
Commission on 16 December 1994, 
differs from the BT-MCI alliance in two 
important ways : firstly, the domestic 
component of the services offered is much 
stronger than the global elements planned, 
and secondly, the home markets of the 
parties (France and Germany) are less 
liberalised than the home markets of BT 
and MCI (UK and US). 
The Atlas transaction brings about a joint 
venture between the French and German 
public telecommunications operators, 
France Telecom (FT) and Deutsche 
Telekom (DT) respectively. Atlas is also 
the instrument of DT and FT's 
participation in the second transaction, 
named Phoenix, with Sprint Corporation, 
which was notified on 29 June 1995. 
Atlas targets on two separate product 
m a r k e t s f o r v a l u e - a d d e d 
telecommunications services, namely the 
market for advanced telecommunications 
services to corporate users and the market 
for standardized low-level packet-switched 
data communications services. The 
broader Phoenix alliance will address the 
same markets for value-added 
telecommunications network services and 
also the market for traveller services and 
the market for so-called carrier's carrier 
services. 
The Atlas/Phoenix arrangements raised a 
number of concerns from a competition 
point of view, in particular with respect to 
the home markets of the EU partners to 
the transactions, where FT and DT hold 
legal and de facto dominant positions with 
r e s p e c t t o a n u m b e r of 
telecommunications services and the 
provision of infrastructure. It was argued 
therefore that competition could be 
eliminated and the positive effects of 
future full liberalization be endangered. In 
response hereto, the parties to the 
alliances as well as the French and 
German Governments have undertaken 
certain amendments and commitments to 
address these concerns. They relate 
amongst others to the non-integration into 
Atlas of the domestic French and German 
public switched data networks before full 
liberalization of the telecommunications 
infrastructure and services markets, the 
non-discriminatory access to these 
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networks, and the avoidance of cross-
subsidization. However, the main 
commitment made by the governments 
was that the use of alternative 
telecommunications infrastructure for the 
p r o v i s i o n of l i b e r a l i z e d 
telecommunications services (i.e. not 
basic voice) will be liberalized as of 1 
July 1996. Without such liberalization, 
competition in the area of data 
communications would also be 
endangered or eliminated in other 
Member States by the alliance between 
the Union's largest telecommunications 
organizations. Full liberalization, i.e. 
including basic voice and infrastructure, 
will take place on 1 January 1998. 
a Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of 
Regulation 17 [OJ C 304 of 15.11.95] 
that it intends to take a positive attitude 
towards the creation of a joint venture 
which will finance, construct and operate 
the Inmarsat-P system as well as towards 
the services agreement governing the 
relationship between Inmarsat and the 
joint venture. 
ETSI ¡PR Policy 
The Commission issued a negative 
clearance-type comfort letter with respect 
to ETSI's (European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute) Interim IPR Policy. 
alia, toner cartridges for printers and 
photocopiers against Kyocera, a Japanese 
manufacturer of computer printers. Pelikan 
manufactures and sells toner cartridges for 
use with Kyoccra's printers which 
compete directly with the cartridges 
produced by Kyocera itself. Pclikan's 
complaint alleged a number of practices 
by Kyocera to drive Pelikan out of this 
market and alleged that these constituted 
restrictive arrangements between Kyocera 
and its dealers and/or abuses of a 
dominant position by Kyocera. 
By a decision of 22 September 1995, this 
complaint was rejected. The Commission 
found that Kyocera did not infringe 
Article 85 nor Article 86. 
On the basis hereof, the Commission 
indicated that it is ready to take a 
positive view to the Atlas and Phoenix 
agreements. 
Global Mobile Satellite Systems 
Another form of strategic alliance in the 
télécoms sector are the big consortia 
which are formed to offer mobile satellite 
telecommunications services on a 
worldwide basis. 
The Commission has launched an in-
depth and comprehensive examination of 
these newly emerging global satellite 
systems. 
In this sector it is unlikely that there will 
be more than a few market players, all of 
which are consortia whose members are 
sharing the risks involved. It is therefore 
essential that competition in safeguarded 
in the downstream markets involved, 
namely local service provision, 
distribution and equipment supply. 
Examples of these consortia which the 
Commission is screening are Inmarsat-P, 
Iridium, Globalstar and Odyssey. 
With respect to Inmarsat-P - a system 
sponsored by the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization and a large number 
of its Signatories, including several EU 
public TOs - the Commission indicated in 
The intellectual property rights 
arrangements which ETSI developed and 
notified to the Commission, provided that 
members would agree in advance to 
allow their IPRs to be included in a given 
ETSI standard, unless the IPR owner had 
identified any IPR it wished to withhold 
within a fixed period. In addition, the 
arrangements contained specific 
provisions regarding the terms of the 
licenses to be granted, such as the 
obligation for licensors to accept 
monetary compensation, unless the 
licensee agreed to grant cross-licenses. 
However, following a complaint alleging 
that the arrangements amounted to a 
compulsory licensing system, ETSI 
modified its arrangements which do not 
any longer contain provisons relating to 
compulsory or automatic licensing, or to 
specific licensing terms. 
After having published a Notice pursuant 
to Article 19 (3) of Regulation 17 [OJ C 
76 of 28.3.95] with respect to the 
modified Interim IPR Policy, the 
Commission concluded this case 
positively. 
S E C O N D A R Y M A R K E T S : 
PELIKAN/KYOCERA 
This case arose from a complaint by 
Pelikan, a German manufacturer of, inter 
With respect to Article 86, the 
Commission found that Kyocera did not 
enjoy a dominant position on any relevan! 
market and that even if it did there was no 
evidence of behaviour that could then be 
considered abusive. It is of particular 
interest to note that the Commission did 
not find that Kyocera enjoyed a dominant 
position in the market for consumables for 
Kyocera printers despite its large market 
share on this market. This was because 
Kyocera was subject to intense 
competition on the "primary" market - that 
for printers- and circumstances on the 
market were such that this competition 
also restrained its behaviour on the 
"secondary" market for printer 
consumables. Purchasers of printers were 
well informed about the price charged for 
consumables and appeared to take this 
into account in their decision to purchase 
a printer. The useful life of a printer and 
the balance between the capital cost of a 
printer and the total cost of consumables 
for that printer over its useful life were 
such that consumers would have a strong 
incentive to switch printer brand if the 
price of consumables for that brand were 
raised. The complexity and cost of 
printers was such that the costs of 
switching from one brand to another are 
not excessive. 
This analysis obviously implies that there 
are circumstances where a manufacturer 
may enjoy a dominant position in a 
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secondary market for consumables or 
services for its own primary products. 
CROSS-BORDER CREDIT 
TRANSFERS 
In September the Commission adopted a 
notice on the application of the EC 
competition rules to cross-border credit 
transfers [OJ C 322 of 19.11.95]. 
In general, the Commission takes a 
positive view to cooperation agreements 
between banks that in particular enable 
them to improve the cross-border credit 
transfer services offered by banks to their 
customers. This cooperation should not, 
however, go so far as to eliminate 
competition between banks. 
The notice addresses two issues : market 
entry, and price competition. 
Concerning market entry, the 
Commission wishes to ensure that smaller 
banks are not unfairly excluded from 
systems which are an essential facility to 
be able to offer cross-border credit 
transfers to their customers. 
With respect to price competition, the 
notice distinguishes between agreements 
between banks fixing the level of 
customer fees, and inter-bank pricing 
agreements. The former are not allowed, 
while multilaterally agreed interchange 
fees ie, collectively agreed transaction 
fees paid by one bank (here typically the 
sender's bank or its correspondent bank) 
to another bank (the beneficiary's bank) 
fall under Article 85 (1), but they can be 
exempted under certain conditions. 
LENIENCY PROGRAM 
The Commission has indicated that it 
intends to issue a notice concerning the 
non-imposition or mitigation of fines in 
cases where undertakings cooperate in the 
preliminary investigation or proceedings in 
respect of an infringement. Before 
adopting the notice, the Commission 
invited all interested persons to submit 
their observations on the Commission's 
draft notice [OJ C 341 of 19.12.95]. 
The Commission considers that the 
interests of consumers and citizens in 
ensuring that secret price-fixing and 
market-sharing cartels are detected and 
prohibited outweigh the interest in fining 
those companies which cooperate with the 
Commission, thereby enabling or helping 
it to detect and prohibit a cartel. 
Press releases issued on the most 
important developments 
BOSMAN CASE 
Speaking to the Social Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament Commissioner 
Flynn set out the Commission's position on 
the European Court of Justice ruling in the 
Bosman case (see also IP/95/1411). 
In particular, he commented on press reports 
on UEFA's reaction concerning the impact 
of the judgement on the European-level club 
competitions that it organises. He said "the 
Court's ruling was clear. The restrictions on 
the number of EU players that clubs can 
play - the so called 3+2 rule - are outlawed. 
I have been surprised to read in the press the 
view that the 3+2 rule may remain valid for 
the European-level club competitions. This 
interpretation seems to me to be clearly 
contrary to the Court's ruling." 
The Court ruled that: "Article 48 of the EEC 
Treaty precludes the application of rules laid 
down by sporting associations under which, 
in matches in competitions which they 
organize, football clubs may field only a 
limited number of professional players who 
are nationals of other Member States". 
The Court also said that nationality 
restrictions can be accepted only for matches 
between national teams, on grounds which 
are of sporting interest. 
Mr Flynn said: "It is clear to me that, from 
now on, nationality restrictions are illegal in 
European-level club competitions. I expect 
those affected to take the necessary steps to 
change their rules to comply with the Court's 
ruling. In any event, all those affected should 
be aware that this ruling has immediate and 
direct effect." [IP/95/1425] 
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL : 
EUROPEAN COURT RULES IN 
THE BOSMAN CASE : FIRST 
REACTION BY COMMISSIONERS 
PADRAIG FLYNN AND KAREL 
VAN MIERT 
The Commission has just received the 
Court's ruling in the Bosman case. The 
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Court concludes that the restrictions 
imposed by UEFA regarding the number of 
foreign players that may be fielded (the 
so-called '3+2' rule) are contrary to the free 
movement of workers and that they cannot 
be justified on grounds of general interest. 
The exclusion of foreign players is only 
considered justifiable in the context of 
national teams, thus confirming the earlier 
position already taken by the Court in 1976 
(the Dona case). 
This ruling has confirmed the relation 
between the rules applied in professional 
sports and the EC Treaty. The Court 
concludes that such rules should respect the 
basic provisions of the Treaty concerning 
the free movement of workers . 
The Court also ruled that the transfer system 
of UEFA is contrary to the free movement 
of workers. 
In August of this year UEFA finally notified 
its transfer rules to the Commission with a 
view to obtaining an exemption from the 
Treaty rules on competition policy (Art. 85 
of the Treaty). It appears that they cannot in 
their present structure be exempted from 
competition rules. Moreover, it must be 
clearly stated that even if transfer rules were 
to be substantially changed., the Commission 
cannot exempt clauses which are in breach 
of Art 48 of the Treaty, which provides for 
free movement. 
The Commission has also received several 
individual complaints against the UEFA 
rules. It will now quickly take a position on 
these complaints in the light of the Court's 
judgment. 
It is now up to the sports federations to 
bring their rules into line with the Court's 
ruling. 
They must take immediate action to amend 
the existing transfer system and to stop 
discriminating on the grounds of nationality 
which impedes the free movement of EU 
citizens. 
concerning the conformity of two major 
issues in professional football, the transfer 
system and the nationality clauses, with 
specific Treaty provisions, the free 
movement of workers (Article 48) and the 
competition rules (Articles 85/86). As 
Advocate General (AG) Lenz said in his 
conclusions these issues are of decisive 
influence for the future of professional 
football. The Court has delivered its ruling 
on Friday 15.12.95. 
The issues at stake 
Transfer system 
International transfers of football players are 
governed by a combination of FIFA and 
UEFA rules. The FIFA rules establish the 
right of a ceding football club to 
compensation of training/development costs 
to be paid by the acquiring football club in 
case a player changes from one club to 
another club when his contract has expired. 
The FIFA rules also stipulate that a player 
can play with his new club as of the 
moment that a contract has been signed, 
even if the clubs in question have not yet 
agreed on the level of the transfer amount. 
Finally the FIFA rules oblige clubs to 
submit disputes concerning the level of the 
transfer fee to arbitration. The UEFA rules 
in particular provide for such an arbitration 
procedure as well as for pre-fixed 
calculation scheme for transfer fees (gross 
salary multiplied by an age coefficient). 
Before 1991 a player could not play for his 
new club as long as the old and new club 
had not agreed on the level of the transfer 
compensation. Following discussions with 
the Commission the transfer rules were 
changed (part of the "gentleman's 
agreement" of the Commission with UEFA 
in 1991): a player can play for his new club 
from the moment that a contract is signed. 
Nationality clauses 
applied in various ways both in national and 
international professional club football 
competitions. As far as UEFA competitions 
are concerned - i.e. so called European Cup 
matches - a maximum of 3 foreign players 
and 2 so-called assimilated players (foreign 
players that have already played 5 years in 
the country in question, of which at least 3 
years in youth teams) may be fielded (the 
so-called 3+2 rule). Although for national 
competitions some federations apply more 
"liberal" rules, generally speaking the 3+2 
rule applies. 
In the past UEFA also limited the number of 
foreign football players that could be 
recruited. Following discussions with the 
Commission in 1978, UEFA changed its 
rules: clubs were allowed to recruit as many 
foreign players as they like, only the number 
of foreign players that could be fielded was 
restricted. 
Earlier Court rulings and follow up 
In two rulings (Walrave/UCI of 1973 and 
Donà/Mantéro of 1976) the Court has taken 
the position that nationality clauses in sports 
can only be justified on sporting grounds, 
e.g. for national teams. 
Following these rulings, the Commission was 
asked by MEP's and individuals to intervene 
against football federations restricting the 
number of EC players who can be recruited. 
Moreover, the question of transfer fees was 
also raised. The Commission took the line 
that, although discriminatory rules on the 
grounds of nationality were in conflict with 
Community law, that it would be difficult to 
initiate infringement proceedings. 
In 1978 the Commission invited UEFA to 
make its rules compatible with the Court's 
rulings. In return the Commission would 
allow a transitional period during which it 
would not take any legal action against the 
federations. Most national football 
federations were reluctant to apply lhe 
compromise. The rules remained unchanged. 
Background note - the Bosnian case 
The Court of Justice has been asked to take 
a position (Bosman case C- 415/93) 
The nationality clauses are included in 
UEFA rules. They limit the number of 
foreign football players that may be fielded 
during football matches. Such clauses are 
In 1982 the Commission launched an inquiry 
in the form of a letter sent by Commissioner 
Richard to the UEFA and to the national 
football federations. At the end of 1984 a 
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meeting was held with UEFA. The national 
federations had interpreted the 1978 
compromise as granting them an indefinite 
transitional period. The Commission invited 
national federations to submit amendments 
to their regulations before 1/7/85, which 
would have had to be implemented before 
the start of the 1986/87 football season. In 
1985, however, the Conference of national 
football federations decided not to respond 
to the Commission's invitation and, instead, 
adopted binding rules limiting the number 
of foreign players that could be fielded. 
In 1989, the European Parliament adopted a 
report on the free movement of professional 
football players within the Community. The 
EP strongly invited the Commission to take 
all necessary steps to enforce Community 
law against the UEFA and the national 
football federations. 
On 31 January 1990, the UEFA member 
federations agreed in Stockholm that the 
3+2 rule would apply as of 1.1.93 for all 
first League clubs, if the Commission would 
guarantee that that rule would not be 
challenged in the future. 
In March 1990, a mandate was given to Ms. 
Papandreou, Mr. Bangemann and Mr. 
Dondelinger to start negotiations with 
UEFA. These negotiations finally led to the 
so-called Gentlemen's agreement (1991) 
which stipulated, among others, that: 
the 3+2 rule would be implemented by 
all UEFA member federations as of 
1.1.1992 and that 
disputes regarding the level of the 
amount of the transfer compensations 
should not impede a player from 
playing for his new club. 
The Bosnian case 
In 1990 the contract of Bosman, a 
professional football player, with his 
Belgian football club (RFC Liège) expired. 
Bosman wanted to be transferred to a 
French club (Dunkerque), mainly because 
his old club had offered him a salary that 
was substantially less than his earlier salary. 
RFC Liège and the Belgian football 
association blocked the transfer of Bosman 
for various reasons. Bosman refused to sign 
the new contract offered by RFC Liège and 
was consequently suspended. Bosman then 
addressed the Belgian court and was granted 
interim measures. Later on he has played 
for several clubs of minor importance. 
The Belgian courts dealing with the Bosman 
case have asked for preliminary rulings of 
the Court of Justice regarding the 
conformity of the transfer rules and the 
nationality clauses with the free movement 
of workers (Art.48) and the competition 
rules (Articles 85 and 86). 
Pending competition cases 
In total the Commission services have 
received three formal complaints of 
professional football players of which the 
one from Bosman is the most prominent. 
UEFA recently notified its transfer rules. 
The Commission services have not actively 
dealt with the complaints, because of the 
pending proceedings before the Court-
Observations of the Commission 
regarding the Bosman case 
Free movement of workers 
At the hearing of the Court of Justice 
concerning the Bosman case the 
Commission has taken the preliminary view 
that the nationality clauses applied to EU 
citizens clearly infringe Article 48. The 
same position was taken regarding the 
transfer rules. Although the transfer rules do 
not discriminate on the basis of nationality 
they are still considered to be contrary to 
Art. 48, because they clearly restrict the free 
movement of workers. 
Competition 
The Commission has also taken the position 
that the nationality clauses and the transfer 
rules restrict competition between clubs, 
because they impede clubs from 
fielding/recruiting new players. The 
Commission has not taken any position 
regarding their exemptibility of these rules 
under Article 85(3). 
The conclusions of AG Lenz 
The conclusions of AG Lenz were presented 
on 20.9.95. 
Nationality clauses 
The AG concluded that the rules limiting the 
number of foreign players that may be 
fielded (the so-called '3+2' rule) infringe 
Article 48 and Article 85(1). He concluded 
that exclusion of foreign players is only 
justifiable for national teams. 
Transfer rules 
The AG concluded that the transfer rules 
also infringe Articles 48 and 85(1). He 
rejected the argument put forward by UEFA 
that the transfer rules are in fact 
pro-competitive, because they keep small 
clubs alive. Nevertheless, he agreed with the 
goal pursued by UEFA: small clubs should 
be supported in order to maintain a 
sporting/economic equilibrium between 
clubs, which is considered indispensable for 
keeping football attractive for spectators. In 
the AG's opinion, however, the current 
transfer system is a disproportionate and 
ineffective means to achieve that goal. He 
took the view that the sharing of revenues 
(from ticket sales and/or the sale of 
broadcasting rights) would be a less 
restrictive and more effective method to 
achieve that goal. 
Exemptibility 
The AG took the position that an exemption 
under 85(3) for the transfer rules or the 
nationality clauses was theoretical. Referring 
to the need for a coherent interpretation of 
the treaty provisions, the AG concluded that 
an agreement which infringes Article 48 
cannot be justified on grounds of general 
interest and cannot be exempted under 
Article 85(3). 
The AG did, nevertheless, consider that it is 
legitimate for clubs to receive some transfer 
compensation but only for initial training 
costs. [IP/95/1411] 
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NETHERLANDS: COMMISSION 
IMPOSES FINES ON CRANE-HIRE 
CARTEL 
Acting on a proposal from Mr Karel Van 
Miert, the European Commission has 
imposed a fine of ECU 11.5 million on the 
Dutch crane-hire association "Federatie van 
Nederlandse Kraan verhuurbedrijven" (FNK) 
which for more than twelve years - from 
December 1979 to April 1992 - engaged in 
unlawful price-fixing agreements in the 
Netherlands. 
A dozen Dutch and Belgian firms lodged a 
complaint with the Commission in January 
1992. The FNK comprises about 75% of 
Dutch crane-hire firms. 
In addition, the Commission has imposed a 
fine of ECU 300 000 on the Dutch crane 
certification association "Stichting 
Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf' (SCK) for 
having prohibited - from 1991 to 1992 - the 
hiring of extra cranes from non-affiliated 
firms, on pain of withdrawal of certification 
and the suspension of the firm through the 
publication of an announcement by the SCK 
in the specialized press. 
A market totally closed to competition 
The severity of the fine imposed on the 
FNK is due not only to the fact that its 200 
or so members had a combined turnover in 
1992 of some ECU 230 million, but also to 
the fact that the recommended prices were 
at least 10% higher than the market price. 
It should also be pointed out that the 
complainants had also instituted proceedings 
before the Dutch courts: on 11 February 
1992, the Utrecht District Court ordered the 
FNL to suspend the system of 
recommended prices, while on 28 October 
1993 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
ordered the SCK to suspend the prohibition 
on hiring cranes from non-affiliated firms. 
Certification called into question? 
Do the fines mean that the Commission is 
calling certification into question? 
No. The Commission's intention is to 
oppose certification activities which in 
practice do not confer any benefit in terms 
of quality standards, distribution or 
production. 
The SCK did not meet the criteria of 
openness and transparency and, by refusing 
to accept equivalent guarantees from other 
systems, it impeded access of foreign firms 
in particular to the Dutch crane-hire market. 
However, certification systems which meet 
such criteria and accept equivalent 
guarantees from other systems may in future 
qualify for exemption under Article 85 of 
the Treaty. [IP/95/1306] 
COMPETITION GUIDELINES FOR 
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER 
SYSTEMS 
The Commission has today adopted 
guidelines for the application of the 
European Community competition rules to 
cross-border credit transfer systems. These 
systems are used by banks and other 
financial institutions to transfer money 
between different countries in the Union. 
The notice containing these guidelines is 
closely linked with the proposed directive 
on cross-border credit transfers on which 
the Council of Ministers is expected to 
adopt a common position next week. The 
proposed directive requires banks to provide 
more information to their customers. It also 
provides that the costs arising from the 
cross-border character of the credit transfer 
should be borne by the sender unless he or 
she instructs otherwise. When the sender 
bears these costs, one talks about an 
OUR-payment (costs supported by the 
originator of the payment). 
The notice provides a framework allowing 
banks to set up cooperation arrangements 
which aim at more efficient ways of 
handling cross-border credit transfers 
without unduly restricting competition. In 
the notice, the Commission addresses two 
main issues. The first one is about market 
entry, the second one about price 
competition. 
The Commission wishes to ensure that 
smaller banks are not unfairly excluded from 
systems to which they must belong if they 
are in practice to be able to offer 
cross-border credit transfers to their 
customers. Conversely, smaller systems 
developed by groups of banks may be 
justified in limiting their membership. In the 
notice, the Commission focuses on payment 
systems which constitute an essential facility 
i.e. a system access to which is crucial for 
banks wishing to handle the credit transfers 
concerned. The conditions for access to such 
a systems should be objectively justified and 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
As far as price competition is concerned, the 
Commission in the notice states once more 
that banks are not allowed to conclude 
agreements among themselves fixing the 
level of client fees or the way in which they 
will charge such fees. 
A key question, however, is about 
multilaterally agreed interchange fees, i.e. 
fees paid by one bank (here typically the 
sender's bank or its correspondant bank) to 
another bank (the beneficiary's bank). The 
Commission accepts that such multilaterally 
agreed interchange fees can in certain 
circumstances be exempted from the 
prohibition of price agreements contained in 
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty. In the case 
of OUR-payments, a beneficiary's bank 
cannot charge the beneficiary a fee for 
handling a cross- border credit transfer. In 
such a case, the Commission takes the view 
that beneficiary's banks are entitled to a 
multilaterally agreed interchange fee if that 
fee covers the costs they actually and 
necessarily incur when handling a 
cross-border credit transfer. As to the level 
of the agreed fee, the Commission specifies 
that it should not exceed the average real 
costs incurred by beneficiary's banks when 
they handle cross-border credit transfers. 
Banks remain free to notify their 
arrangements to the Commission, for 
clearance or exemption under the 
competition rules. [ IP/95/9581 
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
AUTHORISED A JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AVIONS 
DE TRANSPORT REGIONAL 
(ATR) AND BRITISH AEROSPACE 
(BAE) 
- Article 85 
- Sector : regional aircraft 
- ATR (F) and its parent companies 
Aérospatiale (F) and Alenia (Finmeccanica) 
(I) / BAe (UK). 
The Commission has authorised the joint 
venture between Aérospatiale, Alenia and 
British Aerospace in the sector of regional 
aircraft for a transition period of 5 years. In 
fact the Commission has sent a comfort 
letter, which outlines that the Commission is 
of the opinion that competition within this 
sector would not be seriously reduced or 
eliminated by this joint venture. 
Last month, the Commission decided that 
the operation in question does not constitute 
a concentration under the Merger 
Regulation (IP/95/849). 
The final objective of this project is the 
concentration of the parties' activities in the 
regional aircraft sector. At the moment these 
activities include the products of ATR 
(turboprop jets ATR 42 and 72) as well as 
those of BAe (turboprops Jetstream and 
regional jets Avrò and BAe). 
During the first stage of the cooperation the 
parties will pool and rationalise customer 
service resources such as marketing, sales 
and after- sales service. Moreover, they will 
create a single integrated training centre in 
Naples for pilots and will jointly undertake 
feasibility studies for new aircrafts in the 
sector. The joint venture will also undertake 
research and development activities. It is 
this first stage with a duration of five years 
to which the Commission's decision refers. 
The market 
The market for regional aircraft has a 
worldwide dimension. The main 
manufacturers operate in all continents. 
A distinction should be made between jet 
and turboprop aircraft. In its 1991 "de 
Havilland" decision the Commission 
distinguished between three segments within 
turboprop aircraft according to their seating 
capacity (20 to 39 seats; 40 to 59 seats; 60+ 
seats). 
In the regional aircraft market for jets (up to 
125 seats) a distinction between segments 
has not been made. 
The Commission has based its comfort letter 
on the same distinction and has taken into 
account the observations of third parties, 
including those of competitors of the parties 
and Member States. 
While one cannot speak of a high level of 
substitutability as between turboprop aircraft 
and jet aircraft because of substantially 
differing operating costs, nevertheless a 
certain evolution in the market should be 
noted. In particular, if an aircraft with a 
capacity of more than 60 seats is required to 
cover relatively long distances, purchasers, 
mindful of passenger comfort, will be 
inclined to purchase a jet rather than a 
turboprop aircraft. 
Market share 
Through the creation of the joint venture, 
the number of competitors who offer a 
product in this sector will be reduced, but 
the market share will not increase in such a 
way to distort the existing structure. 
Following the cooperation between the first 
and the sixth placed competitors, the 
number of competitors has been reduced 
from 7 to 6. 
2) In the segments of the turboprop aircraft 
market the situation is as follows : 
- 20 to 39 seats : BAe holds 8 % (Jetstream 
J41); ATR does not operate; the main 
competitors are Saab 340 (33 %), Embraer 
120 (28 %), de Havilland Dash 8-100/200 
(24 %), and Dasa-Dornier 328 (6 %); 
- 40 to 59 seats : BAe does not operate; 
ATR holds 43 % (ATR 42); the main 
competitors are Fokker F50 (27 %), de 
Havilland Dash 8-300 (17 %), Casa-IPTN (8 
%) and Saab 2000 (6 %); 
- 60+ seats : BAe stopped production of its 
J61 aircraft at the beginning of 1995 and the 
only model offered in this segment is the 
ATR 72 (100 %); it should be noted, 
however, that this segment only accounts for 
10 % of the overall market for turboprop 
aircraft and that new entrants are expected. 
Therefore, the operation leads neither to a 
cumulation of high market shares in the 
sector as a whole nor in its segments. 
The joint venture does not create a dominant 
group being the sole operators present in all 
market segments. At least one competitor (de 
Havilland) also offers a wider range of 
turboprop aircraft and is preparing to enter 
the market for regional jets. 
For these reasons the Commission has 
authorised the joint venture for a period of 
five years, reserving the right to reconsider 
the case if the merger project does not 
materialise. [IP/95/952] 
FIGHT AGAINST CARTELS: 
COMMISSION PROPOSES TO THE 
MEMBER STATES THAT FIRMS 
WHICH REPORT UNLAWFUL 
AGREEMENTS BE TREATED 
LENIENTLY 
In the Commission's analysis, the present 
situation in the relevant market was an 
essential factor. 
1) In the market for regional jets ATR does 
not operate and BAe occupies 
approximately 24 %. The main competitors 
are Boeing (34 %) and Fokker (31 %). 
Obtaining irrefutable proof of a cartel 
remains a well-nigh impossible task for 
Commission inspectors and their colleagues 
in the fifteen Member States, especially 
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nowadays since a number of firms do not 
hesitate to organize "red alert" exercises to 
instruct their staff in how to make life 
difficult for European inspectors on 
unannounced visits. 
Mr Van Miert, the Member of the 
Commission with special responsibility for 
European competition policy, is proposing 
a solution: in normal circumstances no 
fines, or at least considerably reduced fines, 
will be imposed on firms which report 
unlawful agreements. 
Cartels - concerning prices or market shares 
- are one of the most serious breaches of 
European competition rules. These practices 
have adverse effects not only on consumers 
but also on customer-firms, which are faced 
with an artificial increase in the prices of 
the raw materials or parts that they need. 
For them, the result is reduced 
competitiveness in an increasingly global 
market. 
Mr Van Miert essentially takes the view that 
it is better to have instruments for putting a 
stop to such practices than having to impose 
substantial fines after the damage has been 
done. 
The system proposed by the Commission is 
based largely on the practices adopted by 
the authorities in the United States and in 
Canada. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
this policy has been immediately successful: 
one case per month is now reported 
compared to one case per year 
beforehand; 
investigations are now completed much 
more quickly; 
the deterrent effect is such that it sows 
doubt among potential cartel members. 
Instances where there would be no fines 
Under Mr Van Miert's proposal, which has 
been backed by his colleagues, under 
normal circumstances the Commission will 
no longer impose fines on a firm that 
provides it with detailed information on an 
unlawful agreement, provided that four 
conditions are met: 
1. When the firm takes the initiative, the 
Commission has not received any 
information concerning the reported 
agreement or, if it has information but 
has not yet visited the firms concerned, 
it does not have sufficient proof to 
impose fines. 
2. The firm is the first one to cooperate. 
3. The firm provides the Commission with 
all the documents and evidence in its 
possession concerning the agreement and 
gives permanent and full cooperation 
throughout the investigation. 
4. The firm was not one of the instigators 
of the cartel, did not play a decisive role 
and did not force another firm to join it. 
Substantial reductions in fines 
Confirming an existing practice, the 
Commission also envisages substantial 
reductions in fines, which could amount to 
50% of the usual amount, in cases where, 
once the investigations on suspect firms' 
premises have been completed, the firms are 
the first to cooperate, have not played a 
decisive role, provide evidence which 
confirms the infringement or admit the 
substance of the accusations. 
It should be stressed that when a firm has 
enjoyed favourable treatment with regard to 
its fine it will not necessarily be protected 
from the civil-law consequences of its 
participation in any form of cartel. 
[IP/95/1355] 
Other relevant 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's 
Press releases are available on-
line from the RAPID database, on 
the day of their publication by the 
Commission's Spokesman's 
Service. To obtain access to 
RAPID, please write to EUR-OP 
Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 
Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/95/1036 : CAR DISTRIBUTION -
THE COMMISSION PUBLISHES A 
GUIDE IN QUESTION-AND-
ANSWER-FORMAT 
IP/95/1001 : THE COMMISSION 
SURVEYS THE EUROPEAN ONLINE 
MARKET [95/09/19] 
IP/95/1345 : CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS: 
COMMISSION PUTS AN END TO 
DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
PRACTICES BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE 
NETHERLANDS [95/12/05) 
IP/95/1138 : ATLAS-PHOENIX: 
CLEARANCE POSSIBLE BY 
MID-1996 [95/10/18] 
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Court Judgements 
These summaries of Court Judgements have been prepared by DG 
IV officials and represent their personal views on the Judgement. 
These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the 
Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the 
Commission's or DG IV's views. The CELEX document numbers for 
these Judgements are also included within brackets. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
19 OCTOBER 1995 IN CASE 
C-19/93 P, RENDO NV ET AL. V 
COMMISSION 
On October 19, 1995 the Court partly set 
aside the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of November 18, 1992 (Case Τ­
Ι 6/91) and referred the case back to the 
Court of First Instance. In a proceeding 
for infringement of Art. 85 of the EEC 
Treaty the Commission followed an 
application filed under Art. 3(2) of 
Council Regulation No 17/62 of 6 
February 1962 by local electricity 
distribution companies operating in the 
Netherlands. The applicants, who then 
challenged the Commission decision later 
adopted in this matter in the Court of 
First Instance and, on appeal, in the 
Court of Justice, were restricted to 
receiving their electricity solely from four 
electricity producers in the Netherlands, 
who had formerly set up a pooling 
company named "Samenwerkende 
Elektriciteitsproduktiebedrijfen NV" 
(hereinafter named "SEP"). SEP supplied 
its electricity to the applicants through a 
regional distribution company called 
"Ijsselcentrale" (hereinafter named "IJC") 
and in 1986 concluded with its 
shareholders, the said electricity 
producing companies, the so-called 
"OVS" agreement ("Overeenkomst van 
Samenwerking"), which restricted all 
imports and exports of electricity 
exclusively to SEP and imposed on all 
parties the obligation to ensure this 
exclusivity by adjusting their supply 
contracts, including those with IJC and 
the applicants. 
The import and export of electricity in 
the Netherlands is subject to special 
national legislation. At the time the OVS 
was concluded, only imports of electricity 
into the Netherlands by non-supplier 
companies were subject to an easily 
obtainable authorization. In 1989 and 
1990, the new Netherlands Electricity 
Law entrusted the four electricity 
producers and SEP with ensuring the 
national public electricity supply. The 
SEP was given the exclusive right to 
import electricity with a view to public 
supply, prohibiting the applicants from 
doing so. Nevertheless, some final 
consumers of electricity were given the 
right to import electricity for their own 
use without any further authorization. The 
export of electricity according to the new 
law was unrestricted. 
The Commission examined the OVS 
agreement as far as it imposed an import 
ban on the private consumers exempted 
by the new Netherlands Electricity Law 
and prohibited exports by both final 
customers and the applicant distribution 
companies. It found the OVS, as applied 
by the SEP, to infringe Art. 85 in the 
aforementioned areas. Applying Art. 90, 
the Commission took the preliminary 
view that SEP and the electricity 
generating companies were entrusted 
companies in the meaning of par. 2 of 
Art. 90, but the exclusive position of SEP 
was not necessary for the performance of 
its tasks. Nevertheless, the Commission 
found the exclusivity now to be provided 
for by virtue of the new Electricity Law. 
Given the different lines of investigation, 
the Commission gave preference to the 
evaluation of the new Electricity Law 
pursuant to Art. 90 of the Treaty and saw 
itself not in a position to make a final 
decision on a possible justification under 
art. 90(2). Accordingly, the Commission 
confined itself to "the scope of this [reg. 
17] proceeding" and refused to assess the 
import ban and the export ban on 
Electricity generating companies in the 
field of public supply. As for the export 
ban on distribution companies in and 
outside the field of public supply, the 
Commission found these provisions not to 
be in compliance with the new Electricity 
law. The Commission therefore found the 
ban on imports by private industrial 
consumers and on exports outside the field 
of public supply by distribution companies 
and private consumers to violate Art. 
85(1) of the Treaty and ordered the parties 
to end the infringement. 
The applicants appealed to the Court of 
First Instance, requesting to annul the 
Commission decision as far as it refused 
to rule on the agreement's import and 
export restrictions imposed on distribution 
companies in the field of public supply 
and to order the Commission to take a 
decision under Reg. 17. 
The Court of First Instance found that the 
Commission had not ruled at all on the 
import restrictions imposed prior to the 
enactment of the new Electricity Law and 
found no decision with legal effects in 
that regard. Accordingly, the Court of 
First Instance held the applicant's 
complaint inadmissible as far as it 
concerned this time period. As to the time 
period after enactment of the new 
Electricity Law, the Court of First 
Instance held the Commission, after 
finding an infringement, to be free in a 
decision pursuant to Art. 3(1) of reg. 17 
whether to order undertakings to end an 
infringement. Moreover, so the Court of 
First Instance, Art. 3(2) confers certainly 
no right to obtain a Commission decision 
as to whether an alleged infringement 
actually exists if the Commission, as in 
applying Art. 90 (2) first sentence, has no 
exclus ive competence in the 
subject-matter. 
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The Court of First Instance pointed out 
that, since the import restrictions are 
governed by both the contested 
agreement and the new electricity law, 
the examination of compatibility with the 
Treaty - subject of a proceeding under 
Art. 169 of the Treaty - takes precedence 
over the - "still pending" - evaluation of 
the agreement (see Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance in Case T-16/91, Rendo 
and Others ν Commission, [1992] ECR 
11-2417, par. 111) . The Court found it -
even where an infringement of Art. 85 by 
undertakings was established - impossible 
to require undertakings to behave 
contrary to national law without first 
assessing that law with regard to the 
Treaty (idem, par. 105-107). Accordingly, 
the Court of First Instance upheld the 
Commission decision. 
The judgment of the Court of Justice 
Procedural issues 
On appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed 
the Court of First Instance's view that 
adopting Commission decision on the 
OVS agreement would not have been 
practically possible until the assessment 
of compatibility of the new electricity 
law with the Treaty. The Court held "the 
proper procedure to establish the 
inconsistency of that Law with the 
Treaty" to be "that provided for in Art. 
169 of the Treaty" (Judgment par. 22). 
However, the Court of Justice found the 
reasoning of the Court of First Instance 
not "to establish an order of priority as 
between the procedure provided for in 
Reg. No 17 and the procedure against the 
State for failure to fulfil its obligations" 
- which the Court pointed out to relate to 
"separate persons and separate acts" and 
found the Commission merely to be 
"entitled to take the view" of a procedure 
of examination "most appropriate" 
(Judgment par. 23). 
The Court of Justice found, however, the 
ruling of inadmissibility of the applicant's 
complaint by the Court of First Instance 
with regard to the Commissions refusal to 
rule on restrictions imposed in the time 
prior to the enactment of the new law to 
be erroneous. The Court held that, even 
where the Commission is not obliged to 
adopt a decision, it produces - like any 
other institution "empowered to find [...] 
an infringement and to impose a sanction 
[...] and to which private persons may 
make complaints" - legal effects when 
adopting a measure terminating an 
investigation initiated upon complaint 
(Judgment par. 28, citing the judgment in 
Case C-39/93 Ρ SFEI and Others ν 
Commission [1994] ECR 1-2681, par. 27, 
with references). Accordingly, the Court 
of Justice found the contested 
Commission decision to have legal effects 
even as to the part refusing to rule on 
restrictions imposed prior to the 
enactment of the new law and the 
complaint to be admissible in that regard. 
In doing so, the Court, as opposed to the 
Court of First Instance, saw the adopted 
decision to be an "implied rejection of the 
applicant's complaint" (Judgment par. 25). 
Main Points: 
Analysing the Court's judgment, the 
Commission is still unrestricted in the 
area of evaluations under Art 169 and 
Art. 85/86 to adopt whatever decision it 
deems appropriate - subject simply to 
judicial review. The Court's effort - by 
setting aside the verdict of inadmissibility 
- to include the factual situation prior to 
the enactment of the Netherlands 
electricity law does not challenge the 
Commissions investigational prerogative 
but simply extends, in this special case, 
the scope of the evaluation to a different 
subject-matter, to different circumstances 
in this case represented by different 
periods in time. This also explains the 
twisted opinion of the two European 
Courts on whether the investigation 
pursuant to Reg. 17 was still pending: for 
purposes of judicial review, the 
applicant's complaint was held to be 
rejected. 
Aside from this, the Court of Justice has 
challenged the attempt of the Court of 
First Instance - aside from factual and 
practical considerations applying to the 
respective case - to set up a system of 
preference for investigations with regard 
to Art. 169 and 85/86. Such an attempt can 
be seen in the Court of First Instance's 
reasoning th ι even where an infringement 
of Art. 85 was found, undertakings cannot 
be ordered to adopt a conduct complying 
with Art. 85 but thereby violating national 
law without a prior evaluation of the 
national law (see Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance, par. 106). The separate 
lines of investigation under the respective 
articles, as the Court of Justice now points 
out correctly, instead concern different 
findings towards different persons. 
Therefore, the Commission is also free to 
split up proceedings and to adopt an 
independent decision under Arts. 85/86 
where appropriate, of course subject to 
judicial review. [693J0019] 
M. WUNDERLICH and 
P. ADAMOPOULOS 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
FIRST INSTANCE ("CFI") 
(FOURTH CHAMBER) OF 8 
MARCH 1995 (T-34/93) SOCIÉTÉ 
GÉNÉRALE - V- COMMISSION 
In this case the applicant, Société générale 
("SG"), sought the annulment of 
Commission decision C(93)746 of 1 April 
1993 which, pursuant to Article 11(5) of 
Regulation N° 17, required SG to supply 
within two weeks information which it 
had refused to supply following an Article 
11(3) request for information, and which 
imposed periodic penalty payments 
thereafter at a rate of ECU 1000 per diem. 
SG also sought damages of IFF. 
The facts may be briefly summarised. The 
Commission's request for information had 
been made following the receipt of a 
complaint from a French citizen who had 
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been charged commission of 92.50FF by 
SG to cash a Eurocheque made out to her 
for 471 OFF. The Eurocheque had been 
originally issued by a German bank. The 
complaint was received whilst the 
Commission was considering a request 
from Eurocheque for the renewal of an 
individual exemption previously granted 
to the "Package Deal" agreement (OJ 
L35/43, 07.02.85), an agreement between 
the banks participating in the Eurocheque 
system which regulated the conditions on 
which commission should be charged for 
Eurocheques used abroad. 
The Commission's request for 
information dated 12 September 1992 
referred both to Case IV/30.717-B 
Eurocheque : Package Deal (which 
resulted in the exemption referred to 
above) and to Case IV/30.717-A 
Eurocheque : Helsinki agreement, an 
agreement which the Commission found 
to be inconsistent with the Package Deal 
agreement and void under Article 85(2), 
since it involved an agreement by French 
banks to charge no more commission for 
Eurocheques than was charged within the 
Carte Bleue and Eurocard systems. Fines 
were imposed by the Commission in 
respect of this agreement by a decision of 
25th March 1992 (OJ L95/50, 09.04.92). 
The request also reminded SG that the 
Commission considered that there was no 
justification for differentiating, for the 
purposes of commission charges, between 
different uses of Eurocheques (i.e. 
depending upon whether the Eurocheque 
was cashed at a bank or used to pay a 
French trader, and upon whether or not 
such a trader was a member of the Carte 
Bleue system). 
SG refused to supply the requested 
information and the Commission sent a 
further letter dated 23 October 1992 
giving SG three weeks to comply. SG 
again refused and the Commission 
therefore adopted the decision contested 
in these proceedings. SG claimed that the 
decision was void on three grounds, all of 
which were rejected by the CFI. 
Violation of Article 11 of Regulation 
N° 17 
SG claimed that the request for 
information failed to indicate clearly and 
precisely the legal basis and the purpose 
of the request as required by Article 
11(3), and that it did not establish the 
link between the questions asked and the 
alleged infringement. 
The CFI began from the premise that 
Article 11(3) set down a fundamental 
requirement, by analogy with the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88 Hoechst ( 
ECR 1989, p.2859, para 29) in relation to 
Article 14 of Regulation N° 17. The CFI 
however rejected SG's claim that the 
Commission had modified the purpose of 
its request since the letter dated 12 
September 1992 had referred only to the 
complaint received, the end of the 
Helsinki agreement and the need for 
information in order to assess any act or 
agreement under the competition rules, 
whilst the letter dated 23 October 1992 
asked for information in the context of 
the possible renewal of the Package Deal 
exemption. The CFI found that the 
second letter was intended to prevent 
confusion on the part of SG and that, 
read together, the two letters made it 
clear that the Commission wished to 
verify the factual and legal situation 
regarding Eurocheque commissions only 
in the context of the Package Deal 
exemption renewal. 
In this context, the Commission was quite 
entitled to request information as to the 
commission charged by SG when 
processing foreign Eurocheques. 
Furthermore, the references to the 
Helsinki agreement and to the earlier 
Package Deal agreement had to be 
considered simply as an evocation of the 
historical context of the new Package 
Deal agreement, and did not modify the 
purpose of the request for information. 
The CFI added that SG was not entitled 
to rely on its own interpretation of the 
new Package Deal agreement, to the 
effect that it did not apply to Eurocheques 
made out in favour of individuals, in order 
to refuse to answer a request for 
information : it was for the Commission 
alone to assess the validity of this 
argument. 
Violation of Article 190 EC 
SG argued that the reasons given for the 
request for information were insufficient 
and contradictory. 
The CFI recalled that according to the 
Court of Justice in Case 136/79 National 
Panasonic (ECR 1980, p. 2033, para 10), 
the essential elements of reasoning in a 
request for information are set out on 
Article 11(3) of Regulation N° 17: it must 
state the legal basis and purpose of the 
request and the sanctions set out in Article 
15(l)(b). However, the Commission is not 
obliged to give the addressee all the 
information which it has regarding the 
alleged infringements, nor to give a 
precise legal qualification of such 
infringements, although it must clearly 
indicate the presumptions which it intends 
to verify ( Hoechst, cited above, para 41). 
In this case, the CFI found that the 
Commission had clearly indicated the 
legal basis as the competition rules, and 
the object of the request by stating that it 
was made in the context of the request for 
renewal of the Package Deal exemption. 
The CFI also gave short shrift to SG's 
argument that the reasoning in the two 
letters was contradictory, and accordingly 
dismissed SG's ground of appeal under 
Article 190 EC. 
Violation of the rights of the defence 
SG argued that it was not able from the 
request for information to assess the scope 
of its duty to cooperate nor the scope of 
the questions, and that the Commission 
had infringed the privilege against 
self-incrimination by asking SG to admit 
to differentiating between different uses of 
Eurocheques. 
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The CFI reiterated the judgment of the 
Court of Justice in Case 374/87 Orkem 
(ECR 1989, p. 3283, para 26) that 
Regulation N° 17 recognises only certain 
specific guarantees for the benefit of an 
undertaking which is subject to an 
investigation, and that these do not 
include a right to evade the investigation 
on the ground that the results thereof 
might provide evidence of an 
infringement by it of the competition 
rules. On the contrary, there is a duty of 
active cooperation. The rights of the 
defence must nevertheless be respected 
during preliminary inquiry procedures, 
which may result in decisive evidence of 
unlawful behaviour. 
Accordingly, whilst the useful effect of 
Articles 11(2) and (5) of Regulation N° 
17/62 entitles the Commission to require 
an undertaking to provide all necessary 
information, and to disclose related 
documents, even if these provide 
evidence of an infringement, the 
Commission may not compel an 
undertaking to provide it with answers 
which might involve an admission on its 
part of the existence of an infringement 
which it is incumbent upon the 
Commission to prove. 
In contrast to the Orkem case, the CFI 
found on the instant facts that all the 
questions were purely factual, even if the 
answers thereto might imply a certain 
interpretation of the Package Deal 
agreement on the part on the part of SG. 
The answers given by SG were not 
self-incriminating. 
The CFI therefore continued the 
distinction made by the Court of Justice 
in Orkem between the production of 
incriminating documents, which may be 
compelled, and the admission of an 
infringement, which may not. This 
distinction supports the fundamental 
importance of the rights of the defence, 
and in particular the burden of proof, 
whilst preserving the efficacy of the 
Commission's investigative powers. The 
judgment is a useful reminder that 
requests for information must be drafted 
with as much specificity as possible, and 
should be confined to purely factual 
questions, in order to avoid any potential 
problems relating to the limited privilege 
against self-incrimination which the Court 
of Justice and the CFI have recognised. 
Finally, the CFI also rejected SG's 
argument that the Commission was not 
entitled to gather information concerning 
the abandoned Helsinki agreement when 
an appeal against fines imposed by the 
Commission in relation to that agreement 
was pending before the CFI. The 
Commission should not be deprived of its 
right to investigate facts subsequent to 
those sanctioned in a decision, even if 
identical to those judged in the decision. 
In any event, if information was illegally 
obtained by the Commission, it would be 
struck out by the CFI in those subsequent 
proceedings. 
Accordingly, SG's appeal and claim for 
damages was dismissed. 
[693a0007] G TAYLOR 
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF 
FIRST INSTANCE OF 8 JUNE 1995 
IN CASE T-7/93, LANGNESE-IGLO 
GMBH V COMMISSION, AND 
CASE T-9/93, SCHÖLLER 
LEBENSMITTEL GMBH & CO KG 
V COMMISSION 
On June 8, 1995, the Court of First 
Instance partially granted the request of 
two undertakings to annul the prohibitive 
Commission decisions adopted against 
them in proceedings pursuant to Art. 85 
of the EEC Treaty. The two German 
applicant undertakings in the business of 
producing ice-cream, Langnese-Iglo 
GmbH (hereinafter "Langnese") and 
Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH (hereinafter 
"Schöller"), had established a 
comprehensive distribution network in 
Germany, binding retailers with exclusive 
purchasing agreements linked with the 
obligation to borrow special freezer 
cabinets from the distributor and to 
exclusively use those freezers for the 
undertakings' products. 
On December 23, 1992, the Commission 
adopted final decisions against Langnese 
(OJ 1993 L 183/19) and Schöller (OJ 
1993 L 183/1), mainly prohibiting the 
undertakings to impose exclusive purchase 
obligations on retailers with respect to so-
called single-item ice-cream, refusing to 
grant exemption pursuant to Art. 85(3) of 
the Treaty and prohibiting the 
undertakings to conclude similar 
agreements until 1998. In combination 
with taking interim measures, the 
Commission on March 25, 1992, had 
withdrawn the benefit of the application of 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1984/83 of 22 June 1983 (hereinafter 
"Reg. No 1984/83") regarding exclusive 
purchasing agreements with regard to the 
agreements concluded by the two 
undertakings. About seven years ago, 
however, in September 1985, the 
Commission had previously issued a 
comfort letter addressed to Schöller with 
respect to notified similar standard 
distribution agreements but later reopened 
investigations as to both undertakings after 
a complaint by Mars GmbH (hereinafter 
"Mars") pursuant to Art. 3 of Council 
Regulation No 17/62 (hereinafter "Reg. 
No 17"). 
The judgments of the Court of First 
Instance 
Law 
Procedural issues 
In a annulment procedure pursuant to Art. 
173, par. 4 of the Treaty, both 
undertakings first raised the argument of 
protection of legitimate expectations with 
regard to the comfort letter previously 
issued by the Commission to Schöller in 
September 1985. The Court of First 
Instance, however, noted that by issuing 
the said comfort letter, the Commission 
neither gave negative clearance nor 
adopted a decision pursuant to Art. 2 and 
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6 of Reg. No 17. Accordingly, so the 
Court of First Instance, the comfort 
letter was not "adopted in accordance 
with the provisions of that regulation" 
(T-7/93, par. 36) and could not hinder 
the pursuit of Mars' complaint (citing 
the Court of Justice's judgments in 
Joined Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79 
Guerlain and Others [1980] ECR I-
2327; Case 99/79 Lancôme [1980] 
ECR 1-2511; Case 37/79 Marty [1980] 
ECR 1-2481 and Case 31/80 L'Oréal 
[1980] ECR 1-3775). The Court of 
First Instance found comfort letters 
merely to give a "provisional analysis" 
based on the facts available at that time 
(T-7/93, par. 37/38), which were in the 
present case changed by Mars' 
subsequent entry into the market and 
which had to be carefully investigated 
by the Commission (T-7/93, par. 39, 
41). 
On the merits 
With regard to the relevant product 
market, The Court of First Instance 
first confirmed the Commission's 
opinion that several partial market 
segment had to be excluded from the 
evaluation, basing its analysis - in 
accordance with case law of the Court 
of Justice - on the concept of a 
"sufficient degree of interchangeability 
between all products forming part of 
the same market" and on the 
"competitive conditions and the 
structure of supply and demand on the 
market" (T-7/93, par. 61). According 
to the Court of First Instance, it was 
therefore correct to exclude "ice-cream 
offered as part of a catering service" 
because such marketing of ice-cream 
involved providing services and was 
less dependent oh economic factors (T-
7/93, par. 63, relying on the Court of 
Justice's judgment in Case 234/89 
Delimitis [1991] ECR 1-935). The 
Court also found it necessary to 
exclude from the relevant market "ice-
cream stored in private freezers at 
consumer's homes" and sold in 
"multipacks" since it was not meant to 
satisfy the "impulse needs" of 
customers relevant to this case (T-7/93, 
par. 64/65). Additionally, the Court 
confirmed the Commmission's view to 
exclude "craft-trade ice-cream as a 
whole" because it was not affected by 
the contested supply agreements. 
With regard to "industrial ice-cream for 
bulk-buying customers intended for 
sale in individual portions ('scooping' 
ice-cream)", however, the Court of 
First Instance found that the 
Commission had not met its burden of 
putting forward evidence that there 
were in fact different patterns of 
demand within the meaning of the 
Court of Justice's judgment in Case 
322/81 Michelin [1983] ECR 3461 (T-
7/93, par. 69). To the opposite, the 
Court of First Instance held scooping 
ice-cream sold in the street to fall into 
the same category as the remainder of 
the decisive impulse ice-cream 
distributed by Schöller, Langnese and 
Mars - especially since the Commission 
itself had seen the two categories of 
ice-cream as equivalent products from 
the consumer's point of view. Since 
the different product technology was no 
sufficient distinction, the Court of First 
Instance viewed scooping ice-cream 
sold otherwise than through catering 
services as to be necessarily included 
in the relevant market applicable to the 
Commission's decisions (T-7/93, par. 
70). 
However, since scooping ice-cream was 
distributed under exclusive agreements, 
inclusion of scooping ice-cream, in the 
opinion of the Court of First Instance, 
would have had no substantial effect on 
the Commission's assessment. 
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance 
found it unnecessary to annul the 
contested decisions because of the 
Commissions's failure to include 
scooping ice-cream into the relevant 
product market. 
As to the relevant geographical market, 
the Court of First Instance confirmed 
the Commission's view that, since 
distribution of industrial ice-cream is 
organized nationally and certain national 
characteristics apply, the relevant 
geographical market had to be Germany 
(T-9/93, par. 54). 
With regard to the contested 
agreements' effect on competition 
within the meaning of Art. 85(1) of the 
Treaty, the Court of First Instance first 
made reference to the agreements 
requiring retailers to exclusively sell 
products purchased from the applicant 
undertakings and found the agreements 
to contain "both an exclusive purchasing 
obligation and a prohibition of 
competition" (T-7/93, par. 94). The 
Court of First Instance analyzed 
Schöller's and Langnese's position on 
the market and found the respective 
market share to be sufficiently high. In 
its determination, the Court of First 
Instance looked to the number of sales 
outlets tied to the applicants and the 
turnover achieved through those outlets 
(T-7/93, par. 96/97). Relying on 
Delimitis (see above), the Court of First 
Instance then stressed the need to 
determine the cumulative effect of "all 
the similar agreements entered into in 
the relevant market" together with "the 
other features of the economic and legal 
context" with regard to restriction of 
market access, the extent of tying-in 
sales outlets being only one factor 
relevant to that economic and legal 
context (T-7/93, par. 99-101). With 
regard to the present agreements the 
Court of First Instance held that the 
Commission had sufficiently established 
market-entry barriers trough the 
cumulative effect of the contested 
bundle of distribution agreements, 
especially since Schöller and Langnese 
widely imposed the obligation on 
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retailers to borrow their freezer 
cabinets and to use them exclusively 
for the applicants' products. Given the 
limited space in sales outlets, the Court 
of First Instance viewed this obligation 
as an additional factor limiting market 
access (see T-7/93, par. 107/108). The 
Court of First Instance further took into 
account the need for a profitable 
distribution system due to the low 
average turnover of many small 
retailers and the popularity of the 
undertakings' brand names (T-7/93, 
par. 110) as limiting market access. 
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance 
found the bundle of agreements to have 
appreciable effect on competition. As 
to the effect on Trade between Member 
States, the Court of First Instance 
found it sufficient for the network of 
agreements to have the tendency of 
insulating the German market from 
products from other Member States (T-
7/93, par. 121). 
Discussing the separate assessment of 
individual agreements, which was 
demanded by the applicant 
undertakings, the Court of First 
Instance held that a bundle or network 
of similar agreements established by 
the same undertaking "must be 
considered as a whole" in the course of 
evaluating "the actual details of the 
case" instead of "hypothetical 
situations" (T-7/93, par. 129, 131). 
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance 
found the Commission's evaluation to 
be without error in this regard. 
With regard to an alleged infringement 
of Art. 85(3) of the Treaty, the Court 
of First Instance first restated the well-
established principle that, in European 
competition law, agreements limited in 
time which are automatically renewed 
upon termination have the same legal 
effects as agreements concluded for 
indefinite time (T-7/93, par. 137). 
Accordingly, even those agreements 
concluded by the applicants which were 
limited in duration could not qualify 
for exemption under Reg. No 1984/83. 
The Court of First Instance then 
rejected the applicants' claim that, with 
regard to agreements concluded for no 
longer than five years and qualified for 
block exemption under Reg. No 
1984/83, the Commission was not 
allowed to withdraw the benefits of this 
block exemption because Art. 14(a) and 
(b) of the respective Reg. No 1984/83 
are inapplicable for lack of legal 
authorization. Since, so the Court of 
First Instance, the benefits of a block 
exemption can be withdrawn whenever 
the conditions of Art. 85(3) of the 
Treaty are not fulfilled, and the 
conditions laid down in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of Art. 14 of Reg. No 1984/83 
are included as mere exemplifications, 
the Commission is not bound by 
additional considerations. The 
provision of Art. 14(b) of Reg. No 
1984/83 is, however, by way of 
identical legislative content, covered by 
the authority granted by Art. 7 of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 19/65 of 
2 March 1965 on the application of 
Art. 85(3) of the Treaty (T-7/93, par. 
145-148, 153). 
Additionally, the Court of First 
Instance held the undertaking 
concerned to be responsible to present 
evidence that the conditions of an 
individual exemption pursuant to Art. 
85(3) of the Treaty are fulfilled. As to 
the Commission's refusal to grant such 
an exemption towards the undertakings 
concerned, the Court of First Instance 
found that the undertakings arguments 
fell short of presenting facts to 
"compensate for the disadvantages 
which [the agreements] cause in the 
field of competition" (T-7/93, par. 
181). The Court also confined the 
scope of judicial review with regard to 
the application of Art. 85(3) of the 
Treaty by the Commission to an 
examination of the relevant facts and 
"the legal inferences drawn by the 
Commission from them" and noted a 
"considerable latitude" of the 
Commission (T-7/93, par. 178). The 
Court of First Instance further 
confirmed that - despite the applicants' 
contentions - a block exemption is not 
subject to case-by-case verification 
towards the standards of the Treaty and 
therefore, vice versa, benefits of block 
exemption may be withdrawn without 
limitation by Art. 8(3)(a) of Reg. No 17 
(T-7/93, par. 174/175). In sum, the 
Court of First Instance found no error in 
the Commission's refusal to grant 
individual exemption with respect to the 
contested agreements. 
Since the undertakings concerned have 
the burden of establishing evidence for 
fulfilment of the conditions of Art. 
85(3) of the Treaty, the Court of First 
Instance also found no violation of the 
principle of proportionality by the 
Commission. The Court of First 
Instance confirmed that the Commission 
is, although bound by the principle not 
to exceed appropriate and necessary 
measures, "under no legal obligation" to 
suggest "possible alternative solutions" 
to the undertakings which would not 
interfere with EC competition rules (T-
7/93, par. 192/193). 
Finally, the Court of First Instance 
examined alleged infringements of Art. 
3 of Reg. No 17 by the Commission's 
orders to the applicant undertakings not 
to conclude similar agreements until 
1998. According to the applicants, the 
respective part of the Commission 
decisions was without legal basis. The 
Court of First Instance confirmed that 
the Commission, pursuant to Art. 3 of 
Reg. No 17, is only empowered to 
prohibit existing agreements (T-7/93, 
par. 205). Since Art. 85(1) of the 
Treaty does not, so the Court of First 
Instance, generally prohibit exclusive 
purchasing agreements regardless of 
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their impact on the market, Art. 14 of 
Reg. No 1984/83 equally does not 
authorize to withhold the benefits of a 
block exemption from agreements 
concluded in the future (T-7/93, par. 
207/208). The Court of First Instance 
also found it to be a violation of the 
principle of equal treatment to prohibit 
future agreements concluded by the 
applicants: other undertakings not 
engaged in a prior proceeding could 
"continue to conclude exclusive purchase 
agreements such as those prohibited [...]" 
(T-7/93, par. 209). Accordingly, the 
Court of First Instance found the 
respective Arts. 4 of the Commission 
decisions to exceed the Commission's 
authority and annulled them. 
Main points: 
The Court of First Instance allows the 
Commission to limit the scope of its 
comfort letters to a legal assessment of 
the facts currently available, thereby 
leaving it up to the Commission to 
reopen procedure at any time: a possibly 
different outcome itself warrants the new 
investigation. The nature of comfort 
letters only changes when expressly 
adopted as decision pursuant to Art. 2 or 
6 of Reg. No 17. However, it seems 
impossible that non-addressees could ever 
legitimately rely on the contents of a 
comfort letter. The Court of First 
Instance could have more easily rejected 
Langnese's respective plea simply 
because Langnese was such a non-
addressee - instead of leaving this 
question unanswered (see T-7/93 at par. 
35, at the beginning). 
The Court of First Instance 
acknowledged that exclusivity 
agreements of the kind contested in this 
procedure are generally capable of 
giving rise to a restriction of 
competition within the meaning of Art. 
85(1) of the Treaty as to both inter-
and intrabrand competition. This 
actually confirmes the Commission's 
position that these agreeements, such as 
those in the Delimitis case, have the 
objective to foreclose access to the 
market As to the infringement of Art. 
85(1) in each case, the actual effect 
will not be exclusively determined by 
the Commission's de minimis notice. 
However, it is important to note that 
the Court of First Instance, in applying 
Art. 85(1), places the test of a 
"realistic" market assessment requested 
by the Court of Justice in Delimitis 
within the finding of an effect on 
competition and requires the 
Commission, in this specific regard and 
context only, to "establish the requisite 
factual and legal standard" (T-7/93 at 
par. 94/95). In its market analysis the 
Court of First Instance accordingly 
followed the Court of Justice in 
Delimitis and focuses on a consumer's 
demand-oriented evaluation of the 
whole bundle of agreements and its 
impact on market entry conditions 
through tied-in retailers. 
Although the Commission decisions in 
their operative parts simply prohibited 
the contested agreement's exclusive 
purchasing provisions, the Court 
includes the freezer-exclusivity imposed 
on retailers by the applicants to support 
its finding that the agreements restrict 
competition and finds freezer-
exclusivity, as the Commission does, to 
"[make] access to the market more 
difficult" (T-7/93, par. 107/108). In its 
determination, the Court of First 
Instance looked to the effects of the 
bundle of agreements as a whole, since 
this is the way the market is affected 
by distribution networks. 
As to the prohibition of concluding 
similar agreements, the Court of First 
Instance has not accepted Commission 
orders with respect to the future. Art. 
3 of Reg. No 17 could have been 
interpreted otherwise to ensure both 
effective enforcement of EC 
competition law and effective 
administrative procedure. The Court of 
First Instance simply leaves new 
agreements to future investigations. 
[693a0007] M. WUNDERLICH 
P. ADAMOPOULOS 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
FIRST INSTANCE OF 18 
SEPTEMBER 1995 IN CASE T-
548/93, LADBROKE RACING LTD V 
COMMISSION 
On September 18, 1995, the Court of First 
Instance annulled a Commission decision 
rejecting the applicant's complaint under 
Art. 3 of Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 
February 1962 and under Art. 90 of the 
Treaty. The applicant, a UK based 
corporation in the business of providing 
betting services for horse-races, alleged 
violations of, inter alia, Arts. 85(1), 86 
and 90(1) of the Treaty in the field of so-
called "of-course totalizator betting" in the 
French Republic. With respect to this 
market, the ten main racing companies 
("sociétés des courses") have pooled their 
managerial rights in organizing off-course 
totalizator betting in France in the group 
Pari Mutuel Urbain (thereafter named 
"PMU") Both, racing companies and 
PMU also have, by virtue of French Law, 
the exclusive right to organize such off-
course totalizator betting. 
Since 1891, several decrees of the French 
Republic have extended the position of the 
"sociétés des courses" and the PMU from 
exclusivity in organizing betting on their 
respective racecourses only towards - in 
1974 - an express prohibition of accepting 
bets on horse-races taking place in France, 
as well as accepting bets within France for 
races taking place outside the French 
Republic, by any other person than the 
PMU (see legislation cited in Judgment 
par. 3). 
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The applicant, who seek access to the 
French market, requested the Commission to 
take action against the "sociétés des 
courses" and the PMU for restrictive 
agreements or concerted practices and abuse 
of a dominant position, and against the 
French Republic for enacting and 
maintaining the legislation granting 
exclusivity. 
After nearly four years of investigation and 
the applicant's request to define the 
Commission's position as well as an 
unsuccessful action before the Court of First 
Instance for failure to act pursuant to Art. 
175 of the Treaty (Case T­32/93, Ladbroke 
Racing ν Commission, [1994] ECR Π­
1015), the Commission rejected Ladbroke's 
complaint solely with regard to the alleged 
infringement of Art. 85 and 86. As to Art. 
90, the Court of First Instance in the said 
proceeding had denied a right of applicants 
to request the Commission to take action 
under Art. 90(3) and, accordingly, to bring 
a follow­up lawsuit before the Court of First 
Instance for failure to do so (see Judgement 
in Case T­32/93, cited above, par. 37). The 
Commission instead continued to investigate 
this part of the applicant's complaint. 
The Commission found Art. 85(1) to be 
inapplicable since, due to French legislation, 
in 1891 all competition in taking bets on 
horse­races was abolished. Subsequent 
legislation, so the Commission, had no 
further restrictive effects. Due to the legally 
ordered isolation of the respective French 
market, so the Commission, interstate 
commerce could not be possibly affected by 
the alleged agreements or practices. 
Outside France, however, PMU did 
allegedly nothing else but exercising its 
intellectual property rights. Similar to this 
analysis, the Commission rejected the an 
infringement of Art. 86 for lack of affect on 
interstate commerce due to the French 
monopoly and found PMU simply to be a 
rationalization of the racing companies's 
services. 
Finally, the Commission found the crucial 
time period to be, at most, from 1962 to 
1974 as from the adoption of Regulation 
17/62 to the adoption of the 1974 French 
law finally converting PMU's relationships 
into a legal obligation. As later 
acknowledged in the proceeding before the 
Court of First Instance, the Commission 
continued instead to concentrate on the 
procedure under Art. 90 since the players on 
the French market, especially after 1974, 
were merely fulfilling their obligations 
imposed on the them by the French 
Republic (Judgment, par. 39). 
The judgment of the Court of First 
Instance 
Procedural questions 
On appeal, the Court of First Instance 
examined the Commission's two­tier 
investigation of the case, separating the 
assessment of compatibility of the French 
legislation with the Treaty from the 
adoption of any decision under Arts. 85 and 
86. The Court of First Instance confirmed 
the Commission's "liberty to determine the 
priority to be given to [the] complaint in the 
light of the Community Interest", relying on 
its decision in Case T­24/90 Automec ν 
Commission [1992] ECR 11­2223, par. 85 
(Judgment, par. 44). It also reiterated the 
principle that "the Commission [...] cannot 
be obliged to take action, at an individual's 
request, on the basis of Art. 90(3) of the 
Treaty, as previously held in the action 
brought by the applicants for failure to act 
(Judgment, par. 45). 
However, with its still ongoing investigation 
of the Commission to assess the 
compatibility of the French legislation under 
Art. 90, the Court of First Instance held that 
the Commission was wrong to "definitively 
reject the applicant's complaint under Arts. 
85 and 86 without having previously 
completed its examination of the complaint 
under Art. 90" (Judgment, par. 46 and 51). 
The Court of First Instance found that no 
assessment under Arts. 85 and 86 could 
have been made without first deciding 
whether the respective provisions of French 
law were compatible with the Treaty and 
that the Commission therefore violated its 
"duty to examine carefully the factual and 
legal issues brought to its attention by the 
complainants" (Judgment, par. 47 and 50). 
Accordingly, the Commission decision was 
annulled. 
Laying out its analysis, the Court of First 
Instance went on to present a system of 
decision­taking with regard to Arts. 85, 86 
and 90 applicable to the case: 
If the national legislation would be found 
consistent with the Treaty and the conduct of 
undertakings in compliance therewith, no 
infringement of Art. 85 and 86 could 
possibly be found. In case of non­
compliance by undertakings, the finding of 
an Arts. 85 and 86 infringement would be 
possible. If, however, the national 
legislation would be found to be inconsistent 
with the Treaty, measures could be taken 
against complying undertakings pursuant to 
Arts. 85 and 86 (Judgment, par. 48/49). 
Main points: 
Analysing the judgment, the Court's decision­
making guide for Arts. 85, 86 and 90 may 
simply be taken as applying to the case before 
the Court, a case with a priority for the 
evaluation of national law alleged by the 
Commission. However, the Court of First 
Instance's judgment in Rendo (Case T­16/9, 
Rendo and Others ν Commission, ECR II­
2417 at par. 105­107) may suggest an effort 
of the Court of First Instance to establish a 
general priority for the evaluation of national 
law before any decision under Art. 85/86 
could possibly be taken. Such a general 
approach raises concerns as to the scope of its 
applicability since in Rendo and Ladbroke the 
factual situation was paramount and at least 
in Ladbroke the Commission itself alleged the 
priority of an Art. 90 evaluation. 
Nevertheless, as a matter of everyday 
practice, it seems difficult to handle 
complicated and very different factual 
situations by adopting clear­cut but very 
general rules. Moreover; the Court of Justice 
in Case C­19/93 P, Rendo ν Commission, 
has, aside from logical and factual arguments, 
already rejected any notion "to establish an 
order of priority as between the procedure 
provided for in Reg. No 17 and the procedure 
against a State for failure to fulfil its 
obligations" (see judgment in Rendo, par. 
23). [693A0548] M. WUNDERLICH and 
P. ADAMOPOULOS 
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Other Judgements and Opinions of 
Advocates­General 
Extracts are published in the weekly publication " Les activités de la Cour de 
Justice et du Tribunal de Première Instance des Communautés Européennes", 
available on-line from the RAPID database, a few days after its publication by 
the Court. To obtain access to RAPID please write to: EUR-OP Information, 
Marketing and Public Relations (OP/4B) 2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 2929 42763 
Arrêt de la Cour du 18 septembre 
1995: Aff. T­548/93 Ladbroke 
Racing Ltd / Commission des 
Communautés européennes: 
'Concurrence ­ Articles 85 et 86 
du traité ­ Prise de paris sur les 
courses hippiques ­ Droits 
exclusifs d'un groupement 
d'entreprises national ­ Ententes 
­ Abus de position dominante 
­Article 90 du traité ­ Absence 
d'intérêt communautaire ­
Anciennes infractions aux règles 
de concurrence' (Première 
chambre élargie) 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général G. Tesauro présentés à la 
Cour plénière du 12 septembre 
1995: Aff.¡tes C­319/93, C­399/93, 
C­40/94 et C­224/94 Hendrik Evert 
Dijkstra / Friesland (Frico Domo) 
Coöperatie B.A. : 'Préjudicielle ­
Gerechtshof te Leeuwarden ­
Interprétation de l'art. 2 du 
règlement nu 26/62 du Conseil 
portant application de certaines 
règles de concurrence à la 
production et au commerce des 
produits agricoles ­ Présomption 
de validité d'un accord ou d'une 
décision d'une coopérative 
agricole' 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général CO. Lenz présentés à la 
Cour plénière du 20 septembre 
1995: Aff. C­415/93 ASBL Union 
royale belge des sociétés de 
football association e.a. / Jean­
Marc Bosman: 'Préjudicielle ­
Cour d'appel de Liège ­
Interprétation des articles 48, 85 
et 86 du traité CE ­ Règles et 
pratiques des fédérations 
européennes de football 
professionnel ­ Indemnité de 
transfert ­ Système par lequel le 
transfert, vers un autre club, d'un 
joueur professionnel de football, 
arrivé au terme du contrat le 
liant à son employeur, est 
subordonné au paiement d'une 
somme d'argent entre les deux 
clubs ­ Restrictions à 
l'engagement de joueurs 
étrangers ressortissants 
communautaires' 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général G. Cosmas présentés à 
l'audience de la sixième chambre 
du 28 septembre 1995: Aff. 
C­134/94 Esso Española S.A. / 
Comunidad Autónoma de 
Canarias: 'Préjudicielle ­ Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia de Canarias 
­ Interprétation des articles 3, 
sous c), 5, 6, 30, 36, 52, 53, 56, 85 
et 102, paragraphe 1, du traité CE 
­ Réglementation nationale en 
matière d'approvisionnement 
énergétique dans le domaine 
des produits pétroliers ­
Activité des grossistes en 
produits pétroliers dans les îles 
Canaries ­ Obligation d'assurer 
le ravitaillement dans un minimum 
des 4 îles' 
Arrêt de la Cour du 5 octobre 
1995: Aff. C­96/94 Centro Servizi 
Spediporto Sri / Spedizioni 
Marittima del Golfo Sri 
Concurrence; Préjudicielle: 
'Transports routiers ­ Tarifs ­
Réglementation étatique ­
Concurrence' (Sixième chambre) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 17 octobre 
1995: Aff.jtes C­140/94, C­141/94 et 
C­142/94 DIP SpA e.a. / Comune di 
Bassano del Grappa e.a.; 
Préjudicielle: 'Réglementation du 
commerce ­ Autorisation 
d'établissement ­ Concurrence' 
(Deuxième chambre) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 19 octobre 
1995: Aff. C­19/93 Ρ Rendo NV e.a. 
/ Commission des Communautés 
européennes: 'Concurrence ­
Accord entravant l'importation et 
l'exportation d'électricité ­
Décision de la Commission ­
Abstention partielle de statuer 
sur la compatibilité dudit accord 
avec l'article 85, paragraphe 1, du 
traité' (Sixième chambre) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 24 octobre 
1995: Aff. C­70/93 Bayerische 
Motorenwerke AG / ALD 
Auto­Leasing D GmbH; 
Préjudicielle: 'Système de 
distribution sélective ­
Véhicules automobiles ­ Refus 
de livraison ­ Protection 
territoriale ­ Interprétation de 
l'article 85, paragraphe 1, du traité 
CEE et du règlement (CEE) nu 
123/85' (Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 24 octobre 
1995: Aff. C­266/93 
Bundeskartellamt / Volkswagen AG 
et VAG Leasing GmbH; 
Préjudicielle: 'Leasing en matière 
d'automobile ­ Activité d'agence 
exclusive des distributeurs pour 
la filiale du constructeur 
spécialisée dans le leasing ­
Interprétation de l'article 85, 
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paragraphe 1, du traité CEE et du 
règlement (CEE) nu 123/85' (Cour 
plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 9 novembre 
1995: Aff. C-91/94 Thierry 
Tranchant e.a.; Préjudicielle: 
'Directive 88/301 /CEE de la 
Commission - Indépendance des 
entités chargées de contrôler 
l'application des spécifications 
techniques - Laboratoires 
d'essais' (Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 16 novembre 
1995: Aff. C-244/94 Fédération 
française des sociétés 
d'assurance e.a. / Ministère de 
l'Agriculture et de la Pêche; 
Préjudicielle: 'Articles 85 et 
suivants du traité CE - Notion 
d'entreprise - Organisme chargé 
de la gestion d'un régime 
complémentaire facultatif de 
sécurité sociale' (Cour plénière) 
Conclusions de Monsieur 
l'Avocat général N. Fennelly 
présentés à l'audience de la 
sixième chambre du 7 décembre 
1995: Aff. C-18/94 Barbara 
Hopkins e.a. / National Power pic 
et Powergen pic en présence de 
British Coal Corporation: 
'Préjudicielle - High Court of 
Justice (Queen's Bench 
Division) - Interprétation des 
articles 4 et 63, paragraphe 1, du 
traité CECA et/ou de l'article 86 
du traité CEE - Producteur 
vendant son charbon à un 
opérateur indépendant qui le 
mélange à du charbon d'autres 
provenances afin d'obtenir un 
mélange qu'il vend lui-même à 
l'acheteur - Existence d'une 
discrimination quant aux 
conditions d'achat du charbon -
Existence d'une obligation vis-à-
vis des producteurs de charbon 
dont l'exécution pour être 
poursuivie devant les juridictions 
nationales' 
Arrêt de la Cour du 12 décembre 
1995: Aff.jtes C-319/93, C-40/94 et 
C-244/94 Hendrik Evert Dijkstra 
e.a. / Friesland (Frico Domo) 
Coöperatie BA Agriculture; 
Préjudicielle: 'Concurrence -
Statuts des coopératives laitières 
- Régime d'indemnité de départ -
Interprétation de l'article 2 du 
règlement nu 26' (Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 12 décembre 
1995: Aff. C-399/93 H.G. Oude 
Luttikhuis e.a. / Verenigde 
Coöperatieve Melkindustrie 
Coberco BA Agriculture; 
Préjudicielle: 'Concurrence -
Statuts des coopératives laitières 
- Régime d'indemnité de départ -
Article 85 du traité et règlement 
nu 26' (Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 14 décembre 
1995: Aff. C-387/93 Giorgio 
Domingo Banchero Libre 
circulation des marchandises; 
Préjudicielle: 'Articles 5, 30, 37, 
85, 86, 90, 92 et 95 du traité CEE' 
(Cour plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 14 décembre 
1995: Aff.jtes C-430/93 et 
C-431/93Jeroen van Schijndel 
e.a. / Stichting Pensioenfonds 
voor Fysiotherapeuten; 
Préjudicielle: 'Qualification 
comme entreprise d'un fonds 
professionnel de pension -
Affiliation obligatoire à un régime 
professionnel de pension -
Compatibilité avec les règles de 
concurrence - Possibilité 
d'invoquer pour la première fois 
en cassation un moyen de droit 
communautaire impliquant un 
changement de l'objet du litige et 
en examen des faits' (Cour 
plénière) 
Arrêt de la Cour du 15 décembre 
1995: Aff. C-415/93 Union Royale 
belge des Sociétés de football 
association ASBL e.a. / Jean-
Marc Bosman e.a. Libre circulation 
des personnes; Préjudicielle: 
'Libre circulation des travailleurs -
Règles de concurrence applicables 
aux entreprises - Joueurs 
professionnels de football -
Réglementations relatives aux 
transferts de joueurs - Clauses de 
nationalité (Cour plénière) 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
présentés à l'audience de la 
deuxième chambre du 14 
décembre 1995: Aff. C-226/94 
Grand Garage Albigeois e.a. / 
Garage Massol Sàrl; Préjudicielle -
Tribunal de commerce d'Albi -
Interprétation du règlement (CEE) 
nu 123/85 de la Commission 
concernant l'application de l'article 
85, paragraphe 3, du traité CEE à 
des catégories d'accords de 
distribution et de service de vente 
et d'après-vente de véhicules 
automobiles - Licité de l'activité 
d'un revendeur d'automobiles hors 
du réseau de distribution 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
présentés à l'audience de la 
deuxième chambre du 14 
décembre 1995: Aff. C-309/94 
Nissan France SA e.a. / Jean Luc 
Dupasquier e.a.; Voir affaire 
C-226/94. 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Main developments between 1st August and 31st December 1995 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Jon DENN ESS and John GATTI, DG IV-B 
APPLICATION OF COUNCIL 
REGULATION 4064/89 
The final five months of 1995 has seen a 
continuation of the high levels of 
notifications made under the Merger 
Regulation and consequently high 
number of decisions were taken. During 
the period 50 notifications were received 
and 46 decisions adopted taking the totals 
for the year 112 and 109 respectively. 
This represents an increase of over 20% 
compared to 1994, itself a record year. In 
the Crown Cork and Seal/Carnaud 
MetalBox, Kimberley Clark/Scott Paper 
and Gencor/Lonrho cases the 
Commission opened in depth 
investigations. In addition, a number of 
cases discussed in the previous edition 
were the subject of Commission 
decisions, Orkla/Volvo, ABB/Daimler 
Benz, RTL/Veronica/Endemol. 
Orkla/Volvo 
The Commission approved the proposed 
beverage joint venture between ORKLA 
and VOLVO after the partners amended 
their original proposals. As a condition 
for this approval the parties agreed to sell 
the Hansa brewery business, as a going, 
concern during 1996. 
During its investigation the Commission 
established that the joint venture as 
originally proposed would have a very 
large (in excess of 75%) share of the 
market for beer in Norway. In the 
individual, relevant product markets, beer 
sold to retailers and beer sold to the 
hotel and catering industry, the market 
shares were estimated to be at similar 
levels. 
Neither the retail trade nor the hotel and 
catering industry was considered able to 
offer any countervailing purchasing 
power to the proposed joint venture. In 
addition it was considered that, given 
the environmental and alcohol legislation 
currently in force in Norway, there 
was little opportunity for increased 
import penetration or the establishment 
of new brands to counteract the presence 
of the joint venture on the market for 
beer. 
The Commission concluded that the 
proposed concentration would create a 
dominant position through which 
effective competition in a substantial 
part of the territory covered by the 
EEA Agreement would be significantly 
impeded. 
ABB/Daimler Benz 
In the proposed joint venture ABB and 
Daimler Benz intended to combine their 
worldwide activities in the field of rail 
transportation. The merger will lead to 
the world's largest firm in this sector. In 
Europe, Daimler's and ABB's activities 
complement each other geographically. 
The only overlap in the parties' activities 
is in Germany where a detailed 
investigation of the competitive impact 
has been necessary. 
The Commission carried out in-depth 
investigations into eight markets, mainline 
train sets (eg high speed inter-city trains 
like the ICE and TGV), electrical 
locomotives, electrical and diesel regional 
trains, catenaries, traction power systen.s 
and trams and metros. The Commission 
concluded that the operation would not 
give rise to the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant duopoly in any of these 
markets except that for trams and metros 
(local trains). 
The markets for local trains have 
remained national in Germany, although 
in some other member states the lack of 
major national rail transportation 
industries has already led to wider 
markets. The proposed operation would 
have led to the creation of a dominant 
duopoly in the German markets for local 
trains. The major suppliers in Germany, 
with the exception of the parties and 
Siemens, are primarily producers of the 
mechanical parts of a rail vehicle, 
consequently they need partners or 
suppliers for the electrical parts. The 
concentration would also have impeded 
market entry by foreign suppliers by 
eliminating independent German suppliers 
of electrical components. Local train 
buyers voiced concerns on this issue. 
To eliminate the Commission's concerns 
the parties have agreed to the sale of 
Kiepe Elektrik GmbH (a Daimler-Benz 
subsidiary). Kiepe Elektrik GmbH is a 
firm specialised in electrical supplies for 
local trains. As a result of this divestiture 
a competent producer of electrical 
components, independent of the parties, 
remains on the German market and will 
be able to supply or cooperate with 
suppliers of the mechanical components of 
local trains. Kiepe is an established and 
successful supplier. It has also played an 
important role in helping to open up the 
German market through its cooperation 
with the Canadian firm, Bombardier. This 
divestiture structurally underpins the 
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continued opening-up of the German 
market . 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol 
The Commission decided that the Dutch 
tv joint venture Holland Media Groep SA 
(HMG) cannot be approved under the EC 
Merger Regulation. As a result the 
creation of HMG has been declared 
incompatible with the common market. 
HMG is a joint venture between RTL4 
SA (RTL), Vereniging Veronica 
Omroeporganisatie (Veronica) and 
Endemol Entertainment Holding BV 
(Endemol). The parent companies of RTL 
are the Luxembourg broadcasting group 
CLT and the Dutch publishing group 
VNU. RTL has transferred its 
broadcasting activities in the Netherlands 
to HMG, in particular the two 
commercial tv channels RTL4 and RTL5. 
A third channel has been brought into 
HMG by Veronica which became a fully-
fledged commercial channel as from 1 
September 1995. The other main parent, 
Endemol, is the largest independent 
producer of tv programmes in the 
Netherlands. 
On the basis of its investigation the 
Commission has concluded that, with its 
three channels HMG will achieve a very 
strong position on the Dutch market for 
tv broadcasting, which is likely to result 
in an audience share of more than 40%. 
As a consequence, the audience share of 
the public broadcasters will be 
substantially reduced. HMG therefore will 
become the largest tv broadcaster in the 
Netherlands. 
The market position of broadcasters in 
the tv advertising market is largely 
determined by their audience shares. As 
a result of its high audience shares 
therefore HMG will become by far the 
strongest player on the Dutch tv 
advertising market. In 1994 the two RTL 
channels had a market share of around 
50% in tv advertising although their share 
of the viewers' market was only 32%. 
With the addition of the Veronica 
channel, HMG's market share is likely to 
be at least 60%. A particular strength of 
HMG as compared with its competitors is 
that it is able to cover the most important 
target groups for advertisers by 
coordinating the programme scheduling 
of its three channels. By contrast, given 
the complex structure of the Dutch public 
broadcasting system, it is more difficult 
for the three public channels to act in the 
same way. The market power of HMG is 
also likely to have an adverse effect on 
the opportunities for the small 
competitors to compete and for potential 
new entrants on this market. As a result 
the Commission has concluded that HMG 
will obtain a dominant position on the 
market for tv advertising in the 
Netherlands. 
The Commission considers that Endemol, 
by far the largest independent Dutch tv 
producer, already has a dominant position 
on the Dutch tv production market. Apart 
from Endemol this market is highly 
fragmented with only a few producers of 
any size which are nevertheless very 
small compared with Endemol. Through 
its participation in HMG Endemol has 
obtained a structural link to the leading 
broadcaster in the Netherlands by 
providing it with preferential access to 
the largest customer in the Dutch tv 
production market. As a result Endemol's 
already dominant position on this market 
will be further strengthened. 
The Commission's examination of this 
case was initiated following a request 
from the Dutch government to this effect, 
in the absence of which the Commission 
would have had no jurisdiction to deal 
with the case since the requisite turnover 
thresholds set out in the Merger 
Regulation were not attained by the 
parties concerned and jurisdiction rests 
with the Member States. However, in this 
situation a Member State is entitled under 
Article 22 of the Regulation to request 
the Commission to take over the case. 
Since there is no suspension effect for 
cases under Article 22 the parties have 
been entitled to complete the operation. 
The present decision does not prevent 
HMG from continuing its activities. The 
measures needed to restore effective 
competition on the Dutch tv advertising 
and production markets will be adopted at 
a later date. In the meantime, the parties 
have been invited by the Commission to 
propose appropriate measures within three 
months to this effect. 
Crown Cork and Seal/Carnaud 
MetalBox 
The Commission authorised the proposed 
acquisition of Carnaud Metalbox S.A. by 
Crown Cork & Seal, Inc., subject to the 
fulfilment of divestiture commitments 
made by Crown in order to meet the 
competition concerns identified by the 
Commission. Following a detailed second 
phase investigation, the Commission 
concluded that Crown's commitment to 
divest a specified group of tinplate aerosol 
can operations would be sufficient to 
overcome the competition concerns raised 
by the proposed operation in the EEA 
market for the production and sale of 
tinplate aerosol cans. The concentration 
will create the world's largest packaging 
company. 
In the EEA, both parties produce and sell 
tinplate aerosol cans and food cans, as 
well as certain closures for beverage cans 
and bottles, including beverage can ends, 
metal crowns and plastic and aluminium 
caps. After extensive analysis of both the 
horizontal and vertical issues raised, the 
Commission determined that the only 
market in which the proposed 
concentration threatened to create a 
dominant position was the market for 
tinplate aerosol cans. 
In the market for food cans, the 
Commission noted that Crown is only 
present to a minor degree in the various 
national food can markets, with the 
exception of the Benelux region where 
both parties have a substantial presence. 
However, the Commission concluded that 
the parties' combined share would not 
create or strengthen a dominant position in 
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Benelux and it would not significantly 
change the preexisting competitive 
position of Carnaud Metalbox in the 
remaining Member States. 
The investigation led the Commission to 
conclude that the planned concentration 
would have a negative impact on 
competition in the EEA market for the 
production and sale of tinplate aerosol 
cans. In that market, the combined 
market share of the two market leaders 
(CMB with 40% and Crown with 25%) 
would exceed 60% in the EEA. The 
closest competitor, Schmalbach-Lubeca (a 
subsidiary of Continental Can of Europe), 
would have a market share of 15% to 
20% and no other competitor would have 
more than 5% of this market. 
Furthermore, Crown and CMB are the 
two market leaders in know-how, R&D 
and technology and uniquely have 
European-wide plant coverage from 
which they serve the full range of aerosol 
can customers. Thus, the combined 
entity would have been in a unique 
position and could have behaved 
independently of competition in the 
tinplate aerosol can market. 
The Commission determined that the new 
firm would not be constrained from 
exercising market power. The remaining 
competitors have neither the necessary 
production capacity, the geographical 
flexibility, nor the technical abilities to 
qualify as a primary supplier for most 
customers. In addition, the 
countervailing power of customers would 
be inadequate, as they would have no 
credible alternative to the new group. 
Finally, there is no substantial potential 
competition, as there are significant 
barriers to entry created by know-how 
requirements and the large excess 
capacity in the hands of the parties. 
Thus, the Commission concluded that the 
proposed merger would create a dominant 
position for the parties in this market. 
In order to eliminate the Commission's 
competition concerns regarding the loss 
of one of the major operators in the 
tinplate aerosol can market, Crown 
proposed to modify the original 
concentration plan by offering to divest 
certain overlapping plants in a divestiture 
package. Specifically, Crown will sell its 
aerosol plant in Southall and supporting 
operations in Tredegar (UK) and its 
aerosol assets and operations in Voghera 
(Italy), as well as the CarnaudMetalbox 
plants in Laon (France), Reus (Spain) and 
Schwedt (Germany). 
Kimberly-Clarke/Scott Paper 
The Commission decided to initiate 
proceedings under the Merger Regulation 
in relation to the proposed merger 
between Kimberly-Clark Corporation and 
Scott Paper Company on 12 September 
1995. Both companies are based in the 
United States. Kimberly-Clark produces 
and sells a wide range of paper and 
related products worldwide. The majority 
of its turnover is generated by tissue and 
related products designed for both 
consumer and industrial (away-from-
home) use. Scott is active worldwide 
primarily in the manufacture and sale of 
tissue products for consumer and away-
from-home use. 
The merger would create the largest 
manufacturer of tissue products in the 
world as well as in Europe with more 
than twice the worldwide capacity of the 
next largest competitor. It would combine 
the marketing and technical strengths of 
Kimberly-Clark and Scott as well as their 
brands Kleenex (Europe), Scottex (the 
continent), and Andrex (United 
Kingdom) 
In its preliminary enquiry the 
Commission identified several markets 
where the combined shares enjoyed by 
the parties, especially with regard to 
branded consumer tissue products, gave 
rise to concern that the merger would 
create or strengthen a dominant position 
which would substantially impede 
competition. In particular the parties have 
extremely high combined shares in the 
United Kingdom consumer markets for 
toilet tissue, kitchen towels and 
hankies/facials, as well as a strong 
position in the overall UK tissue market 
including away-from-home products; for 
example, the combined market share of 
the parties would appear to exceed 75 per 
cent for branded toilet tissue and branded 
hankies/facials and 50 per cent for 
branded kitchen towels. The parties also 
enjoy strong positions in Ireland and Italy 
and their brand strengths may give rise to 
competition concerns in other member 
states of the European Union. 
On 12 December 1995 the Commission 
granted to Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper 
Company a partial derogation from the 
suspension of the implementation of the 
proposed merger between them it had 
imposed in September. The effect of the 
derogation was that the parties were able 
to complete the merger following 
meetings of their shareholders but that 
they must hold separate the EEA business 
of Scott pending the Commission's final 
decision. 
In granting the derogation the Commission 
took into account the fact that the parties 
had proposed a remedy, involving the 
divestment of specified assets relating to 
consumer tissue markets in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, to the concerns 
which the Commission had expressed 
about the effects of the merger.The 
Commission also took into account the 
loss of staff and the fall in revenue which 
Scott's business had experienced since the 
merger was announced and the safeguards 
incorporated into the derogation which 
included the appointment by the parties of 
an independent oversight person to 
monitor their compliance with the hold-
separate undertaking. The Commission 
must take a final decision on the merits of 
the merger and its effects on the relevant 
EEA markets no later than 22 January 
1996. 
Gencor/Lonrho 
The Commission decided on 22 December 
to initiate a detailed investigation into the 
proposed merger of the PGM (platinum 
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group metals) interests of Gencor and 
Lonrho which are located in South 
Africa. Both Gencor and Lonrho have 
substantial operations in the European 
Union, and at this stage of its 
investigation the Commission considers 
that the scope of the geographic market 
for PGMs is worldwide. 
The merger involves share exchanges 
between the two companies with respect 
to Impala Platinum Holdings Limited, 
Eastern Platinum Limited and Western 
Platinum Limited. 
The operation will result in Lonrho 
receiving new shares in Impala. These 
shares would be listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the 
International Stock Exchange in London. 
Following the issue of new shares Gencor 
and Lonrho will each hold about 32% of 
the shares in Impla. The remaining shares 
will be held by the public. 
The Commission has decided to initiate 
the second phase, four month 
investigation into the effects of the 
operation because of concerns that the 
merged company may have an adverse 
effect on competition in the PGM market. 
A final decision must be taken before 7 
May 1996. 
Repola/Kymmene 
The Commission approved an operation 
by which Repola Corporation and 
Kymmene Corporation enter into a full 
merger. Repola and Kymmene are large 
international companies active in the 
fields of printing paper and packaging 
materials. The operation involves among 
others the product markets of newsprint, 
magazine paper and paper sacks. 
In paper sacks the Commission's 
investigation lead to the conclusion that 
there is a separate Finnish market for this 
product and that the concentration would 
lead to the creation of a dominant 
position on the Finnish market. Repola 
and Kymmene have dominated the 
Finnish market for several years and by 
the operation the new company would be 
nearly the sole provider of paper sacks to 
Finnish customers. 
However, Repola and Kymmene have 
entered into commitments vis a vis the 
Commission which remove the serious 
doubts as to the proposed operations 
compatibility with the common market. 
The commitments involve divestiture of 
some of Repola and Kymmene's paper 
sack capacity on the Finnish market. 
The markets for newsprint and magazine 
paper are at least Western European in 
scope and Repola/Kymmene as well as 
all the other major European paper 
producers transport and market their 
products in almost all Member States. 
Due to the operation the new company 
will be the major European player in 
newsprint and magazine paper. However, 
their combined market shares will not 
exceed approximately 20% in any of the 
two product markets and several other 
competitors have strong positions. 
Repola is, together with five other 
Finnish paper producers, a member of 
Finnpap Marketing Association. Finnpap 
is a joint sales organisation which 
markets the paper products of the 
members on a world wide basis. 
Kymmene has its own sales network and 
is not a member of Finnpap. The parties 
have committed themselves within a 
given date not to sell paper products 
through the Finnpap joint sales agency. 
For the above reasons, and the 
commitments given by Repola and 
Kymmene, the Commission has 
concluded that the concentration does not 
create or strengthen a dominant position 
and has decided not to oppose it and 
declare it compatible with the common 
market. 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
In 1995 there was a marked increase, to 
six, in the number of cases involving 
pharmaceutical companies compared to 
previous years. In 1993 and 1994 
respectively there were two and three 
notifiable cases in the sector. 
There appear to be two main driving 
forces towards increased concentration in 
the sector. Research and development is 
essential for the future of these 
companies. Only very large companies 
can now support the costs of research 
necessary to ensure a continued flow of 
new products. The cost of research is 
escalating, patent protection is limited in 
time while the approval procedures for 
new products are becoming more stringent 
and time consuming. 
The second reason is that companies wish 
to provide a wider range of products. This 
enables the merged group to become a 
more competitive supplier to wholesalers, 
hospitals and pharmacy chains. A wider 
product range also reduces the risk that 
the demise of a single product has a 
disproportionate effect on the company's 
future. 
This search for complementary partners 
means that although the result of a merger 
between pharmaceutical companies may 
be a very large undertaking there are often 
only minimal increases in market share for 
individual products. The merger between 
Glaxo and Welcome which created the 
world's largest pharmaceutical company 
gave rise to competition concerns only in 
relation to anti-migraine drugs. Similarly 
in Rhône Poulenc/Fisons and 
Upjohn/Pharmacia the areas of overlap 
were very limited. 
The Commission has also examined the 
pharmaceutical companies' "pipelines", ie 
potential new products at various states of 
development, in its evaluation of mergers. 
It was particularly concerned that a 
merger which did not give rise to 
competition concerns at the time of 
notification would not give rise to 
problems in the future. This requires 
careful evaluation as a large majority of 
products in development do not reach lhe 
market place. In this respect only products 
in the final stages of clinical trials and 
close to lhe market and were considered. 
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REVIEW OF THE MERGER 
REGULATION 
The introduction of Community merger 
control procedures in 1990 established 
the powers of the Commission to 
appraise concentrations between large 
companies with operations falling within 
the European Union. The Commission's 
"one­stop shop" to multi­national merger 
control, has been widely heralded as a 
success. 
After five years' experience the 
Commission is required, by a 1993 
Council resolution, to examine the 
operation the Merger Regulation 
particularly the level of the turnover 
thresholds, above which concentrations 
are notifiable to the Commission and the 
way in which transactions are referred to 
and from the Commission and the 
Member States. The Commission is, in 
addition, taking the opportunity to 
respond to other shortcomings in the 
Regulation and to criticisms of its 
operation to date. A Green Paper which 
will be published shortly will launch a 
widespread consultation process regarding 
various elements of possible reform in 
this area. 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 66 OF 
THE ECSC TREATY 
In the period under consideration the 
Commission took two decisions on 
concentrations under the merger 
provisions of the ECSC Treaty making 
seven in all for the year. These decisions 
concerned the establishment of joint 
ventures between USINOR SACILOR and 
HOOGOVENS and between RIVA and 
FREIRE which respectively acquired SN­
PLANOS and SN­LONGOS thereby 
effecting the privatisation of the 
Portuguese steel industry. ■ 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press releases are available on-line from the 
RAPID database, on the day of their publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain access to RAPID, please write to EUR-OP 
Information, Marketing and Public Relations (OP/4B) 2 rue Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg tel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 2929 42763 
BIO/95/360 : CARNAUD METALBOX, 
CROWN, CORK & SEAL CASE: 
COMMENTS OF MR VAN MIERT 
[95/10/10] 
IP/95/881 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES ACQUISITION OF 
KLEINWORT BENSON BY DRESDNER 
BANK [95/08/01] 
IP/95/893 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION BY JEFFERSON 
SMURFIT OF MUNKSJÖ [95/08/01] 
IP/95/929 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
ACQUISITION OF SOLE CONTROL OF 
SUN LIFY BY UAP [95/08/23] 
IP/95/930 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION BY CREDIT LOCAL DE 
FRANCE OF BERLIN­BASED 
HYPOTHEKENBANK [95/08/24] 
IP/95/931 : COMMISSION GIVES 
GO­AHEAD TO TAKEOVER OF 
FRANCE VIE AND FRANCE IARD BY 
GENERALI [95/08/24] 
IP/95/950 : THE COMMISSION CLEARS 
PROPOSED JOINT VENTURE 
BETWEEN NORANDA FOREST INC 
AND GLUNZ AG IN THE SECTOR OF 
WOOD BASED AND BOARD 
PRODUCTS [95/09/11] 
IP/95/952 : THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION AUTHORISED A JOINT 
VENTURE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
AVIONS DE TRANSPORT REGIONAL 
(ATR) AND BRITISH AEROSPACE 
(BAE) [95/09/11] 
IP/95/968 : COMMISSION OPENS FULL 
INVESTIGATION INTO PROPOSED 
MERGER BETWEEN KIMBERLY­
CLARK AND SCOTT PAPER [95/09/12] 
IP/95/978 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE ACQUISITION BY RICOH OF 
GESTETNER [95/09/14] 
IP/95/922 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
ESTABLISHMENT OF CABLE AND 
WIRELESS AND VEBA TELE­
COMMUNICATIONS JOINT 
VENTURES [95/08/181 
IP/95/928 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE THOMSON­CSF / TENEO / INDRA 
JOINT VENTURE [95/08/23] 
IP/95/932 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
CAPITAL INJECTION BY NORDIC 
CAPITAL INTO THE SWEDISH 
TRAVEL GROUP TRANSPOOL 
[95/08/24] 
IP/95/935 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE IN THE FIELD OF 
FLEXIBLE PACKAGING [95/08/29] 
IP/95/984 : COMMISSION FINDS 
BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO/BT 
TELECOMS JOINT VENTURE 
ALBACOM TO BE OUTSIDE THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE MERGER 
REGULATION [95/09/21] 
IP/95/985 : THE COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE ACQUISITION OF CREDIT 
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LYONNAIS BANK NEDERLAND N.V. 
BY GENERALE BANK N.V. [95/09/27] 
IP/95/995 : HOLLAND MEDIA GROUP 
- DUTCH TV JOINT VENTURE 
CANNOT BE CLEARED IN ITS 
CURRENT FORM. - COMMISSION & 
PARTIES POSITIVELY DISCUSS 
SOLUTIONS [95/09/20] 
IP/95/1021 : ORKLA/VOLVO : 
COMMISSION ACCEPTS JOINT 
VENTURE AFTER COMMITMENT TO 
SELL THE HANSA BREWERY 
[95/09/20] 
IP/95/1024 : COMMISSION DECIDES 
THAT TAKEOVER OF FISONS BY 
RHONE POULENC DOES NOT RAISE 
COMPETITION ISSUES [95/09/22] 
IP/95/1059 : COMMISSION APROVES 
THE MERGER OF UPJOHN AND 
PHARMACIA [95/10/02] 
IP/95/1085 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
A JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN KNP 
BT AND SOCIETE GENERALE IN THE 
FIELD OF DISTRIBUTION, 
MAINTENANCE, ENGINEERING AND 
TRAINING IN THE PROFESSIONAL 
PC MARKET. [95/10/04] 
IP/95/1126 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
RAIL TRANSPORTATION JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN ABB AND 
DAIMLER- BENZ [95/10/18] 
SWISS LIFE OF A CONTROLLING 
INTEREST IN THE CAPITAL OF 
I.N.C.A. [95/10/26] 
IP/95/1177 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE MERGER BETWEEN 
CHEMICAL BANKING CORPORATION 
AND THE CHASE MANHATTAN 
CORPORATION. [95/10/27] 
IP/95/1182 : FINNISH PAPER 
INDUSTRY: COMMISSION CLEARS 
FULL MERGER BETWEEN REPOLA 
AND KYMMENE [95/10/30] 
IP/95/1245 : CROWN CORK & 
SEAL/CARNAUDMETALBOX: THE 
COMMISSION IMPOSES STRICT 
CONDITIONS [95/11/14] 
IP/95/1282 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE ACQUISITION OF SOVAC BY GE 
CAPITAL [95/11/22] 
IP/95/1290 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE MERGER BETWEEN 
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY INC.AND 
CONNER PERIPHERALS INC. 
[95/11/24] 
IP/95/1323 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
A JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN 
MCDERMOTT AND ETPM IN THE 
FIELD OF THE PROVISION OF 
MARINE CONSTRUCTION SERVICES 
TO THE OFFSHORE AND GAS 
INDUSTRIES [95/11/30] 
IP/95/1379 : MINING SECTOR : 
COMMISSION CLEARS THE MERGER 
BETWEEN RTZ AND CRA [95/12/11] 
IP/95/1382 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES THE ACQUISITION OF 
ROTH FRERES BY JOHNSON 
CONTROLS [95/12/12] 
IP/95/1383 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE ACQUISITION BY 
MONTEDISON OF GARDINI'S 
SHAREHOLDING IN SCI [95/12/12] 
IP/95/1385 : COMMISSION GRANTS 
PARTIAL DEROGATION FROM 
SUSPENSION ON COMPLETION OF 
MERGER BETWEEN 
KIMBERLY-CLARK AND SCOTT 
PAPER [95/12/12] 
IP/95/1449 : COMMISSION INITIATES 
DETAILED INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
MERGER OF THE PLATINUM 
OPERATIONS OF GENCOR AND 
LONRHO [95/12/21] 
IP/95/1467 : COMMISSION DECIDES 
THAT ACQUISITION OF UBS BY 
SWISS LIFE IS NOT OF COMMUNITY 
LEVEL [95/12/22] 
IP/95/1468 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN BAYERISCHE 
LANDESBANK AND AUSTRIAN 
TRADE UNIONS [95/12/22] 
IP/95/1154 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
TAKEOVER OF SCHWARZKOPF BY 
HENKEL [95/10/19] 
IP/95/1164 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES THE ACQUISITION OF 
CONTROL OF SOCIETE NATIONALE 
DE CREDIT A L'INDUSTRIE BY 
CAISSE GENERALE D'EPARGNE ET 
DE RETRAITE BANQUE [95/10/24] 
IP/95/1165 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
CREATION OF A JOINT VENTURE BY 
RHONE- POULENC CHIMIE AND 
ENGELHARD S.A. [95/10/24] 
IP/95/1174 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES THE ACQUISITION BY 
IP/95/1327 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES CEP COMMUNICATION 
(A HAVAS SUBSIDIARY) TO 
ACQUIRE CONTROL OF GROUPE DE 
LA CITE, L'EXPRESS AND LE POINT 
[95/12/01] 
IP/95/1335 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE PROPOSED ENTRY OF 
BERTELSMANN INTO THE 
CONTROLLING BLOCK OF TELE 
MONTE CARLO [95/12/04] 
IP/95/1354 : COMMISSION OPENS AN 
ENQUIRY ON THE ALLIANCE 
AMERICA ONLINE / BERTELSMANN / 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM [95/12/06] 
IP/95/1469 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
TAKEOVER OF NORTHUMBRIAN 
WATER BY LYONNAISE [95/12/22] 
IP/95/1470 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
HYDRAULIC EXCAVATOR JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN MANNESMANN 
DEMAG AND KOMATSU [95/12/22] 
IP/95/1471 : THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE PROPOSED 
ACQUISITION OF ALUMIX BY ALCOA 
[95/12/22] 
IP/95/1472 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES THE ACQUISITION OF 
HARTMANN & BRAUN BY ELSAG 
BAILEY [95/12/22] 
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Application of Article 90 EC 
Main developments between 1st August and 31st December 1995 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by José-Luis BUENDIA, DG IV-A-1 
GENERAL 
Pendant le deuxième semestre de l'année, 
la Commission a poursuivi ses efforts 
visant à introduire la concurrence dans 
des secteurs traditionnellement 
m o n o p o l i s é s , c o m m e l e s 
télécommunications, l'énergie, les 
services postaux ou les transports. 
Elle a eu recours, selon les cas, aux 
différents instruments que le Traité lui 
offre, tant dans le cadre de ses fonctions 
d'initiative législative que dans le cadre 
de sa mission de surveillance du Droit 
communautaire. 
Ainsi, par exemple, des propositions de 
directives du Conseil et du Parlement 
concernant les secteurs de l'énergie et de 
l'assistance aéroportuaire sont en 
discussion à l'heure actuelle au sein du 
Conseil. Il faut constater que, si 
l'évolution du dossier assistance en escale 
a été assez satisfaisante, la situation du 
dossier énergie ne l'est pas du tout, après 
plusieurs années de blocage au sein du 
Conseil. 
Dans d'autres cas, la Commission s'est 
vue obligée de poursuivre des infractions 
aux règles du Traité. A cet effet, elle a 
parfois eu recours aux instruments prévus 
à l'article 90§3 du Traité CE. Elle a ainsi 
adopté, entre août et décembre 1995, 
deux décisions et une directive fondées 
sur cette disposition. L'adoption de deux 
autres directives de l'article 90§3 est 
envisagée pour le début de l'année 1996. 
Lorsque la Commission a considéré 
nécessaire d'adopter des mesures 
générales comme des directives article 
90§3, elle l'a fait dans le cadre d'une 
procédure transparente comportant des 
consultations des Etats membres et des 
institutions et parties concernées. 
Dans l'exercice de ses compétences, la 
Commission a toujours accordé une 
attention particulière au maintien des 
objectifs d'intérêt économique général 
prévus à l'article 90§2 du Traité. Elle a 
donc adopté les mesures nécessaires à la 
compatibilité entre l'ouverture à la 
concurrence et le maintien des services 
publics au bénéfice des consommateurs. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Directive Art. 90§3 sur l'ouverture 
des réseaux de TV par câble pour la 
fourniture de services de 
télécommunications 
La Commission a adopté le 18.10.1995 la 
directive 95/51/CE (JOCE n° L 256 du 
26.10.1995, p. 49-54) qui vise à 
permettre, à partir du 1er janvier 1996, 
l'utilisation des réseaux de télévision par 
câble pour la fourniture des services de 
télécommunications déjà libéralises, tels 
que le multi-media, le téléshopping, les 
services éducatifs, les bases de données 
"on-line", les transactions à distance, etc. 
L'adoption par la Commission de cette 
directive sur la base des pouvoirs 
reconnus par l'article 90§3 du Traité CE 
fait suite au processus de consultation 
préalablement entamé sur le projet 
(publié au JOCE n° C 76 du 28.03.1995, 
p. 8-12) auquel ont participé les autres 
Institutions communautaires, les Autorités 
des Etats membres, les opérateurs du 
secteur et les représentants des 
consommateurs (voir EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter, vol. 1, n. 4, p. 40-41). 
En effet, dans la majorité des Etats 
membres, les législations nationales en 
vigueur limitent l'utilisation de réseaux 
de TV par câble aux seuls services de 
diffusion de programmes télévisés. Ces 
dispositions réglementaires empêchent 
donc les opérateurs de TV par câble 
d'offrir des services interactifs nouveaux. 
L'objectif essentiel de la Commission est 
de lever ces restrictions afin d'encourager 
l'investissement et de susciter des projets 
pilotes et des nouvelles initiatives dans ce 
domaine. 
En outre, cette initiative devrait également 
mettre à la disposition de tous les 
fournisseurs de services de 
télécommunication des moyens alternatifs 
pour atteindre le consommateur final -
plutôt que de devoir transiter 
exclusivement par les opérateurs de 
télécom qui disposent encore généralement 
d'un monopole - et engendrer ainsi une 
baisse des coûts. 
Comme c'est le cas pour la récente 
directive sur les satellites, la directive sur 
le câble entraîne une modification de la 
directive 90/388/CEE sur les services de 
télécommunication, en ce sens que les 
fournisseurs de services auront désormais 
le choix de recourir aux réseaux de 
télévision par câble. 
Cette nouvelle directive ne change en rien 
les droits des Etats membres de maintenir 
le monopole en matière de téléphonie 
vocale de base jusqu'en 1998. En effet, la 
Commission a considéré que le maintien 
de ces derniers services sous monopole 
peut être justifié à l'heure actuelle en 
raison du fait que les revenus qu'ils 
génèrent sont encore nécessaires pour le 
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développement d'un réseau universel de 
télécommunications, objectif qui est 
considéré comme étant d'intérêt 
économique général au sens de 
l'acception de l'art. 90§2 du Traité CE. 
Au cours de la consultation engagée sur le 
projet de directive, le Parlement européen 
et d'autres parties ont proposé d'étendre la 
portée du texte de manière à permettre 
aux opérateurs de télécommunications 
d'offrir des services de télévision par 
câble. La Commission n'a pas considéré 
envisageable d'intégrer ce concept de 
réciprocité dans la directive sur la 
libéralisation du câble. Elle estime 
toutefois qu'il est tout à fait envisageable 
d'évoquer cette possibilité dans le 
contexte de la libéralisation totale des 
télécommunications prévue pour 1998. 
La directive offre la possibilité de 
recourir sans restriction aux capacités des 
réseaux de TV par câble pour tous les 
services de télécommunications, à 
l'exception de la téléphonie vocale de 
base, et ce, à partir du 1er janvier 1996. 
Ceci couvre, en particulier, les 
communications de données, les réseaux 
de communications "fermés" d'entreprises 
et les services multi-media. Enfin, les 
réseaux de TV par câble peuvent d'une 
part se connecter au réseau public 
national de télécommunication et d'autre 
part s'interconnecter entre eux. 
La directive traite également les cas où 
certains opérateurs de télécommunication 
sont en même temps propriétaires de 
sociétés de TV par câble. II est, dans ces 
cas, demandé aux Etats membres 
d'assurer la transparence et la séparation 
des comptes des deux activités à partir 
d'un chiffre d'affaires de 50 millions 
d'Ecus dans le marché des services de 
télécommunications autres que la 
distribution des services de radio et de 
télévision dans la zone géographique 
concernée. La Commission vérifiera, 
avant le 1er janvier 1998, si cette 
séparation comptable est suffisante pour 
éviter des pratiques abusives. 
Il convient de signaler que la 
Commission a envoyé des demandes 
d'information aux opérateurs de 
télécommunications italien, irlandais et 
espagnol afin de vérifier, soit de sa 
propre initiative, soit sur la base d'une 
plainte (le cas espagnol), la portée 
juridique et les effets sur la concurrence 
de l'entrée de ces détenteurs d'un 
monopole en matière d'infrastructure de 
télécommunications sur le marché de la 
TV par câble. 
Projet de directive Art. 90§3 sur la 
téléphonie mobile 
Suite à la consultation sur le projet 
publiée en juin dernier (voir EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, vol. 1, n. 
5, p. 37-38), la Commission européenne 
a marqué, dans sa réunion du 20.12.1995, 
son accord de principe sur une directive 
article 90§3 ouvrant à la concurrence le 
marché de la téléphonie mobile. 
L'adoption définitive de la directive par 
la Commission est envisagée pour le 
début de l'année 1996. L'objectif de la 
Commission est d'assurer un niveau de 
concurrence équitable tant pour l'octroi 
des licences aux opérateurs que pour la 
gestion des réseaux de téléphonie mobile 
dans l'Union européenne. Cela doit 
favoriser l'entrée sur le marché de 
nouveaux entrants et faciliter 
l'interconnexion des réseaux nationaux. 
Décision article 90§3 sur les conditions 
d'octroi de la deuxième licence de 
téléphonie mobile GSM en Italie 
La Commission européenne a adopté, le 
04.10.1995 une décision 95/489/CE 
(JOCE n° L 280 du 23.11.1995, p. 49-
57), fondée sur l'article 90§3 du Traité 
CE, exigeant du gouvernement italien que 
le deuxième opérateur GSM en Italie, à 
savoir Omnitel Pronto Italia, soit traité de 
manière équitable. La Commission 
demande aux autorités italiennes de 
mettre fin, en effet, à ce qu'elle juge être 
une distorsion de concurrence, en raison 
du "droit d'entrée" - en l'occurrence 750 
milliards de LIT - que doit acquitter 
uniquement le deuxième opérateur GSM 
en Italie. 
La Commission veut que des conditions 
équitables soient rétablies : 
- soit en exigeant un paiement similaire 
de la part du premier opérateur GSM; 
- soit, après accord de la Commission, en 
adoptant des mesures correctives 
équivalentes, en termes économiques, au 
paiement effectué par le second 
opérateur. 
Cela étant, la Commission note que des 
progrès ont été accomplis dans ce dossier 
en Italie: ainsi, récemment, un projet de 
loi a été présenté qui comporte des 
éléments de réformes fondamentales du 
marché italien des télécommunications. Ce 
projet prévoit, entre autres, la 
libéralisation des infrastructures 
alternatives pour les communications 
mobiles. 
Un des problèmes majeurs identifiés par la 
Commission européenne est celui des 
procédures d'enchère que certains Etats 
membres, dont l'Italie, ont incluses dans 
les critères de sélection du second 
opérateur GSM. Dans ce cas, la licence 
est accordée non seulement sur la base 
d'une comparaison des éléments qualitatifs 
présentés par les candidats, à savoir la 
couverture géographique, l'expertise dans 
le secteur, les tarifs envisagés, mais 
également sur la base d'une offre 
financière dépassant un seuil déterminé. 
La Commission a critiqué cette pratique 
d'enchère dans son livre vert de 1994 sur 
les communications mobiles estimant que 
cela constitue une charge supplémentaire 
à l'égard de technologies innovantes qui 
auront des répercussions également pour 
les futurs utilisateurs. 
De l'analyse que la Commission a faite 
jusqu'à présent des procédures de 
sélection, il ressort clairement que le 
recours à des enchères pour la selection 
du second opérateur GSM délbouche sur 
des dangers de distorsion de com'iirre««.. 
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Au mois de décembre 1994 la 
Commission avait décidé d'entamer une 
action au titre de l'art.90 du Traité à 
l'égard de l'Italie : elle annonçait à cette 
occasion qu'elle mettrait un terme à cette 
procédure si l'Italie supprimait le "droit 
d'entrée" ou imposait un même droit 
d'entrée à l'opérateur en place ou encore 
en appliquant des mesures de 
compensation adéquates en faveur du 
second opérateur. 
Autres initiatives dans le secteur des 
télécommunications 
A la suite de l'ouverture de la procédure 
prévue à l'article 90 du traité CE par la 
Commission, le ministère allemand des 
postes et télécommunications a octroyé 
une nouvelle licence en vue de la 
création et l'exploitation d'un nouveau 
réseau important de télécommunications. 
Vebacom est une filiale de VEBA AG, 
un holding allemand de services publics. 
En avril 1995, elle a déposé plainte 
auprès de la direction générale de la 
concurrence de la Commission, après 
plusieurs tentatives infructueuses 
d'obtenir une licence pour un réseau de 
télécommunications à large bande 
utilisant la technologie HNS, qui 
permettrait la transmission de données 
entre 36 sites différents de la chaîne 
publique de télévision allemande ARD. 
La Commission a considéré que la plainte 
était fondée, en particulier en raison du 
fait que Vebacom envisage d'offrir un 
service basé sur une technologie nouvelle 
(HNS) non proposée par Deutsche 
Telekom AG, qui détient le monopole de 
l'infrastructure en Allemagne. Le refus 
d'autoriser ce nQuveau service constitué 
dès lors un frein au progrès technique. 
Après des discussions informelles avec la 
Commission, le ministère allemand des 
postes et télécommunications vient 
d'accepter d'octroyer la licence réclamée. 
Par ces nouvelles infrastructures de 
télécommunications, on entend 
généralement les réseaux de 
télécommunications possédés et gérés par 
des entreprises autres que les opérateurs 
de télécommunications traditionnels, tels 
que les distributeurs d'électricité et les 
chemins de fer. Actuellement, des 
restrictions réglementaires limitent, dans 
la plupart des Etats membres, l'utilisation 
de ces réseaux aux besoins internes de 
l'entreprise à laquelle ils appartiennent. 
Ces entreprises ne sont donc pas 
autorisées à louer les capacités 
disponibles à des tiers. Ces limitations 
constituent un obstacle majeur à 
l'introduction, d'ici à 1998, d'un 
environnement réglementaire totalement 
libéralisé pour le secteur des 
télécommunications; en effet, la demande 
de location de ces capacités est très forte, 
mais ne peut généralement être satisfaite 
que par l'entreprise qui détient le 
monopole. 
Pour éviter notamment une multiplication 
de procédures d'infraction dans des cas 
similaires, la Commission a adopté le 19 
juillet 1995 en première lecture un projet 
de directive fondée sur l'article 90§3 du 
Traité CE, en vue de la libéralisation 
générale des infrastructures. Cette 
directive vise aussi la libéralisation totale 
pour 1998 des se rv ices de 
télécommunication non encore libéralisés 
(la téléphonie vocale). Ce projet a été 
publié au JOCE n' C 263 du 10.10.1995, 
P. 6-17, aux fins d'une consultation 
publique similaire à celle réalisée pour le 
projet de directive concernant la 
téléphonie mobile. 
ENERGIE 
Les ministres européens de l'Energie 
réunis à Bruxelles le 20.12.1995 ont 
constaté la persistance de leurs 
désaccords sur le projet de directive de 
libéralisation du marché de l'électricité, 
qui repousse une fois de plus l'échéance 
d'une directive sur ce thème. 
Les ministres n'ont pas pu se mettre 
d'accord sur un relevé de conclusions 
communes de leurs débats du jour. Seul 
un texte de la présidence espagnole 
estimant que les négociations en étaient 
arrivées au stade final rendant possible 
l'adoption d'une position commune à un 
prochain conseil des ministres de 
l'énergie début 1996, a été publié à l'issue 
des travaux. 
Même si le principe de la coexistence de 
deux systèmes, celui de "l'accès des tiers 
au réseau" et celui de "l'acheteur 
unique", a été accepté en juin dernier, ceci 
a été fait sous certaines conditions. Celles-
ci portent notamment sur la transparence 
des prix de transport et l'absence de 
discrimination, l'introduction d'un système 
d'autorisations accordées à des 
producteurs indépendants parallèlement 
aux procédures de mise en concurrence 
dans la zone couverte par l'acheteur 
unique, la négociation des contrats de 
fourniture à l'étranger pour les 
consommateurs éligibles à l'intérieur du 
système d'acheteur unique, la possibilité 
pour les producteurs non liés par contrat à 
l'acheteur unique de pouvoir exporter leur 
électricité via le réseau de l'acheteur 
unique. Par ailleurs, des conditions 
appropriées de transparence dans le 
transport et la distribution doivent être 
définies dans les deux systèmes afin 
d'éviter toute sorte de discrimination ou 
de comportements prédateurs, et des 
mécanismes de régulation, de contrôle et 
de règlement des conflits doivent être 
introduits dans les deux systèmes afin 
d'éviter tout abus de position dominante. 
Les discussions se sont poursuivies tout au 
long de l'année sans qu'une position 
commune n'ait été encore atteinte. Des 
divergences importantes existent encore 
entre les Etats membres sur la définition 
des consommateurs éligibles et l'inclusion 
dans cette catégorie des distributeurs. 
SERVICES POSTAUX 
Ainsi qu'il a été annoncé dans le numéro 
précédent de cette publication (voir EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, vol. 1, n. 
5, p. 40-41), la Commission avait adopté, 
le 26.07.1995, un ensemble de mesures 
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composé d'une proposition de directive 
du Parlement européen et du Conseil 
concernant les règles communes pour le 
développement des services postaux ainsi 
que d'un projet de communication de la 
Commission sur l'application des règles 
de concurrence au secteur postal. 
L'objectif de ces initiatives est de 
garantir la fourniture d'un service 
universel ainsi que simultanément 
l'ouverture du marché postal à une plus 
grande concurrence. 
Ces deux textes viennent maintenant 
d'être publiés au Journal Officiel. Le 
projet de Communication de la 
Commission sur l'application des règles 
de la concurrence au secteur postal et, 
notamment, sur l'évaluation de certaines 
mesures d'Etat relatives aux services 
postaux, a été publié au JOCE n° C 322 
du 02.12.1995, p. 3-14. Dans ce texte, la 
Commission présente les principes qui la 
guideront dans l'application, au secteur 
postal, des règles de concurrence du 
traité, en vue de faciliter la libéralisation 
progressive et contrôlée du marché postal. 
Elle décrit l'approche qu'elle entend 
adopter en ce qui concerne l'analyse des 
mesures d'Etat limitant la libre prestation 
de services ou la libre concurrence sur les 
marchés postaux, par rapport aux règles 
du traité. 
La Commission aborde, notamment, les 
questions relatives à la non-discrimination 
en matière d'accès au réseau postal, à 
l'identification des subventions croisées 
et à la définition des protections 
réglementaires nécessaires à la garantie 
d'une concurrence loyale. Avant 
l 'adoption définitive de cette 
communication, la Commission invite les 
parties intéressées à transmettre leurs 
observation éventuelles dans les deux 
mois suivant la date de publication. 
La proposition de directive du Parlement 
européen et du Conseil "concernant des 
règles communes pour le développement 
des services postaux communautaires et 
l'amélioration de la qualité du service", a 
été publiée aussi au JOCE n° C 322 du 
02.12.1995, p. 22-30. 
AEROPORTS 
La Commission poursuit ses efforts pour 
assurer que la libéralisation du transport 
aérien dans l'Union européenne n'est pas 
mis en danger par des pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles dans le domaine 
aéroportuaire. 
Décision art.90§3 sur les redevances 
d'atterrissage à l'aéroport de 
Bruxelles 
Ainsi, la Commission a adopté le 
28.06.1995 une décision 95/364/CE au 
titre de l'article 90(3) (JO L216 du 12 
septembre 1995) à l'encontre du système 
de rabais sur les taxes d'atterrissage, mis 
en place à l'aéroport de Bruxelles-
National par l'Arrêté Royal du 
22 décembre 1989. British Midland, la 
compagnie aérienne qui avait porté 
plainte estimait que ce système permettait 
à la compagnie aérienne Sabena, sa 
principale concurrente sur la ligne 
Bruxelles-Londres, de bénéficier d'un 
rabais de 18% sur ses charges 
d'atterrissage alors qu'aucune compagnie 
aérienne n'était en mesure de bénéficier 
de rabais. 
Après instruction de la plainte, la 
Commission a considéré que ce système 
constituait une mesure étatique au sens de 
l'article 90(1) en liaison avec l'article 86, 
car il a pour effet d'appliquer à l'égard 
de compagnies aériennes des conditions 
inégales à des prestations liées à 
l'atterrissage et au décollage équivalentes 
en infligeant de ce fait un désavantage 
dans la concurrence. La Commission a 
estimé qu'un tel système ne pourrait se 
justifier que par des économies d'échelle 
équivalentes qui seraient réalisées pour le 
gestionnaire de l'aéroport. Ces économies 
d'échelle n'existent pas dans le cas 
d'espèce. La Commission a donc 
demandé aux autorités belges de mettre 
fin à ce système. 
Projet de directive du Conseil et du 
Parlement sur la libéralisation des 
services d'assistance en escale 
Le Conseil, lors de sa réunion du 
08.12.1995, est parvenu à un accord de 
principe sur les éléments essentiels de sa 
position commune concernant la 
proposition de directive relative à la 
libéralisation des services de l'assistance 
en escale dans les aéroports de la 
Communauté. Cette proposition avait été 
présentée par la Commission en décembre 
1994 (voir EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter, vol. 1, n. 4, p. 45). 
L'assistance en escale est une activité 
connexe au transport aérien indispensable 
pour permettre aux transporteurs de se 
livrer à leur activité. Sa libéralisation 
s'inscrit dans le cadre des mesures 
d'accompagnement de la réalisation du 
marché unique dans le transport aérien et 
fait suite notamment à l'adoption de la 
réglementation communautaire en matière 
d'allocation des créneaux horaires et du 
fonctionnement des systèmes informatisés 
de réservation. En outre, il s'agit de 
permettre aux compagnies aériennes 
européennes de mieux maîtriser leurs 
coûts d'exploitation et de mieux adapter 
leurs services aux besoins de leur 
clientèle. 
Le texte prévoit une période transitoire 
pour l'adaptation du marché. Plusieurs 
délais d'entrée en vigueur sont envisagés 
en fonction de certains seuils de référence. 
Ainsi, pour ce qui est de l'auto-assislance 
(les services que chaque compagnies 
aérienne réalise pour elle-même avec ses 
propres moyens), elle sera libéralisée à 
partir du 1er janvier 1998. Il faut 
néanmoins distinguer entre les services 
"côté-aérogare", qui seront libéralisés dans 
tous les aéroports, indépendamment de 
leur volume de trafic, et les services 
"côté-piste", dont la libéralisation 
n'interviendra que pour les aéroports dont 
le trafic est supérieur ou égal à un million 
de passagers par an. 
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En ce qui concerne l'assistance aux tiers 
(les services offerts par des prestataires 
spécialisés aux compagnies aériennes), 
elle sera libéralisée dès le 1er janvier 
1999 pour tout aéroport dont le trafic 
annuel est supérieur ou égal à 3 millions 
de passagers. L'ouverture à la 
concurrence interviendra le 1er janvier 
2001 pour les aéroports ayant un trafic 
annuel supérieur ou égal à 2 millions de 
passagers. 
Pour certaines catégories de services 
(assistance bagages, assistance opérations 
en piste, assistance carburant, assistance 
fret et poste) le projet de position 
commune prévoit la possibilité de limiter 
à deux le nombre des prestataires 
autorisés. Dans le cas de limitation à 
deux prestataires, au moins l'un de ces 
prestataires devrait être indépendant à la 
fois de l'autorité aéroportuaire et du 
transporteur dominant à partir du 1er 
janvier 2001. Toutefois, cette obligation 
pourrait être étendue jusqu'au 31 
décembre 2002 à la demande d'un Etat 
membre, après examen par la 
Commission assistée par un comité 
consultatif. 
Le projet admet certaines dérogations en 
raison des contraintes d'espace et de 
capacité. Ces dérogations seront 
octroyées par les Etats membres pour une 
période de trois ans renouvelable. La 
durée d'une dérogation, permettant 
l'exercice par un seul prestataire des 
activités côté-piste, ne peut pas excéder 
deux ans. Toutefois, il sera possible 
d'étendre la durée de cette dérogation 
pour une seule nouvelle période de deux 
ans, à la demande d'un Etat membre et à 
la suite d'une prise de décision de la 
Commission assistée par le comité 
consultatif sus-mentionné. 
Pour toute entité gestionnaire d'un 
aéroport, usager ou prestataire de 
services, la séparation comptable selon 
les pratiques commerciales en vigueur est 
prévue entre les activités liées à la 
fourniture des services d'assistance en 
escale et les autres activités. 
Le Conseil a chargé le Comité des 
représentants permanents de finaliser les 
travaux en vue de permettre l'adoption de 
la position commune dans les meilleurs 
délais. Une fois adoptée formellement, 
elle sera transmise au Parlement dans le 
cadre de la procédure de coopération. 
Court Judgements 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 18.09.1995, 
aff. T-548/93, "Ladbroke Racing 
c. Commission" 
Arrêt de la Cour du 05.10.1995, 
aff. C-96/94, "Centro Servizi 
Spediporto Sri e. Spedizioni 
Marittima del Golfo Sri" 
Arrêt de la Cour du 19.10.1995, 
aff C-19/93, "Rendo NV e.a. e. 
Commission" 
Arrêt de la Cour du 09.11.1995, 
aff C-91/94, "Procureur de la 
République c. Thierry Tranchart" 
Arrêt de la Cour du 16.11.1995, 
aff. C-244/94, "Fédération 
française des sociétés 
d'assurance e.a. c. Ministère de 
l'Agriculture et de la Pêche" 
Arrêt de la Cour du 14.12.1995, 
aff. C-430/93 et C-431/93, 
"Jeroen Van Schijndel et 
Johannes Nicolaas Cornells van 
Veen c. Stichting Pensioenfonds 
voor Fysiotherapeuten" 
Relevant Press 
releases 
777e full texts of Commission's Press 
releases are available on-line from 
the RAPID database, on the day of 
their publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain 
access to RAPID, please write to 
EUR-OP Information, Marketing 
and Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
MEMO/95/158 : 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LIBERALISATION : STATE OF PLAY 
[95/11/27] 
IP/95/959 : AS GSM MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IS 
OPENED TO COMPETITION THE 
COMMISSION SCREENS THE 
LICENSING PROCEDURES [95/09/13] 
IP/95/1093 : GSM ITALY : 
COMMISSION ASKS FAIR 
TREATMENT FOR OMNITEL 
[95/10/04] 
IP/95/1102 : THE COMMISSION 
OPENS CABLE TV NETWORKS TO 
LIBERALISED TELECOMS 
SERVICES [95/10/11] 
IP/95/1275 : ALTERNATIVE 
TELECOMS NETWORK 
AUTHORISED IN GERMANY AFTER 
COMMISSION INTERVENTION 
[95/11/22] 
IP/95/1353 : START OF 
CONSULTATION ON THE DRAFT 
POSTAL NOTICE [95/12/06] 
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STATE AID 
Main developments between 1st August and 31st December 1995 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Henrik MØRCH, DG IV-G-1 with Vittorio 
VERDUN di CANTOGNO, DG-G-2 (for the R & D Framework) 
THE COMMISSION ADOPTS NEW 
COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK ON 
STATE AID FOR RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Article 130f of the EC Treaty outlines the 
Community objective of strengthening the 
scientific and technological bases of 
Community industry and encourage it to 
become more competitive internationally. 
The Maastricht Treaty confirmed that 
objective. 
In the light of these objectives the 
Commission has traditionally adopted a 
favourable approach towards aid for 
research and development. Thus, in its 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness 
and Employment (see EC-Bulletin 6/93) 
the Commission recognizes the important 
contribution research and technological 
development can make to renewing 
g r o w t h , s t r e n g t h e n i n g the 
competitiveness of European industry and 
boosting employment in the Community. 
However, the Commission considers that 
European research and development 
suffers from a series of weaknesses, in 
particular an insufficient level of funding, 
lack of coordination and cooperation and 
a limited application of the results of the 
research, which work against the 
achievement of the aforementioned 
objectives. In the White Paper the 
Commission submits a number of 
proposal to remedy this situation. In line 
with these considerations the 4th 
Community programme (1994-1998) 
adopted by the European Parliament and 
the Council (see OJ L 126 of 18 May 
1994) puts emphasis on cooperation 
between firms and research institutes and 
between the Community and third 
countries/ international organisations, the 
dissemination and application of the 
results of R&D projects and training and 
mobility. 
To take account of these developments 
and the new provisions on state aid for 
R&D contained in the GATT Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (the Agreement SCM) signed 
by the Commission in 1994, which 
among other things allows higher aid 
intensities for R&D compared to the 
existing Community Framework on state 
aid for R&D (see OJ C 83 of 11.4.1986), 
in December the Commission adopted a 
new R&D Framework. The new 
Framework will be in force for a period 
of five years and lays down the criteria 
the Commission will apply during this 
period to assess the compatibility of state 
aid for R&D with the common market. 
The main criteria are as follows: 
- The new Framework, like the previous 
one, is based on the principle that as 
the activity being aided gets nearer to 
the market-place the potential 
distortion of competition and affection 
of trade between Member States due 
to the aid increases. In its examination 
and evaluation of national aid 
proposals the Commission will look in 
principle for lower levels of aid for 
R&D activities nearer to the market-
place. 
To determine the proximity of R&D 
activities to the market-place the new 
Framework makes a distinction 
between "industrial research" and 
"pre-competitive development 
activity". As the latter category is 
considered to be nearer to the market-
place the Commission will authorize 
lower levels of aid for such activities. 
- The definition of the R&D activities 
eligible for state aid and the division of 
the R&D activities into "industrial 
research" and "pre-competitive 
development activity" corresponds to 
those contained in the Agreement SCM. 
Similarly, the definition of the eligible 
costs is changed in the new Framework 
so as to comply with the definition in 
the Agreement SCM. 
- The Framework provides criteria to 
assess to what extend the public 
financing of R&D activities carried out 
by universities or non-profit public 
research institutes in collaboration oron 
behalf of private or public firms 
constitute state aid within the meaning 
of Article 92(1); 
- Aid for R&D should create an incentive 
for the recipient firm to carry out R&D 
activities in addition to those carried out 
by the firm in the normal course of 
business and without public support. If 
it is not clear that the aid will provide 
an incentive for the recipient firm the 
Commission could adopt a less 
favourable position in respect of the aid. 
In order to asses whether the aid creates 
an incentive for the recipient finn the 
Commission will look upon facts which 
may be quantified, such as the 
development in the costs of R&D, 
number of persons involved in R&D 
etc. The Commission may presume that 
in respect of aid for R&D to the benefit 
of SMEs the incentive effect exists. 
The Commission attaches particular 
importance to the incentive effect of ine 
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aid in case of aid for big firms 
carrying out close-to-the-market 
research, and in cases where a 
significant proportion of the R&D 
expenditure for a given project has 
been made prior to the application for 
aid. 
Under the new Framework aid for 
pre-competitive development may, as 
a general rule, not exceed 25% of the 
eligible costs (as defined in Annex II 
to the Framework) whereas aid for 
industrial research may go up to 
50%. However, these basic aid 
intensities may be increased if 
justified on the basis of the common 
interest. Thus, it will be possible to 
grant a "bonus" on top of these 
figures in respect of R&D projects 
involving SMEs (+10 points), if the 
projects is carried out in regions 
eligible for regional aid (+5 or 10 
points) or the R&D project is a 
priority under a Community R&D 
programme (+15 points). 
Moreover, the aid intensity may be 
increased by 10 points in respect of 
projects involving crossboarder 
cooperation between independent 
enterprises, coorperation between 
universities and industry or when the 
results and intellectual property rigths 
of the project are widely 
disseminated; 
To take accoun t of the 
competitiveness of European industry 
on a global level the new Framework 
stipulates that firms within the 
Community may benefit from aid for 
R&D up to the maximum aid 
intensity allowed under the GATT 
Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, i.e. 75% of 
eligible costs for industrial research 
and 50% for pre-competitive 
development activity. This is the case 
in respect of cumulation of aid from 
the Community and the Member 
State concerned for the same project, 
projects linked to relevant 
Community projects or programmes 
involving crossboarder cooperation 
between firms or between firms and 
public research institutes and a wide 
dissemination of the results achieved 
and important projects of a common 
European interest. Moreover, the 
aforementioned aid intensities may be 
authorized if firms located outside the 
Community has received (within a 
period of three years) or may receive 
an equivalent level of aid for similar 
projects; 
- With regard to technical feasibility 
studies prior to the industrial research 
or the pre-competitive activities the 
Framework allows aid intensities up to 
75% and 50% respectively; 
- In order to promote the dissemination 
of the results of the R&D project the 
Commission has a favourable 
approach to aid for the costs involved 
in the patent application and renewals. 
Such aid may be granted up to the 
level of the aid granted for the R&D 
activities which are the origin of the 
patents. However, under the 
Framework the aid for this purpose is 
limited to SMEs. 
With a view to streamlining procedures 
the new Framework contains certain 
important provisions in respect of 
notification requirements: 
- Notification of aid proposal for R&D 
should be submitted to the 
Commission on the standardized 
notification form which was sent to 
Member States by letter dated 22 
February 1994, as modified by letter 
to Member States of 2 August 1995. 
In this way it is hoped that the 
Commission will dispose of all the 
information necessary to assess the 
compatibility of the notified aid 
measure at a very early stage, thereby 
shortening the period needed for a 
final decision. Similarly, the annual 
reports on approved schemes must be 
submitted in the form prescribed by 
the aforementioned letters to Member 
States; 
The Framework underlines that the 
accelerated procedure for aid schemes 
for small and medium-sized enterprises 
and certain modifications of existing 
schemes as well as the "de minimis" 
rule (see the SME Aid Guidelines, OJ C 
213 of 19.8.1992) also applies to aid for 
R&D; 
The Commission receives a considerable 
number of notifications from Member 
States concerning the refinancing or 
prolongation of R&D aid schemes 
already approved by the Commission 
under the current R&D Framework. The 
Commission has never raised any 
objections to these notifications. 
Therefore, the Framework stipulates that 
Member States will not be required to 
notify to the Commission increases in 
the annual budget of a R&D aid scheme 
already approved provided this increase 
does not exceed 100% of the annual 
budget originally approved and concerns 
the period for which the scheme has 
been approved. Similarly, a prolongation 
of an approved scheme not exceeding 5 
years and without any modifications in 
respect of the conditions for the 
application of the scheme does not need 
to be notified to the Commission, if the 
scheme complies with the new 
Framework. Member States will 
however be required to inform the 
Commission of such measures prior to 
their implementation; 
In principle aid granted under an 
approved R&D aid scheme for an 
individual project does not need to be 
notified to the Commission. However, 
the Commission wants to reserve its 
right to examine important individual 
grants of aid under an approved scheme. 
The Framework requires therefore that 
Member States notify all individual 
grants of aid under an approved scheme 
for projects exceeding ECU 25 million 
where the aid exceeds ECU 5 million 
gross. 
The Commission is asking agreement 
from Member States to this proposal 
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pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC 
Treaty. 
NOTICE ON COOPERATION 
BETWEEN THE COMMISSION 
AND NATIONAL COURTS 
It follows from Article 93(3) of the EC 
Treaty that Member States are under an 
obligation to notify all aid measures 
within the meaning of Article 92(1) to 
the Commission and may not put the aid 
measure into effect before the 
Commission has adopted a decision 
approving it. Non-notified aid is illegal 
and the obligation to notify has direct 
effect and may thus be relied upon by 
individuals in national courts. National 
courts must use all appropriate devices 
and remedies of national law to enforce 
the direct effect of the notification 
obligation and any deficiency of these 
national rules which denies the "effet 
utile de l'effet direct" of Article 93(3) 
must be set aside as a matter of 
Community law. The national court may, 
as appropriate, grant interim relief, order 
the freezing or return of aid illegaly paid 
and award damages to parties whose 
interest are harmed. 
Concern is often expressed that the 
Commission's final decision in State aid 
cases are reached some time after the 
distortions of competition have damaged 
the interest of third parties. The 
Commission believes that national courts 
may be better placed to ensure that 
breaches of the obligation to notify in 
individual cases are dealt with and 
remedied and the Commission intends to 
assist national courts in this task, thereby 
reinforcing the rights of third parties and 
in particular the competitors of 
undertakings in receipt of non-notified 
aid. Thus, in October the Commission 
adopted a Notice on Cooperation with 
national courts in the state aid field (see 
C(95) 2436 final, not yet published) 
setting out the legal position and offering 
assistance to judges on questions of fact, 
economic analysis and law. It is expected 
that national courts may benefit from 
such assistance in respect of the notion of 
aid in particular. In this context it is 
important to note that a clear distinction 
must be drawn between the competence 
of national courts and the Commission in 
the field of state aid. It follows from the 
European Court of Justice's ruling in the 
"Salmon"-case (see case C-354/90, 1991 
1-5505) that at present national courts 
have the competence to rule on the 
legality of the aid only, i.e. whether the 
aid has been notified under Article 93(3) 
of the Treaty, whereas the Commission 
has the exclusive competence to examine 
the compatibility of the aid with the 
common market, i.e. whether the aid may 
be approved pursuant to one of the 
exemption clauses in the Treaty. 
EXPORT AID 
Export aid, that is aid linked to the 
quantity of goods sold in other Member 
States/EEA States or aid closely linked to 
the marketing and sale of goods in these 
countries, such as aid for the setting-up 
or operation of distribution networks or 
sales agencies of goods and services 
within the Community and the EEA, is 
clearly contrary to the objective of an 
internal market. Such aid does not 
promote any Community objective which 
may justify the direct distortive effects on 
competition it causes. Thus, the 
Commission will not authorize export aid. 
In line with this policy DG IV states in 
an explanatory note of March 1993 to the 
Member States that the "de minimis" rule 
(See the Community Guidelines on state 
aid to small and medium-sized 
companies, OJ C 213 of 19.8.1992) does 
not apply to export aid. Moreover, in 
view of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
signed by the Commission in 1994, 
which explicitly prohibits export aid, the 
Commission is considering to include an 
explicit exemption in respect of export 
aid in the "de minimis" rule under 
However, in line with its favourable 
approach towards financial assistance to 
SMEs, in particular in view of their 
limited know-how and difficulties in 
raising external financing, the Commission 
may authorize soft aid in favour of SMEs 
related to the development of export 
markets, such as aid for consultancy and 
marketing research, provided the aid is a 
one-off operation and limited to the 
entrance on new markets. The 
Commission may, under the same 
circumstances, approve aid to SMEs for 
participation in trade fairs. 
Aid for internationalisation 
European companies are not only in 
competition within the EC/EEA but also 
compete for investment on foreign 
markets, such as Eastern-Europe, Russia 
and South-East Asia. The Commission 
believes that aid to firms for investments 
on foreign markets may distort 
competition and affect trade within the 
Community and therefore falls under the 
state aid rules in the EC Treaty. The 
Commission is concerned that such 
investment aid measures may lead to 
délocalisation and be available 
predominantly in the central and most 
developed regions of the Community, 
thereby working against the efforts made 
under the Community's cohesion policy to 
reduce the gap between the more and less 
prosperous regions of the Community. On 
the other hand these aid measures may 
assist countries in Eastern-Europe, the 
Baltic States and Russia in their efforts to 
convert to a market economy and may, 
therefore, be justified in certain cases. To 
establish a clear policy in this field the 
Commission decided in a number of 
internationalisation schemes to open the 
Article 93(2) procedure and invite 
Member States and third parties to submit 
their comments. 
REGIONAL AID 
The Commission adopted a number of 
important decision in the field of regional 
aid. 
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Thus, in July the Commission approved 
the new regional aid map for Belgium 
(apart from the region of Hainaut) and 
decided that the only legal basis for 
approving regional aid in Belgium would 
be Article 92(3)(c). In other words, no 
region in Belgium fulfilled the criteria for 
being eligible for regional aid under 
Article 92(3)(a) on the basis of which 
higher aid intensities may be authorized. 
The aid intensity for regional aid in 
Belgium remains unchanged, i.e. 15% 
and 20% net grant equivalent, but is 
decreased in relative terms. The coverage 
is the same compared to the existing 
map, i.e. 34.97% (Hainaut included). The 
decision confirms the objectives pursued 
by the Commission in this field, in 
particular a greater coherency in terms of 
geografical coverage and period of 
validity with the Community aid 
programmes under the Structural Funds, 
a limitation in the aid intensity and a 
more favourable treatment of SMEs. 
In July the Commission moreover 
proposed appropriate measures pursuant 
to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty in the 
context of the revision of the Spanish 
regional aid map. Spain complied with 
the proposed measures in September 
1995. The most significant modification 
compared to the old regional aid map is 
the reduction in the maximum aid 
intensity from 75% to 60% net grant 
equivalent (the aid after deduction of 
tax). Moreoevr, due to the particularly 
serious socio-economic problems in 
certain zones the new regional aid map 
allows up to 60% aid intensity although 
these particular zones are located in areas 
not eligible for the maximum aid 
intensity. 
TREUHANDANSTALT 
In January the Commission decided on 
the terms applicable for 1995 for 
privatization aid in the new Länder. Such 
terms had previously been defined in 
1991 (see Twenty-first Competition 
Report, point 249) and in 1992 (see 
Twenty-second Competition Report, point 
349). Further to the dissolution of the 
Treuhandanstalt the Commission decided 
that the procedures and assessment 
criteria applying to privatization in 1995 
should be more in line with those 
applicable for other Member States. After 
the transition year 1995 no special rules 
would exist. 
The Commission investigated several 
individual cases of aid for the 
privatization of companies in the new 
Länder. By far the most important was 
the privatization of the petrochemical 
plants of BSL (Buna, Sächsische 
Olefinwerke, Leuna) to Dow Chemical. 
In November the Commission took a 
final decision allowing for ECU 5 billion 
aid for the restructuring of BSL as an 
integrated complex. 
SECTORAL AID 
Shipbuilding 
In December the Council adopted a 
Regulation (no reference yet) 
implementing an OECD agreement 
respecting normal competitive conditions 
in commercial shipbuilding and 
shiprepair, including the elimination of 
production subsidies. The new Regulation 
will be applicable as from the entry into 
force of the OECD agreement. This has 
been due on 1 January 1996, but although 
the European Union ratified the 
agreement in December, entry into force 
was delayed because of hold-ups in the 
ratification process among other parties to 
the agreement. The Council has therefore 
decided that the rules of the Seventh 
Directive on aid to shipbuilding (Council 
Directive 90/684/EEC, as amended by 
Directive 94/73/EEC) should continue to 
apply ad interim and at the latest until 1 
October 1996. Against this background 
the Commission decided to maintain the 
common production aid ceiling as from 1 
January 1996 at 9% for large vessels and 
4.5% for vessels costing less than ECU 
10 million an for conversions. 
The motor-vehicle sector 
The reintroduction of the Framework 
In view of the legal vacuum created by 
the judgment of the European Court of 
Justice of 29 June 1995, which states that 
the 1992 review of the Framework on aid 
to the motorvehicle sector could not 
extend the Framework for an indefinite 
period, the Commission decided to 
reintroduce the Framework pursuant to 
Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty and to 
introduce interim measures in the form of 
retroactive prolongation of the original 
Framework until the end of 1995 pending 
the reintroduction of the Framework under 
Article 93(1) EC (see for more detail the 
last number of the Competition Policy 
Newsletter). 
All Member states apart from Spain 
agreed unconditionally to reintroduce the 
Framework for two years as from 1 
January 1996. The Commission considered 
that the arguments put forward by the 
Spanish government did not justify its 
refusal to accept the reintroduction of the 
Framework and as the Commission cannot 
accept the non-applicability of the 
Framework in one Member State only, 
unless exceptional circumstances would 
occur in that Member State (which is not 
the case in Spain), in September the 
Commission decided to open the Article 
93(2) procedure in respect of all aid 
schemes in operation in Spain. 
In December the Commission took a final 
decision in respect of this procedure 
requiring existing state aid schemes in 
Spain to be altered so to comply with the 
obligations to notify and submit annual 
reports contained in the new Framework. 
In other words, the Spanish government is 
required to notify all aid measures to be 
granted for projects costing more than 
ECU 17 million under any existing or 
approved aid schemes to undertakings 
operating in the motorvehicle sector as 
defined in the Framework. 
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Cases 
The Commission took a number of 
important decisions in respect of aid for 
the motorvehicle sector. Thus, in July the 
Commission approved aid totalling ECU 
16.1 million in favour of Opel Austria, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of General 
Motors Corp., to support its R&D, 
environmental and training expenditure in 
Aspern/Vienna. In July the Commission 
moreover approved regional and 
environmental aid to Ford Werke AG in 
support of its investment plans in Genk, 
Belgium. The aid takes the form of a 
grant of ECU 24.1 million and an 
exemption from property tax for a period 
of 5 years with a value of ECU 4.5 
million. 
In September the Commission took a 
partly negative decision in respect of the 
two Article 93(2) procedures opened in 
1993 to examine the compatibility of 
state aid elements contained in the public 
intervention of the Dutch State and the 
Region of Flanders in favour of the truck 
producer DAF, before and after its 
bankruptcy. The Commission required the 
Dutch State to recover from DAF a total 
of ECU 17.9 million of aid which did not 
comply with the Framework on state aid 
to the motorvehicle sector, in particular 
because the aid (ECU 17.7 million) 
qualified as a rescue and restructuring aid 
was granted without being linked to a 
restructuring plan ensuring the long-term 
viability of the company. Finally, the 
Commission required the Belgian 
authorities to recover a non-notified aid 
of ECU 200 000 from the new DAF 
company, as this aid constituted operating 
aid. Under the Framework operating aid 
is not allowed in the motorvehicle sector. 
In October the Commission took a final 
conditional decision in respect of an aid 
package of ECU 283 million awarded by 
the Spanish authorities in support of the 
restructuring plan of SEAT S.A., a 
motorvehicle manufacturer subsidiary of 
the Volkswagen Group. 
The service sector 
The relationship between Article 90(2) 
and Articles 92-94 EC - the postal 
sector 
For the first time the Commission applies 
the state aid rules in Articles 92-93 in 
conjunction with Article 90(2) of the EC 
Treaty. 
The Commission considers that the postal 
sector is of essential importance for the 
realisation of social and economic 
activities in any country, but the 
Commission must at the same time take 
account of the caselaw of the European 
Court of Justice which recognizes that the 
competition rules in the EC Treaty also 
apply to this sector. This is without 
prejudice, however, to Article 90(2) 
which stipulates that undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest or having 
the character of a revenu-producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules on 
competition only in so far as the 
application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to 
them. 
On the basis of complaints the 
Commission examined whether certain 
tax reliefs in favour of the French Post 
constituted state aid within the meaning 
of Article 92(1) wich distorts competition 
on competitive markets where the French 
Post operates, and if so, whether they 
may be compatible with the common 
market. In its decision the Commission 
noted that pursuant to Article 90(2) the 
postal sector is subject to the rules on 
competition in the EC Treaty, including 
the state aid rules in Articles 92-94, in so 
far as the application of such rules does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to 
them. In light of this and in conjunction 
with Article 92(1) the Commission 
considered that the tax reliefs in favour 
of French Post constitute an economic 
advantage for French Post which, in order 
to benefit from the exemption in Article 
90(2), must not exceed what is necessary 
to accomplish the operation of services of 
general interest imposed on the French 
Post, i.e.an obligation to be present with 
post offices throughout the country and a 
requirement to deliver mail throughout the 
territory of France irrespective of the fact 
that the prices for this service may not 
always correspond to the costs. In other 
words, the economic advantage derived 
from the tax reliefs must not benefit the 
activities carried out by French Post on 
competitive markets. 
As the Commission established that the 
value of these tax reliefs is inferior to the 
costs of the public service obligations 
imposed on French Post the Commission 
considered that the tax reliefs in favour of 
French Post do not go beyond what is 
necessary to provide the service of general 
interest entrusted with French Post. 
Therefore, it was decided pursuant to 
Article 90(2) that the tax reliefs do not 
constitute state aid within the meaning of 
Article 92(1). 
The audiovisual sector 
Whether there exists a level playing field 
on which public and private broadcasters 
compete and, if not, what needs to be 
done to make it so is the subject of 
increasing debate in the Community. This 
is further accentuated by the receipt of 
complaints from private broadcasters in 
Spain, France, Portugal and Italy alleging 
that public broadcasters benefit from 
public funding going far beyond the costs 
of public service obligations imposed on 
them, in particular when coupled with the 
right to compete for advertising. The 
complainants allege that the public 
funding constitute state aid within the 
meaning of Article 92( 1 ) of the EC Treaty 
which distorts competition on the 
television market within the EC. In return. 
public broadcasters argue that the public 
funding is justified by special or more 
onerous public service obligations placed 
on them, and by existing restrictions on 
their advertising. 
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Before attempting to resolve these 
complaints the Commission wished to 
obtain information about the competitive 
starting position of public and private 
broadcasters in these areas in all Member 
States of the EC. Thus, in 1993 the 
Commission appointed a firm of 
consultants to undertake a study on "The 
balance between the respective rights and 
obligations and financial resources of 
public and private television in the 
Member States of the EC." Briefly, the 
purpose of the study was to obtain 
information about the television market in 
each Member State, in particular whar 
are the public service obligations imposed 
on public broadcasters, how much do 
they cost and how much subsidy do the 
public broadcasters receive. 
The consultants submitted the final report 
end October and the report will be send 
to Member States for comments. In 
respect of the new Member States 
(Sweden, Finland and Austria) and the 
EFTA States, signatories to the EEA 
Agreement, the Commission has issued a 
tender for a similar study to be carried 
out. 
HORIZONTAL AID 
Rescue and restructuring aid 
The purpose of a rescue aid is to 
maintain a firm in operation temporarily 
while an appropriate restructuring plan is 
drawn up. A rescue aid may therefore 
only be granted for a limited period of 
time, normally not longer than 6 months. 
The Commission considered that the 
guarantee with a duration of 18 months 
granted by the Spanish government to the 
company "Gutierrez Asunee Corporación" 
for commerial loans did not meet the 
conditions of rescue aid. 
Aid for environmental protection 
The Community guidelines on aid for 
environmental protection (see OJ C 72 of 
10.3.1994) stipulate that, although 
operating aid is normally considered to 
be incompatible with the common 
market, in exceptional cases the 
Commission may authorize operating aid, 
in particular in the form of relief from 
environmental taxes, provided the aid is 
necessary to achieve the environmental 
objectives sought. Thus, the Commission 
considered that the relief from new 
energy taxes on C02- and S02-emission 
in favour of energy-intensive firms in 
Denmark and the Netherlands and the 
relief from tax on groundwater and waste 
in favour of certain firms in the 
Netherlands could be approved, as they 
must be regarded as the inevitable price 
to be paid for being among the first 
countries to introduce a tax that will be 
beneficial for the global environment. 
Without some relief these taxes would 
seriously damage the competitiveness of 
energy-intensive firms in the countries 
going ahead with the tax, in this case 
Denmark and the Netherlands, so as to be 
politically impracticable. However, to 
ensure that these tax reliefs do not distort 
competition unduly and to give an 
incentive for the aid recipients to 
implement measures to reduce pollution, 
the Commission will always require that 
the tax relief is temporary and, in 
principle, degressive. 
The Commission examines an increasing 
number of systems for the collection and 
disposal of products or substances which 
are dangerous to the environment. Under 
those systems the Member State normally 
imposes a charge on the sale of the 
products or substances concerned, be it 
imported or produced domestically, and 
the proceeds of the charge are used to 
pay companies for the collection and 
disposal of the products after use. The 
Commission considers that these systems 
do not involve state aid provided the 
c h a r g e is i m p o s e d on al l 
importers/producers of the products 
concerned in a non-discriminatory way, 
the payment to the collecting firms is 
based on normal commercial terms and 
the system does not allow, directly or 
indirectly, the collecting companies to 
sell the collected products to prices below 
market price. As these conditons were 
fulfilled with regard to a Danish scheme 
for the collection and disposal of used 
batteries and a Dutch scheme for the 
collection and disposal of car wrecks the 
Commission decided that no aid was 
involved in these systems. 
PROCEDURES 
In the automn of 1995 the Court of First 
Instance has issued a judgment of 
potential significant importance in respect 
of the rights of complainants in state aid 
procedures and a judgment giving support 
to the Commissions attempt to enforce the 
order to recover incompatible aid from 
firms. 
SYTRAVAL 
In its judgment of 28 September 1995 in 
case T-95/94 "SYTRAVAL" v. 
Commission the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) annulled the Commission's decision 
of 31 December 1993 rejecting a 
complaint in respect of alleged state aid in 
favour of "Sécuripost", a subsidairy of the 
state-owned French Post, which is 
operating on competitive markets. The 
CFI considered that the Commission had 
provided insufficient reasoning for the 
rejection of a series of allegations by the 
complainants concerning preferential 
treatment of Sécuripost by the State 
through French Post. 
However, in the absence of clear rules 
concerning state aid procedures the 
significance of this judgment lies with the 
statements made by the CFI in respect of 
the rights of complainants in state aid 
procedures. The CFI makes it clear that 
the Commission must examine impartially 
and exhaustively all the allegations made 
by complainants and cannot impose the 
burden of proof concerning the existence 
and (in)compatibility of a state aid on the 
complainant. Otherwise, complainants 
would be required to obtain information in 
support of their allegations which in most 
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cases they would not be able to collect 
without the Commission as an 
intermediary. Therefore, the Commission 
cannot justify the lack of sufficient 
reasoning or the failure to examine 
certain allegations by referring to the 
scarce information provided by the 
complainant. The conclusionsin 
SYTRAVAL confirm the CFI's judgment 
of 18 September 1995 in case T-49/93 
SIDE v. Commission. 
The procedure for the Commission's 
examination of state aid measures is 
characterized by two stages, i.e. the 
preliminary examination of the measure 
and the opening of the procedure 
provided for in Article 93(2) EC in cases 
where the Commission, following the 
preliminary examination, still has doubts 
about the compatibility of the measure 
with the common market. Whereas the 
Treaty provides for a procedure to invite 
third parties to submit their comments in 
the procedure opened under Article 93(2), 
this is not the case in respect of the 
preliminary examination. When the 
compatibility of an aid with the common 
market can be established without further 
examination, it does not appear necessary 
to alert third parties before the decision 
of the Commission. It has been the 
consistent practice of the Commission, 
therefore, not to grant a right to be heard 
to third parties, including complainants, 
during the preliminary examination. The 
European Court of Justice has supported 
this position in a number of judgments 
(see in particular case 84/82 Germany v. 
Commission, ECR 1984 page 1451). 
However, further to the requirement to 
examine impartially and exhaustively all 
the allegations made by the complainant 
and to state the reasons for its decision in 
SYTRAVAL the CFI moreover imposes 
an obligation on the Commission, under 
certain circumstances, to initiate a 
con t rad ic to ry p rocedure with 
complainants in cases involving difficult 
questions as to the qualification of certain 
measures as state aid even before the 
Article 93(2) procedure has been opened. 
As this judgment seems to impose 
additional obligations on the Commission 
in its examination of complaints, at least 
in cases giving rise to doubts about the 
existence of aid, and goes against the 
established caselaw of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the Commission 
intends to appeal this judgment to the 
ECJ. 
TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH 
In May 1986 the Commission adopted a 
negative decision in respect of non-
notified aid granted by the German 
authorities to the company TWD 
Textilwerke Deggendorf and imposed on 
the German authorities to recover the aid 
already paid to the company. In October 
1989 and 1991 the German Government 
notified a new package of aid to the 
company which the Commission 
authorized. However, as the incompatible 
aid had not yet been recovered from the 
company at the time the Commission 
authorized the new aid package, the 
Commission made its authorization of the 
new aid package subject to a suspension 
of the payment of that aid until the 
incompatible aid had been recovered. 
In its judgment in joined cases T-244/93 
and T-486/93 TWD Textilwerke 
Deggendorf GmbH v. Commission the 
CFI upheld the Commission's decision to 
make its authorization of the new aid 
package subject to a suspension of the 
payment of that aid until the incompatible 
aid had been recovered, because it was 
clear from the Commission's decision 
that the cumulation of the incompatible 
aid and the new aid package would 
render the totality of the aid 
incompatible. 
Application of the "Boussac" -
injunction 
The Commission has the power to issue 
an injunction ordering Member States to 
suspend payment of an aid pending the 
outcome of the investigation and/or to 
supply information needed for the 
Commission to take a decision on a case, 
which has not been forthcoming despite 
requests (see the "Boussac"-judgment, 
case C 301/87 France v. Commission, 
ECR 1990 1-307). As the German 
authorities, despite several written 
requests, had not submitted information to 
the Commission with regard to aid to the 
new investment projects of the 
Volkswagen Group (VW) in the new 
German Länder, i.e. the car plant Mosel II 
and the engine plant Chemnitz II in 
Sachsen, the Commission in October 
decided to enjoin the German government 
to provide all documentation , information 
and data on these investment projects. 
Should the German Government fail to 
provide the requested information the 
Commission could take a final decision 
with respect to any aid granted to VW for 
these projects on the basis of the 
information available to it. 
MULTILATERAL MEETING WITH 
MEMBER STATES 
A multilateral meeting with Member 
States was held in December 1995 to 
discuss future state aid control within the 
synthetic fibres sector, a first draft on 
Horizontal guidelines for regional aid in 
favour of large investment projects and an 
update of the reference rates. 
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Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press releases are available on-line 
from the RAPID database, on the day of their publication by the 
Commission's Spokesman's Service. To obtain access to RAPID, 
please write to EUR-OP Information, Marketing and Public 
Relations (0P/4B) 2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/95/1077 : COMMISSION DECIDES 
THAT THERE IS NO PRODUCTION 
AID IN SECURITY BOND TO MCTAY 
SHIPYARD [95/10/05] 
IP/95/1081 : FRANCE: THE 
COMMISSION APPROVES THREE AID 
PACKAGES FOR EUREKA PROJECTS 
[95/10/05] 
BIO/95/475 : CREDIT LYONNAIS: 
COMMENTS OF MR KAREL VAN 
MIERT [95/12/08] 
IP/95/1004 : REGIONAL LAW OF 11 
MAY 1994 : AID TO AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES AND FARMS FOR 
FUNDING THEIR DEBTS (AND 
REGIONAL LAW NO 52 OF 31 
OCTOBER 1994) [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1002 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES TWO DUTCH 
SUBSIDIES TO DEVELOP COMBINED 
ROAD/RAIL TRAVEL [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1006 : COMMISSION CLOSES 
93(2) PROCEDURE AND APPROVES 
AID TO TUBES PRODUCER IN 
GERMANY [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1007 : COMMISSION OPENS 
INVESTIGATION INTO SPANISH AID 
SCHEMES TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
INDUSTRY [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1008 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZE AID TO THE CLOCK 
MANUFACTURING AND JEWELLERY 
INDUSTRY IN FRANCE [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1009 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE RELEASE OF A 
FURTHER TRANCHE OF 
INVESTMENT AID FOR 
MTW-SCHIFFSWERFT GMBH IN 
WISMAR IN MECKLENBURG-
- VORPOMMERN [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1010 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE RELEASE OF A 
FURTHER TRANCHE OF 
INVESTMENT AID FOR THE 
WARNOW WERFT IN WARNEMUNDE 
IN MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 
[95/09/21] 
IP/95/1011 : COMMISSION DOES NOT 
OBJECT TO RESTRUCTURING AID IN 
FAVOUR OF A MANUFACTURER OF 
CERAMICS IN BAVARIA [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1012 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID TO HÄRJEDALENS MINERAL AB 
IN SWEDEN [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1013 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE RELEASE OF A NEW 
TRANCHE OF 500 000 DM CLOSURE 
AID FOR THE ELBEWERFT 
BOIZENBURG IN 
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 
[95/09/21] 
IP/95/1014 : COMMISSION DOES NOT 
RAISE OBJECTIONS TO 
SHIPBUILDING AID IN GREECE 
[95/09/21] 
IP/95/1015 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
WASTE MANAGEMENT SCHEME IN 
BAVARIA. [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1016 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID FOR IMPROVING THE QUALITY 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1017 : COMMISSION RAISES NO 
OBJECTION TO FRENCH AID FOR 
EUREKA R&D PROJECT INVOLVING 
DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
EXCIMER LASER [95/09/21] 
IP/95/1076 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
PRIVATISATION OF COMPANHIA 
NACIONAL PETROQUÍMICA [95/10/05] 
IP/95/1086 : COMMISSION TAKES 
FINAL DECISION ON STATE AID TO 
THE TRUCK PRODUCER DAF. 
[95/10/05] 
IP/95/1091 : COMMISSION OPENS 
INVESTIGATION INTO TAX CREDITS 
AWARDED TO ITALIAN ROAD 
HAULIERS [95/10/04] 
IP/95/1101 : IRISH STEEL [95/10/11] 
IP/95/1124 : STATE AID FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF FISHING 
VESSELS IN SPAIN (ASTURIAS) 
[95/10/18] 
IP/95/1130 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES DUTCH SCHEME TO 
PROMOTE INLAND WATERWAYS 
[95/10/18] 
IP/95/1131 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES FRENCH AID WORTH 
115 MILLION FF FOR THE 
REORGANISATION OF THE ROAD 
TRANSPORT SECTOR [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1132 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES UK PROPOSAL TO 
EXTEND TAX RELIEF SCHEME FOR 
SHIPOWNERS [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1133 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES A LOAN OF US$ 500 
MILLION GUARANTEED BY THE 
ITALIAN STATE TO FERROVIE DELLO 
STATO S.P.A [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1137 : NEUE MAXHUTTE 
STAHLWERKE GMBH: COMMISSION 
DECIDES THAT STATE AID HAS TO 
BE REPAID [95/10/18] 
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IP/95/1140 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
GERMAN AID TO RAPE SEED OIL 
METHYLESTER PILOT PLANT 
[95/10/18] 
IP/95/1141 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
FORESTRY EXPLOITATION AID IN 
ASTURIAS [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1142 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING 
DEVELOPMENT AID [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1143 : COMMISSION DOES NOT 
OBJECT TO INVESTMENT AID IN 
FAVOUR OF A COMPANY IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR IN 
BRANDENBURG. [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1144 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
PACKAGE OF 
EMPLOYMENT-BOOSTING 
MEASURES IN SICILY [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1145 : COMMISSION RAISES NO 
OBJECTIONS TO FRENCH AID FOR 
EUREKA R&D PROJECT 
CONCERNING MACHINE 
TRANSLATION SYSTEM [95/10/18] 
IP/95/1159 : COMMISSION OPENS 
ARTICLE 93 (2) PROCEDURE TO 
STUDY AID GRANTED BY THE 
FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO 
COMPAGNIE GENERALE MARITIME 
(CGM) [95/10/31] 
IP/95/1185 : DECREE-LAW NO 149 OF 
20 MAY 1993 (EX AID NO NN 96/B/93) 
AND REGIONAL LAW (SICILIA) NO 
37/94 (EX AID NO 707/94) - HELP FOR 
COOPERATIVES [95/10/31] 
IP/95/1186 : STATE AID DECISIONS 
[95/10/31] 
IP/95/1187 : COMMISSION URGES 
GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO 
PROVIDE ALL EVIDENCE ON 
SCHEDULED AID TO VOLKSWAGEN 
IN SAXONY [95/10/31] 
IP/95/1188 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID TO VOLKSWAGEN AND SEAT IN 
SUPPORT OF THE 1994-1997 
RESTRUCTURING PLAN OF SEAT 
[95/10/31] 
IP/95/1189 : COMMISSION TAKES 
FINAL DECISION ON AID TO 
PRIVATISE AND RESTRUCTURE 
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN 
EASTERN GERMANY [95/11/08] 
IP/95/1193 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
FRENCH SCHEME TO PROMOTE 
INLAND WATERWAYS [95/11/14] 
IP/95/1207 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
DUTCH SHIPBUILDING 
DEVELOPMENT AID IN FAVOUR OF 
INDIA AND TUNISIA [95/11/08] 
IP/95/1208 : COMMISSION APROVES 
STATE AID TO STERLING TUBES, UK 
[95/11/08] 
IP/95/1215 : HAMBURGER 
STAHLWERKE GMBH: COMMISSION 
DECIDES THAT STATE AID MUST BE 
REPAID [95/11/10] 
IP/95/1236 : DECISIONS ON STATE 
AID SCHEMES IN THE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR [95/11/15] 
IP/95/1250 : FURTHER TO A COURT 
RULING THE COMMISSION 
ENLARGENS THE SCOPE OF ITS 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AID TO A 
GREEK MANUFACTURER OF 
CEMENT. [95/11/15] 
IP/95/1252 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A MANAGEMENT 
BUY-OUT OF SHIPYARD "LUIGI 
ORLANDO" IN LIVORNO [95/11/15] 
IP/95/1253 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE RELEASE OF A 
FURTHER TRANCHE OF 
INVESTMENT AID FOR THE 
VOLKSWERFT IN STRALSUND IN 
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 
195/11/15] 
IP/95/1254 : COMMISSION 
APPROUVES DUTCH SCHEME FOR 
THE DISPOSAL OF CAR WRECKS 
[95/11/15] 
IP/95/1255 : GRUPO DE EMPRESAS 
ALVAREZ : COMMISSION INITIATES 
PROCEEDINGS ON AWARDED STATE 
AID [95/11/15] 
IP/95/1304 : ITALIAN STEEL - THE 
BRESCIANI CASE: COMMISSION 
APPROVES A LIT 258 BILLION 
CLOSURE AID [95/11/29] 
IP/95/1305 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES AUSTRIAN STATE AID 
TO VOEST-ALPINE ERZBERG GMBH 
[95/11/30] 
IP/95/1311 : AID FOR AGRICULTURE 
AND A LEVY ON PESTICIDES TO 
FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION [95/11/29] 
IP/95/1312 : EXCEPTIONAL AID IN 
THE CATTLE SECTOR TO MAKE UP 
FOR FARMERS' LOSS OF INCOME AS 
A RESULT OF MONETARY 
DISTURBANCES [95/11/29] 
IP/95/1313 : STATE AID DECISIONS 
[95/11/30] 
IP/95/1319 : COMMISSION SAYS 
PROPOSED SALE OF BRITISH 
ROLLING STOCK COMPANIES IS NOT 
STATE AID [95/11/30] 
IP/95/1326 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
STATE AID MEASURES [95/11/30] 
IP/95/1329 : GERMANY ASKED NOT 
TO PROLONG A TAX SYSTEM 
RELATED TO THE ACCELERATED 
DEPRECIATION FOR AIRLINE 
INVESTMENTS [95/12/01] 
IP/95/1351 : STATE AID FOR 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: 
COMMISSION DRAWS UP A 
TRANSPARENT AND DYNAMIC 
SYSTEM FOR THE UNION 195/12/06| 
IP/95/1392 : COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATES ALLEGED AID TO 
GILDEMEISTER AG [95/12/13] 
IP/95/1407 : AGREEMENT IN 
PRINCIPLE ON A CAPITAL INCREASE 
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IN THE IBERIA AIRLINE ON 
COMMERCIAL GROUNDS [95/12/14] 
IP/95/1424 : DECISIONS ON STATE 
AID SCHEMES [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1428 : DECISIONS ON STATE 
AIDS [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1429 : AID FOR A SUGAR 
PLANT AT OSTELLATO [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1431 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
#IRL 50 MILLION THIRD TRANCHE 
OF STATE AID FOR IRISH CARRIER 
AER LINGUS [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1432 : COMMISSION EXTENDS 
93 (2) PROCEDURE OPENED IN 
OCTOBER TO STUDY AID GRANTED 
BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO 
COMPAGNIE GENERALE MARITIME 
(CGM) [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1442 : COMMISSION TO BE 
NOTIFIED BY SPAIN OF ALL STATE 
AID MEASURES TO THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE SECTOR [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1443 : COMMISSION OPENS THE 
PROCEDURE ON THE CAPITAL 
INJECTIONS BY AUSTRIA 
TABAKWERKE INTO HEAD TYROLIA 
MARES [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1444 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID TO FORD ESPANA, S.A.FOR NEW 
ENGINE PLANT [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1445 : COMMISSION FIXES 
SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION AID 
CEILING [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1446 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID MEASURES CONTAINED IN 
DUTCH ENERGY TAX [95/12/20] 
IP/95/1447 : SPANISH SHIPBUILDING -
COMMISSION TAKES PARTIAL 
DECISION: AID TO COVER PAST 
LOSSES AUTHORISED; 
INVESTIGATION OPENED ON 
FUTURE TAX CREDITS [95/12/20] 
Court 
Judgements 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 13 septembre 
1995: Aff.jtes T-244/93 et T-486/93 
TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf 
GmbH / Commission des 
Communautés européennes Aides 
d'Etat: 'Aides d'Etat - Décisions 
de la Commission suspendant le 
versement de certaines aides 
jusqu'au remboursement d'aides 
illicites antérieures' (Troisième 
chambre élargie) 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 18 septembre 
1995: Aff. T-49/93 Société 
internationale de diffusion et 
d'édition (SIDE) / Commission des 
Communautés européennes 
Aides d'Etat: 'Aides d'Etat -
Articles 92 et 93 - Recours en 
annulation - Aides à l'exportation 
dans le secteur du livre' Première 
chambre élargie) 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 18 septembre 
1995: Aff. T-471/93 Tiercé 
Ladbroke SA / Commission des 
Communautés européennes Aides 
d'Etat: 'Concurrence - Aides 
d'Etat - Prélèvement sur les 
enjeux des paris pris sur les 
courses de chevaux - Transfert de 
ressources à une entreprise 
établie dans un autre Etat 
membre' (Première chambre 
élargie) 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 28 septembre 
1995; Aff. T-95/94 Chambre 
syndicale nationale des 
entreprises de transport de fonds 
et valeurs (Sytraval) / Commission 
des Communautés européennes 
Aides d'Etat: 'Aides d'Etat - Plainte 
d'un concurrent - Défaut 
d'ouverture de la procédure 
d'examen - Droits de la défense -
Recours en annulation' (Quatrième 
chambre élargie) 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général N. Fennelly présentés à 
l'audience de la cinquième 
chambre du 28 septembre 1995: 
Äff. C-56/93 Royaume de Belgique 
/ Commission des Communautés 
européennes: Annulation de la 
communication de la Commission 
au titre de l'article 93, paragraphe 
2, du traité CEE, adressée aux 
Etats membres et autres 
intéressés, concernant un système 
tarifaire préférentiel appliqué par 
les Pays-Bas pour les livraisons de 
gaz naturel aux fabricants 
néerlandais d'engrais azotés 
Conclusions de Monsieur l'Avocat 
général F.G. Jacobs présentés à 
l'audience de la Cour plénière du 
14 décembre 1995: Äff. C-39/94 
Syndicat français de l'express 
international (SFEI) e.a. / La Poste 
e.a.: Préjudicielle - Tribunal de 
commerce de Paris - Interprétation 
des articles 92 et 93, paragraphe 3, 
du traité CE -Aides d'Etat -
Assistance logistique et 
commerciale fournie par la Poste à 
la Société française de messagerie 
internationale - Compétence des 
juridictions nationales en cas de 
saisine parallèle de la Commission 
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INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF COMPETITION POLICY 
Main developments between 1st August and 31st December 1995 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
l'ensemble, prudents sur la nature des 
nouvelles mesures à adopter et sur le 
calendrier de leur mise en oeuvre. 
by Claude RAKOVSKY, Stefaan DEPYPERE, Thinam JAKOB and 
Brona CARTON, DG IV-A-3 
RELATIONS AVEC LE JAPON 
Visite de M. Van Miert 
Le 22 novembre, le Commissaire Van 
Miert s'est rendu à Tokyo où, après avoir 
inauguré un séminaire sur la politique de 
concurrence (voir plus bas), il a eu une 
série d'entretiens avec de hauts 
responsables japonais, en particulier avec 
M. Hashimoto, Ministre du MITI, M. 
Inoue, Ministre des Télécommunications, 
M. Nakayama, Directeur Général de la 
Management and Coordination Agency, 
ainsi qu'avec une commission de 
parlementaires des partis de la majorité 
gouvernementale associée à l'élaboration 
du programme de déréglementation. M. 
Van Miert a également eu des contacts 
avec les milieux d'affaires européens basés 
à Tokyo (European Business Community) 
et japonais (Keidanren). 
Les interlocuteurs du Commissaire ont, 
dans le cadre de leurs compétences 
respectives, fourni des informations sur 
l'état du processus de déréglementation (Le 
terme de déréglementation devant, ici, être 
entendu dans un sens large, allant au-delà 
de la seule démonopolisation des "utilities" 
pour couvrir toutes les mesures visant à 
alléger les contraintes administratives de 
toutes sortes qui brident les forces du 
marché) fondé sur le programme rendu 
public par le Gouvernement japonais en 
mars denier, ainsi que sur les mesures 
envisagées dans le cadre de la mise à jour 
de ce programme. 
M. Van Miert a mis l'accent sur 
l'importance de renforcer la politique de 
concurrence en parallèle avec la levée des 
obstacles législatifs ou réglementaires au 
libre-jeu des forces du marché. Les projets 
d'amendement de la loi antimonopole 
visant à renforcer le statut de l'autorité de 
concurrence (da façon, notamment, à lui 
permettre de limiter le nombre et 
d'endiguer la portée des mesures dirigistes 
et/ou restrictives de la concurrence mises 
en oeuvre par d'autres branches de 
l'administration) constitueraient une 
avancée positive à cet égard. M. Van 
Miert a également souhaité que l'actuel 
exercice de réexamen des actuelles 
immunités à l'application des règles de 
concurrence dont bénéficient certains 
secteurs d'activités (que ces immunités 
résultent de la loi antimonopole elle-même 
ou de dispositions législatives sectorielles) 
conduise à l'élimination de, virtuellement, 
toutes ces immunités. 
Sur ces différents points, ainsi que sur la 
portée du processus de déréglementation 
lui-même, les responsables japonais ont 
émis des positions dans l'ensemble 
positive. 
Des convergences de plus en plus large, en 
faveur de la déréglementation, apparaissent 
ainsi entre l'autorité de concurrence, 
certains instances gouvernementales (MITI 
...) et les milieux d'affaires, soutenue par 
une évolution sensible des comportements 
des consommateurs japonais (plus grande 
attention aux prix, succès de la grande 
d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o g r e s s i v e m e n t 
déréglementée, etc.) . 
Toutefois, s'ils ont confirmé ces 
évolutions positives, les interlocuteurs de 
M. Van Miert se sont montrés, dans 
Séminaire conjoint 
Pour la troisième fois depuis 1993, 
l'autorité japonaise de concurrence et la 
DG IV ont tenu, cette année à Tokyo, le 22 
novembre, un séminaire public conjoint sur 
le droit et la politique de concurrence. 
Avec la participation active d'un public 
composé de dirigeants politiques et 
administratifs, de représentants du monde 
des affaires, des milieux universitaires, 
d'associations de consommateurs et en 
présence de journalistes, le séminaire 
introduit par MM. Van Miert et Kogayu, 
Président de la Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (JFTC) a permis un large 
échange de vues sur : 
- l'application de la politique de la 
concurrence dans le contexte de la 
mondialisation de l'économie 
- la portée (légale et réelle) des politiques 
de concurrence et la réduction des 
immunités et exceptions à leur 
application. 
De même que pour le 2ème séminaire tenu 
à Bruxelles en 1994, il sera procédé (cette 
fois à l'initiative de la JFTC) à une 
publication des minutes des débats de ce 
3ème séminaire. 
Réunion bilatérale 
La réunion annuelle à haut niveau entre la 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission et la DG 
IV s'est tenue à Tokyo le 24 novembre 
sous la coprésidence de MM. Kogayu, 
Président de la JFTC, et Schaub, Directeur 
Général de la DG IV. 
Au cours des entretiens, les deux autorités 
se sont informées mutuellement sur les 
développements récents de la mise en 
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oeuvre de la politique de concurrence dans 
leurs juridictions respectives. La JFTC a, 
en particulier, mis l'accent sur les efforts 
réalisés au Japon dans la lutte contre les 
cartels (notamment sous la forme de bid-
rigging). Cet effort s'est traduit par un 
relèvement des amendes infligées et, en 
1995, un cas de poursuites pénales 
engagées par la JFTC. La JFTC a, par 
ailleurs, fait état des initiatives en cours 
visant à réduire le nombre des immunités 
et exceptions à l'application de la loi 
antimonopole. La position de la JFTC en 
faveur de l'élimination des systèmes 
encore en vigueur de prix imposés 
(secteurs des livres, journaux, disques et 
cassettes) a également été explicitée. 
La DG IV a fait part des principaux 
développements intervenus en Europe et en 
particulier des cas d'application de la 
politique de concurrence liés aux 
problèmes d'accès au marché et/ou à des 
infrastructures essentielles. La DG IV a, 
également, apporté des précisions sur 
l'avancement du processus de libéralisation 
(télécommunication, transport maritime). 
Enfin, les deux autorités de concurrence 
ont envisagé les moyens de rendre leur 
coopération plus étroite et plus 
opérationnelle à travers, notamment, un 
renforcement des échanges d'information, 
et des consultations en particulier sur les 
"projets horizontaux" (guidelines, livres 
verts, règlements d'exemption, etc.). La 
DG IV a indiqué son intention de 
soumettre formellement à la JFTC des cas 
dans lesquels l'accès au marché japonais 
semblerait entravé par des comportements 
d'entreprises restrictifs de la concurrence. 
Elle a émis le souhait que la JFTC donne 
suite à ces requêtes en procédant à un 
examen de la situation du secteur 
considéré en vue, si nécessaire, de 
l'adoption de mesures de redressement. 
REPORT OF GROUP OF EXPERTS 
ON COMPETITION POLICY IN 
THE NEW TRADE ORDER 
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in December 1993 and 
the gradual reduction of state imposed 
trade barriers has put the spotlight firmly 
on related areas which could have the 
effect of distorting trade between 
countries. The Ministerial Conference in 
Marrakesh in April 1994, at the formal 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
launch of the WTO, identified a number of 
areas which required further examination. 
Competition policy was explicitly 
mentioned as one such area. 
In a world where business activities are 
increasingly being carried on a global 
scale, and where the ability of 
governments or even regional 
organizations, such as the EU, to monitor 
the activity of multinational companies is 
severely limited, there is a greater need to 
address private anti-competitive practices 
at the international level. Competition 
authorities themselves are all too aware of 
the problems of trying to address 
international business operations through 
laws intended for national (or regional) 
application. 
Business activity may be organized in a 
way which brings it beyond the reach of 
any competition authority and so 
anti-competitive practices escape review 
and, more importantly, sanction. 
Alternatively, the same business activity 
can fall within the jurisdiction of two or 
more competition authorities, each 
applying their own national rules. The 
possibility for conflict is all too apparent. 
International cooperation between 
competition authorities serves two main 
objectives. 
On the one hand, it provides a means of 
making competition policy more effective 
by working closely with those countries 
which have in place and enforce 
developed competition policies and with 
which the EU does not necessarily have 
major trade frictions linked to anti-
competitive conduct. 
The Community has already concluded an 
agreement of this type with the USA and 
is currently negotiating one with Canada. 
On the other hand, international 
cooperation can also address the trade 
problems which result from a combination 
of private anti-competitive conduct and 
poor enforcement of competition rules. In 
this context multilateral cooperation has a 
particular attraction for the Community as 
it allows us to implicate all our trade 
partners in the cooperation process. 
The barriers to trade represented by anti-
competitive conduct are difficult to 
measure, but they are not of recent origin. 
In 1948, the Havana Charter attempted to 
introduce competition principles into the 
international arena. Since then we have 
had the OECD competition policy 
guidelines (first adopted in 1967 and 
revised several times since, most recently 
in July 1995) and the UNCTAD Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices (1980). It is reasonable 
to suppose that the removal of state 
protect ion resul t ing from the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round will 
encourage, rather than discourage, 
companies to take measures to exclude new 
competitors from their traditional markets. 
The lessons learned from the EU's own 
experience is that the removal of public 
trade barriers between Member States has 
not lessened the need for an effective 
competition policy in order to address the 
market restrictions resulting from private 
anti-competitive behaviour. 
A common set of competition policy 
principles, accepted and enforced by all 
countries, would go a long way to 
achieving a more coherent approach to 
addressing anti-competitive activity at 
international level. 
In mid-1994, Commissioner Van Miert 
invited three outside experts, Professors 
Immenga, Jenny and Petersmann, to lead a 
group, which also included Commission 
officials participating in a personal 
capacity, to reflect on the EU's needs in 
relation to international cooperation. Last 
June the group presented its final report 
entitled "Competition policy in the new 
52 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** * * 
** ** *** 
v ^ . Volume 1 · Number 6 · Autumn/Winter 1995 
> INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
trade order: strengthening international 
cooperation and rules". 
Although the report is the work of an 
independent group, and so does not bind 
the Commission, both Commissioners Van 
Miert and Brittan, with the support of 
Commissioner Bangemann, considered the 
subject to be of sufficient importance to 
ask the Commission to send this 
independent report to the European 
Parliament and to Council in order to 
stimulate a serious debate within the 
Community and beyond at the earliest 
possible stage. 
On 12 July 1995, the Commission agreed 
to make the report public. 
The report 
The report begins with an analysis of 
recent economic developments which the 
experts consider make necessary improved 
cooperation between competition 
authorities. Following the positive 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
consequent progressive reduction of 
state-imposed trade barriers, there is a risk 
that they will be replaced by other 
obstacles to international trade. In 
particular the behaviour of companies, 
through both vertical and horizontal 
arrangements, could limit market access. If 
widespread, this would compromise the 
expected benefits of liberalized 
international trade in terms of growth and 
employment. 
At the same time, there is a contradiction 
between increasingly international 
economic activity and limited territorial 
enforcement of competition rules by 
national (or regional in the case of the 
Commission) authorities. 
For example, company behaviour on the 
market of a particular country could raise 
questions under that country's competition 
rules. Yet the evidence that would allow 
the competition authority to act against the 
companies concerned might be located 
within the territory of a neighbouring 
state and thus be inaccessible. This is not 
unusual in the case of export cartels. 
Another problem can arise when same 
company behaviour affects several national 
markets and is reviewed by the various 
competition authorities responsible. 
Conflicts could arise between them on the 
action to be taken. Developments such as 
these call for strengthening links between 
the authorities charged with enforcing 
competition rules. 
The authors of the report then went on to 
make an inventory of the forms of 
cooperation already existing between 
competition authorities. These forms 
of cooperation consist mainly of 
mechanisms, based on bilateral 
relations, which favour the exchange of 
information (while respecting of the rights 
of companies to protect their business 
secrets) as well as consultation with a 
view to accommodating the concerns of 
each of the parties and their respective 
competition rules. 
The recommendations 
The largest section of the report is given 
over to the recommendations of the group 
of experts. 
First, they propose that countries should be 
encouraged to ensure that they have in 
place an adequate set of competition rules 
and that these are effectively enforced. 
Technical assistance should be provided to 
developing countries requiring it. 
Second, the European Union should extend 
to other countries the network of bilateral 
agreements that link it with certain of its 
partners (the United States and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe). 
The Group considers, moreover, that it 
would be necessary to increase the scope 
of these agreements by providing for, in 
particular, the possibility of exchanging 
confidential information. 
Third, the Group considers that bilateral 
agreements alone cannot respond to all the 
needs of international cooperation. Thai is 
why the Group, in its principal 
recommendation, is in favour of putting in 
place a plurilateral cooperation structure 
accompanied by a dispute resolution 
procedure based on a set of common rules. 
It recommends that negotiations are 
pursued in this manner with interested 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Korea, Japan, Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Singapore, and Mexico. 
In concrete terms, the experts judge that a 
plurilateral framework should contain four 
key elements: 
1. An instrument enabling the exchange of 
information between competition agencies, 
including business secrets, but with 
watertight guarantees with respect to the 
protection of their confidential nature: 
2. A "positive comity instrument", by 
which one competition agency can ask 
another to investigate and if necessary act 
against a practice that harms its importam 
interests yet falls outside its 
jurisdiction, that would be binding in 
nature; 
3. A set of appropriate substantive rules. 
with tougher disciplines as practices are 
considered to have more pronounced 
anti-competitive effects (i.e stronger rutes 
against hard core cartels than asains« 
vertical restrictions); 
4. A dispute settlement system subject lo 
strict deadlines, whereby the complainant 
authority can seek redress within a 
relatively short period of lime if the rules 
of the Agreement have nol been respected. 
The follow-up 
The Commission has launched a débale on 
the report with the other institutions of EU 
and with the Member Stales. The 
Directors General of the Member State 
competition authorities, al Iheir annual 
meeting of 17 October, set up a working 
group to consider in more detail lhe 
technical aspects of some of the report's 
recommendations. 
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At the same time the report has been 
presented to the representatives of the 
Member States in the Council of 
Minister's Article 113 trade committee 
with a view to considering whether trade 
and competition policy should be proposed 
as an item on the agenda of the WTO's 
Ministerial Conference in December 1996. 
The work of the Article 113 Committee on 
this topic will continue in 1996 under the 
Italian presidency. 
Commissioners Van Miert and Brittan also 
presented the report to the European 
Parliament's Committee on External 
Economic Relations on 18 December and 
have committed themselves to keeping the 
Committee informed of future 
developments. 
The Commission has also had the 
opportunity to present the report in 
international fora, specifically, at a number 
OECD meetings, including a meeting of 
the Committee on Competition Law and 
Policy and at the third UNCTAD 
conference to review all aspects of the 
agreed equitable principles and rules for 
the control of restrictive business 
practices. Discussion of the report will be 
continued in the OECD in 1996 The 
report has also been discussed during 
various bilateral meetings held in 
November with representatives of 
competition authorities from countries 
outside the EU. 
1996 will see the continuation of the 
discussions at Community and 
international level when and it is also 
hoped to have the reactions of the 
European business community to the 
report. 
efforts under the EC/US bilateral 
agreements on competition laws. Since 
the Council of Ministers' approval of the 
Agreement on 10 April 1995, thus 
removing the question marks regarding its 
position under Community law, some 
thirty-three notifications have been made 
to the United States competition 
authorities, bringing the total for the year 
to forty-two. Thirty of these notifications 
were made in merger cases. Thirty-five 
notifications were received from the US, 
twenty-one of these being in merger cases. 
The competition authorities also 
cooperated in a number of cases of joint 
interest to their mutual benefit and to the 
benefit of the companies involved. 
The twice yearly high level meetings 
between the Commission and the US 
competition authorities were also revived 
and a meeting was held on 13 November. 
The participants took the opportunity of 
the renewal of these formal high level 
contacts as an opportunity to examine the 
day to day working of the agreement with 
a view to improving its functioning. The 
discussion also extended to broader issues 
of international cooperation and in view of 
the Federal Trade Commission's current 
hearings on globalization and innovation, 
the participants exchanged views on issues 
relating to the application of competition 
policy to sectors characterized by rapid 
innovation. 
The Commission will be preparing a 
report to Council and Parliament on the 
application of the agreement during the 
first half of 1996. 
on the draft agreement. These will be 
pursued with a view to concluding the 
agreement in 1996. 
An informal high level meeting took place 
in Brussels on 14 November and 
representatives of the Commission and the 
Canadian Bureau of competition policy 
were able to exchange views on recent 
developments in competition policy and on 
individual cases where the Commission had 
taken decisions during the previous twelve 
months. 
OECD RECOMMENDATION 
COOPERATION 
ON 
The Commission contributed to the work of 
the OECD Committee on Competition Law 
and Policy during the year and in particular 
to the revision of the Recommendation on 
Cooperation between Member Countries on 
anti-competitive practices affecting 
international trade. The final text was 
adopted by the Council of the OECD in 
July 1995. 
The recommendation takes account of 
recent trends in economic behaviour, in 
particular globalization, and experience in 
concrete cases also inspired the changes. 
The notification provisions have been 
significantly reinforced, both in the terms 
of the criteria for notification and the 
information provided by a notifying 
country. The recommendations as regards 
coordination and cooperation between 
competition authorities have also been 
substantially modified and new text 
introduced, with a potential for greater 
assistance being provided by Member 
Countries in information gathering. 
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN RELATIONS WITH NORTH 
AMERICA 
United States 
During the second half of 1995 the 
European Commission redoubled its 
Canada 
The negotiation of the bilateral 
cooperation agreement with Canada was 
put on hold temporarily during the earlier 
part of the year pending the resolution of 
the North Atlantic fishing dispute. By 
autumn normal relations had been restored 
and there were some informal exchanges 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
PREACCESSION STRATEGY 
TOWARDS THE CEC 
The Commission services continued to 
prepare the accession of the Central 
European Countries (including the Baltic 
States). 
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DG IV participated actively. In broad 
terms it is fair to state that cooperation in 
the area of antitrust is well-advanced. At 
least all structural elements are in place. 
With some extra effort, it should be 
possible to achieve a similar result for 
state aid monitoring and monopolies and 
special rights . We now have to see how 
the practical cooperation (exchange of 
information and consultation) develops. 
In the antitrust field training and 
cooperation efforts have been stepped up. 
DG IV and the Member States authorities 
aim at pooling their resources. The 
collective training that was organised as a 
joint event was deemed very successful 
(Competition Policy Newsletter no. 5). 
The response from the participants was 
very encouraging. One main result beside 
the purely technical training aspect was to 
establish good human relations between 
officials from all authorities involved. 
Both in the perspective of accession and 
with the view of executing the 
implementing rules of the Europe 
Agreements this is an important 
achievement. 
In the field of state aid the proposed 
implementing rules are based on the 
structure that was laid down by the 
Council of Essen. Each CEC should 
entrust monitoring of the aid to a single 
authority. This authority should evaluate 
the aid measures pursuant to the relevant 
articles of the Europe Agreements (the 
numbering is different in the various 
Europe Agreements but the articles always 
boil down to a transposition of Art 92 and 
the guidelines, frameworks and decisions 
that follow from it). The authority should 
also be the main discussion partner for DG 
IV for cases that merit a joint analysis 
(between DG IV and the authority 
involved).The negotiations of the 
implementing rules have been completed 
with the Czech Republic and with Estonia. 
The conclusion of the technical 
negotiations with Hungary seems to be 
imminent. The proposed rules are now 
sent into the formal approval process that 
will lead to determining the position of the 
Union in the Association Council and the 
adoption of these rules by the Association 
Council. 
Meanwhile technical cooperation 
programmes are being put in place to 
facilitate making the inventories of 
existing aid, developing mechanisms for 
collecting data on new aid and creating the 
necessary technical skills within the CEC 
monitoring authorities for assessing the 
competition distorting effects of the aid. 
Certain countries have some difficulties in 
deciding which administration could play 
the role of monitoring authority. 
The Council of Madrid having envisaged 
to start the concrete preparations for the 
accession viz. the drafting of opinions, the 
process of establishing state aid control 
will have to be accelerated. 
The PHARE programme is adapting in a 
flexible manner to the evolutions regarding 
accession. A promising development is the 
increased availability of "horizontal" 
budget funds. "Horizontal" funds are 
oriented to actions supporting competition 
law and policy development throughout 
Central Europe without being tied to any 
particular country. Conferences with the 
CEC competition authorities (Visegrad 95 
and Brno 96) are examples of such 
actions. Other actions that are now being 
scheduled consist of workshops forjudges 
and for academics. 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
The first operational contacts with the 
competition authorities from the 
Mediterranean countries were established 
during a Workshop for African countries 
organised in Tunis by the Ministry for 
Commerce and the UNCTAD secretariat. 
During two days high level presentations 
from various delegations (i.a. ten African 
countries) were made and technical topics 
were discussed. 
The Commission supported the workshop 
financially and through its active 
contribution to the discussion. So did the 
French authorities. Germany offered 
financial support. The OECD and the 
World Bank participated in the workshop. 
A main topic for discussions was the role 
of competition policy for developing 
countries that wish to participate fully in 
the global economy. Many developing 
countries have undertaken significant 
programmes of structural adjustment. A 
common feature of these programmes and 
transition programmes like in the CEC is 
that various instruments such as direct 
supply control or price control are dropped. 
Their role is taken over by the market 
mechanism and evidence abounds that there 
will be a great need to introduce 
competition law and enforced policy before 
these reforms can be really successful. 
Hence the high demand on the Union on 
the Member States and on other countries 
having an experience in this field to 
provide guidance and technical assistance. 
Despite the high strain on its limited 
resources, DG IV tries to accommodate 
such demands coming from Mediterranean 
countries. As for the CEC it seeks to join 
forces with the authorities of the Member 
States. These efforts are compatible with 
the conclusions of the Council in Cannes 
(June 95), of the Euro-Mediterranean 
conference in Barcelona (November 95) 
and of the Council in Madrid (December 
95). To be remembered that the association 
agreements with the Mediterranean 
countries closely follow the CEC model. 
After the agreement with Tunisia, the 
agreements with Morocco and Israel have 
now also been signed. Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon are expected to follow soon. 
To the extent possible requests for 
information coming from other countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America are also 
handled. 
MERCOSUR 
At the end of September a delegation of 
authorities dealing with competition issues 
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in Mercosur countries visited DG IV. The 
theoretical and practical problems of 
developing a competition policy between 
Mercosur countries and between them and 
the Union have been discussed. There was 
an agreement to continue the analysis. 
Early November a large study group from 
IBRAC, a Brazilian study institute, visited 
DG IV for several days. Lectures and 
bilateral meetings were organised and 
highly interesting technical discussions 
took place. 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR 
COMPETITION VISITS SOFIA 
On the invitation of the Chairman of the 
Commission for the Protection of 
Competition the Director­General for 
Competition of the European Commission 
paid a visit to Bulgarian leaders in 
Government and National Assembly, 
involved in competition policy issues. 
The main objectives of the visit were to 
pursue mutual efforts towards a rapid 
implementation of the competition 
provisions of the Europe Agreement 
concluded between the European Union 
and Bulgaria, and to further strengthen the 
cooperation with the Bulgarian 
Commission for the Protection of 
Competition. 
In the course of the visit meetings took 
place with a number of leading politicians. 
Participants agreed that competition is an 
essential means to encouraging economic 
development. An effective competition 
policy which promotes the competitive 
process and prevents unfair behaviour in 
the market is one of the cornerstones for 
such development. This is why the Europe 
Agreement places high emphasis on 
competition matters, just as the European 
Commission's White paper on Preparation 
of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
Internal Market of the Union. Co­operation 
in the field of antitrust, state aid control 
and adjustment of monopolies is of high 
importance and in the mutual interest of 
the European Union and Bulgaria. 
It was further agreed to concentrate joint 
efforts on achieving concrete progress in 
the implementation of the Europe 
Agreement. 
Three issues should be treated : 
1. Implementing rules for state aid, as 
foreseen by the competition provisions of 
the Europe Agreement : the Bulgarian side 
will quickly decide on the existing draft 
rules, including the identification of a 
future monitoring authority. 
2. Transparency in the field of state aid 
and monopolies : the Bulgarian authorities 
will support the establishment of an 
inventory of state aids currently existing in 
Bulgaria as a first step towards 
transparency. The Bulgarian authorities 
will also provide a detailed description of 
the currently existing monopolies. 
3. Electronic information exchange 
network between the European 
Commission and the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition : the European 
Commission is investigating the feasibility 
of such a project under the PHARE 
programme. 
The visit took place before a background 
of the slowing down of developments in 
Bulgaria. Progress had been retarded 
particularly in the fields of state aid field 
and monopolies. As a consequence of the 
visit the process of the adoption of the 
implementing rules for state aid and the 
stock­taking of existing monopolies 
received a new impetus. A new technical 
cooperation programme under PHARE 
could also be launched. The relations with 
the CPC and the Secretariat for European 
Integration have taken on a new and 
dynamic dimension which should enable 
Bulgaria to rapidly catch­up with the other 
CEC. 
APPROXIMATION OF 
LEGISLATION 
Under the Europe Agreement and as laid 
down in the CEC White Paper, an 
approximation of legislation is taking place 
in the competition field. In the antitrust 
area, progress has been made. All CEEC 
save one have a competition law and an 
active enforcement authority. The laws are 
being revised or new legislation is being 
proposed in order to bring the systems 
closer to the EU rules. Most countries have 
laws that date from the early nineties. 
Some have been revised in recent years 
(the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland), 
whereas others are still in the process of 
drafting new legislation. In this context one 
can speak of a "second generation 
approximation" : whereas earlier revisions 
have already taken account in different 
degrees of the approximation requirement, 
efforts now need to be made to step up the 
process and to provide for closer alignment 
in view of the accession perspective. In this 
context the current drafts are already more 
harmonised than the earlier revisions where 
work will have to be undertaken. In the 
field of state monopolies of a commercial 
character and in the field of undertakings 
with special and exclusive rights, a stock­
taking exercise is currently under way to 
ensure transparency as a first step. 
Regarding state aid, work still needs to be 
done to ensure compliance with the Europe 
Agreements. Some of the CEC are now in 
the process of deciding on the 
establishment of a monitoring authority (as 
preconised in the Essen Conclusions and 
taken up in the draft implementing rules) 
and of developing a state aid system. This 
process should be taken up by all CEC and 
be monitored carefully. ■ 
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SUMMARY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN 
COMPETITION LEGISLATION 
by Andrei B. KASHEVAROV and Andrei.G. TSYGANOV, 
State Committee of the Russian Federation for Anti-Monopoly Policy and 
Promotion of New Economic Structures; seconded to DG IV for two months 
at the end of 1995. 
The Law "On competition and limitation of 
monopolistic activity on commodity 
markets" was adopted in 1991 as one of the 
first market economy laws in Russia. The 
main change in Russian competition 
legislation is the entry into force on May 
1995 many additions and amendments to 
this Law. 
These developments reflect four years of 
practical carrying out of the Law by the 
State Committee of the Russian Federation 
for Anti-Monopoly Policy and Promotion of 
New Economic S t ruc tu res ( the 
Antimonopoly authority), its regional 
agencies, courts of law and arbitration 
courts. 
Amendments are based on the constitutional 
ban on monopolisation, unfair competition 
and restriction of free movement of goods. 
New legislation is tailored according to the 
new Civil Code of Russian Federation. It 
must be noticed that the fundamental 
prohibitionbased principle of the Russian 
competition legislation is unchanged and 
additions and amendments are intended to 
clarify its basic ideas and procedures and to 
define the competence of the Federal 
antimonopoly authority. 
Some new or revised definitions are 
included into the Law (art.4): 
a) dominant position is defined as the 
exclusive position of an economic entity 
(undertaking) affording it the possibility of 
exerting a decisive influence on a market 
situation or of making access to the market 
difficult for other undertakings. Dominant 
position should be determined based on a 
market share analysis. "It exists if the 
enterprise's share on the market of a 
particular commodity is more than 65%. If 
the share is less than 65% dominant 
position should be proved by the 
Antimonopoly authority. If the share is less 
than 35% the position of an economic entity 
shall not be deemed to/be dominant. 
b) unfair competition - the definition is 
introduced for the first time. Art. 10 of the 
Law consists the list of forms (cases) of 
unfair competition. The federal Law "On 
advertising" adopted in 1995 is a legal basis 
for the Antimonopoly authority in carrying 
out supervision of advertising as one of 
possible forms of unfair competition. 
c) group of persons - according to the Law 
its provisions shall be applied to group.of 
persons in the same way as to economic 
entity. Group of persons in terms of the 
Law exists when one or several following 
conditions are met: 
- direct or indirect (through third persons) 
control of more than 50% of the total 
number of votes by person or several 
persons by agreement; - right to 
determine the conditions of a business 
activity for any person by agreement of 
two or more persons; 
- right to nominate more than 50% of the 
membership of an executive or 
supervisory body of a legal person; -
membership of a stable group of natural 
persons in executive or supervisory 
bodies of two or more legal persons. 
The list of prohibited cases of monopolistic 
activity and unfair competition (art.5-10) 
remains nearly the same in the amended 
Law. It means that the basic approach to 
possible cases and different kinds of 
violation of the competition legislation is 
comprehensive and practically useful. 
In case of concerted practice (art.6) a new 
criterion is introduced. Agreements and 
concordant actions are a subject of the 
Antimonopoly authority investigation only if 
the aggregate market share of all 
participating parties is more than 35%. 
Also this article gives the Antimonopoly 
authority the right to turn to a court with an 
appeal for liquidation of union or association 
of commercial organisations if it is proved 
that this union or association coordinale 
business activity of its participants and is 
deemed as .a form of concerted practice 
limiting competition. 
The main feature of Russian competition 
legislation is that it is applied not only lo 
enterprises but to State executive authorities. 
According to the Law (art.7, 8) acts, actions 
and agreements of the bodies of executive 
authority that limit the economic 
independence of enterprises, create favourable 
or discriminatory conditions for certain 
enterprises shall be prohibited. New addition 
to article 7 of the Law gives the 
Antimonopoly authority the power of 
preliminary control over adoption of 
decisions of the bodies of executive authority. 
Decisions on questions of establishing, 
reorganisation and liquidation of enterprises 
as well as on granting any privileges to a 
certain enterprise or group of enterprises shall 
be approved by the Antimonopoly authority. 
This is a legal basis for the Stale aid control 
and regulation in Russia. 
The most important changes were made in 
articles 17 and 18 of the Law (the siale 
control over concentration). The basic 
criterion for the state control is lhe value of 
total asseis of enterprise (not the statute 
capital as it was before). For all quantitative 
measurements Via minimum amount of a 
month wage" (m.w.) is used. This is an 
officially determined ligure periodically 
revised by the Government that Ids minimise 
the influence of inflation. 
Because of changing of the quantitative 
criteria and procedure, many enterprises now 
are released from the preliminary control of 
the Antimonopoly authority. Preliminary 
consent (approvement) is applied now only 
in following cases: 
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lhe establishment of union (association) 
of commercial organisations; 
the merger of commercial organisation 
if their total assets exceed 100 000 
m.w.; 
the liquidation of state-owned enterprise 
if its assets exceed 50 000 m.w. where 
this leads to the emergence of an 
economic entity with a market share 
more than 35%; 
the acquisition of shares that gives a 
person the right to dispose of more than 
20% of the shares if a total assets of the 
buyer and of the commercial 
organisation which shares are bought 
exceed 100 000 m.w. or if the market 
share of one of the parties to this 
transaction is more than 35%. 
In cases of the establishment of commercial 
organisation if the founders aggregate assets 
exceed 100 000 m.w., of the merger of 
commercial organisations if their total assets 
exceed 50 000 m.w., of the acquisition of 
shares if a total assets of the parties is from 
50 000 m.w. to 100 000 m.w. a notification 
procedure is used. The time-limit of 
notification is 15 days after the official 
registration of the new legal person or after 
the transaction. 
In cases of violation of the rules of 
antimonopoly control over concentration 
(e.c. the creation of commercial organisation 
without notification or the acquisition of 
shares without preliminary application) the 
Antimonopoly authority can bring the suit 
to a court for nullification of state 
registration or transaction and impose fines 
and penalties on legal and natural persons. 
Liability for violation of the Law (art.22-24) 
was strengthened sufficiently. Main 
grounds for the Antimonopoly authority to 
impose fines are failure to fulfil its order or 
decision, to submit applications, 
notifications and information, presentation 
of unauthentic data, obstructing the 
fulfilment by officials of the Antimonopoly 
authority of their duties. Amount of fines is 
measured in month wages (m.w.). Top limit 
of fines is 25 000 m.w. for legal person and 
200 m.w. for natural person. Managers of 
commercial and non-commercial 
organisations and officials of State 
executive authorities who are found guilty 
of repeated violation of the Law shall bear 
criminal responsibility. 
According to the Law (art.27) the procedure 
for investigation and examination of cases 
of violation of the Law shall be determined 
by the rules endorsed by the Antimonopoly 
authority. To exercise its powers the 
Antimonopoly authority shall have the right 
to obtain any information and persons 
authorized by the Antimonopoly authority 
shall have the right of free access to 
executive bodies and to enterprises and 
organisations in order to familiarize 
themselves with all necessary documents 
(art. 13). Legal persons, executive authorities 
and natural persons must submit authentic ' 
documents, written and oral explanation and 
other information required by the 
Antimonopoly authority (art. 14). 
On the base of examination of facts of 
violation of the Law the Antimonopoly 
authority shall issue binding orders that 
shall be subject to carrying out within 
established time-limits (art.29). 
Legal and natural persons have the right to 
tum to a court with an appeal to declare 
decisions (orders) of the Antimonopoly 
authority fully or partially invalid or to 
cancel and alter decisions on the imposition 
of a fine (art.28) . 
Main figures of the Antimonopoly authority 
activities are shown in Annex 1-3. 
ANNEX 1 Activity of the SCAP ofrussia 
in implementation of antimonopoly 
legislation 
- state control over acquisition of stocks 
(shares) in the capital of commercial 
organisations (art.18): 2140 (18%) 
Number of applications: 1992 8620 
1993 11470 
1994 12152 
Kinds of examined applications in 1994: 
- facts of violation of antimonopoly 
legislation (art. 5-8, 10, 19) : 
3720 (31%) 
- state control over establishment, 
reorganisation and liquidation of 
commercial organisations and 
associations (art. 17): 5364(43%) 
others (art.9, 16): 928 (8%) 
ANNEX 2 : Distribution of cases of 
violation of antimonopoly legislation 
- abuse of dominant position (art.5) : 
2328 (62%) 
- concerted practice (art.6) : 197 (5%) 
- acts and actions of 'executive authorities 
directed towards limitation of competition 
(art.7): 881 (24%) 
- unfair competition (art. 10) : 175 (5%) 
- others (art.8,9,19) : 139 (4%) 
Total 3720 (100%) 
ANNEX 3 .· Results of examination of 
application by SCAP 
- Violation is stopped without initiation of 
proceeding: 1300 
- Proceeding is opened : 1467 (100%) 
under art.5 
art.6 
art.7 
art. 10 
Orders are issued 
896 (61%) 
70 (5%) 
331 (23%) 
104 (7%) 
1353 
Administrative penalties and warnings are 
imposed 198 
Preliminary consents to the establishment, 
reorganisation and liquidation of com-
mercial organisations are given : 4 100 
Rejects on applications for obtaining 
consent to creation etc. of commercial 
organisations are made: 550 
Preliminary consents to the acquisitions of 
shares are given: 1581 
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DG IV staff list 
Télécopieur central : 295 Ol 28 
Directeur général 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Conseiller principal 
Conseiller auditeur 
Conseiller auditeur 
(chargé également de la sécurité des informations) 
Assistants du Directeur général 
directement rattachés au Directeur général : 
1 Affaires administratives et budgétaires; 
Information, Parlement européen 
Comité Economique et Social 
2 Questions informatiques 
Alexander SCHAUB 
Jean-François PONS 
Gianfranco ROCCA a.i. 
Hartmut JOHANNES 
Joseph GILCHRIST 
Christopher JONES 
Irène SOUKA 
Guido VERV AET 
2952387/2954576 
2994423/2962284 
2951152/2951139 
2955912/2956942 
2955673/2960246 
2965030/2957491 
2957206/2960189 
2959224/2951305 
DIRECTION A 
Politique générale de la concurrence et coordination 
Conseiller 
1 Politique générale de la concurrence et Coordination 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2 Affaires juridiques et législation 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3 Aspects internationaux 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
Jonathan FAULL 
Juan RIVIERE MARTI 
David DEACON 
Emil PAULIS 
Helmut SCHRÖTER 
Claude RAKOVSKY 
Stefaan DEPYPERE 
2958658/2965201 
2951146/2960699 
2955905/2960562 
2965033/2966207 
2951196/2955911 
2955389/2962368 
2990713/2952007 
DIRECTION B 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 
1 Unité opérationnelle I 
2 Unité opérationnelle II 
3 Unité opérationnelle III 
4 Unité opérationnelle IV 
Götz DRAUZ a.i. 
Enrique LOPEZ VEIGA 
Roger DAOUT 
Kirtikuman MEHTA 
2958681/2952965 
2957381/2961180 
2965383/2965574 
2957389/2952871 
DIRECTION C 
Information, communication, multimédias 
1 Télécommunications et Postes 
Coordination Société d'information 
- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 
2 Médias, éditions musicales 
- Aspects de propriété intellectuelle 
John TEMPLE LANG 
Herbert UNGERER 
Suzette SCHIFF 
Sebastiano GUTTUSO 
3 Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 
2955571/2954512 
2968623/2968622 
2957657 
2951102/2954363 
2955619/2951150 
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DIRECTION D 
Services 
Conseiller 
1 Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2 Transports 
3 Commerce (y compris la grande distribution), 
tourisme & autres services 
Humbert DRABBE 
Georges ROUNIS 
Luc GYSELEN 
Luigi CAMPOGRANDE 
2950060/2952701 
2953404 
2961523/2959987 
2957243/2954623 
2952767/2960872 
DIRECTION E 
Industries de base 
1 Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non 
métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre 
2 Produits chimiques de base et transformés, caoutchouc 
3 Energie(charbon, hydrocarbures, électricité, gaz) 
4 Cartels et Inspections 
Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels 
Rafael GARCIA PALENCIA 2950253/2950900 
Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816 
Wouter PIEKE 
Paul MALRIC-SMITH 
Pierre DUPRAT 
Julian JOSHUA 
2959824 
2959675/2964903 
2953524/2954850 
2955519/2958986 
DIRECTION F 
Industries des biens d'équipement et de consommation Sven NORBERG 
1 Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 
Dieter SCHWARZ 
2 Automobiles, autres moyens de transport 
et construction mécanique connexe 
3 Produits agricoles.alimentaires, pharmaceutiques, 
textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 
2952178/2959031 
2956084/2950663 
2951880/2950479 
2952224/2961179 
DIRECTION G 
Aides d'Etat 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
1 Politique des aides d'Etat 
2 Aides horizontales 
3 Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
4 Aides sectorielles I 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
5 Aides sectorielles II 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
6 Entreprises publiques et services 
7 Analyses,inventaires et rapports 
Asger PETERSEN 
Francisco ESTEVE REY 
Anne HOUTMAN 
Claude ROUAM 
Alfredo MARQUES 
2955569/2958566 
2951140/2955900 
2959628/2969719 
2957994/2954592 
2962542/2967581 
Constantin ANDROPOULOS 2956601/2960009 
Geert DANCET 2960993/2950068 
Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900 
Ronald FELTKAMP 
Reinhard WALTHER 
2954283/2960450 
2958434/2955410 
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Documentation ... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given by Community officials that may be of 
interest. Copies of some of these may be available from DGIV's Information Officer. Future issues of the 
newsletter will contain details of conferences on competition policy which have been brought to our attention. 
Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facility should refer to page 1 for the address of 
DGIV's Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
L'encadrement communautaire 
des aides aux entreprises, Denis 
Leythienne, Commission 
Européenne, (sp95032) 
Economie Assessment of 
Oligopolies under the Community 
Merger Control Regulation, in 
European Competition Law Review, 
Vol. 14, Issue 3, May/June 1993, 
Sweet & Maxwell Pubi., ISSN 
0144-3054, by Juan F. BRIONES 
ALONSO (sp95033) 
Les règles communautaires 
applicables aux concentrations, 
dans Observateur de Bruxelles N 
13, Dr. Georgios KYRIAZIS, 
(sp95034) 
Oligopolistic dominance. Is there 
a common approach in different 
jurisdictions ? A review of 
decisions adopted by the 
Commission under the Merger 
regulation, speech by Juan Briones-
Alonso, European Study 
Conference, 18/11/1995, Brussels. 
(sp95036) 
International cooperation between 
competition authorities, by Jean-
François PONS, Deputy Director-
General for Competition of the 
European Commission, in 
Conference "Competition Policy in 
Transition Economies" 26 
September 1995 - Moscow 
(sp95040) 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
22nd Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law & 
Policy, Fordham University School 
of Law, New York City, "EU 
Competition Law in the 
Telecommunications, Media and 
Information Technology Sectors", 
by Dr H. UNGERER (sp95041) 
European Cable Communications 
'95, London, 23rd October 1995, 
WHO SHOULD BE EUROPE'S 
DIGITAL GATE KEEPERS ? 
Clarifying how recent EU policies 
and Decisions will foster effective 
competition , by Dr H. UNGERER 
(sp95042) 
State aid control by the European 
Commission: the case of the 
automobile sector, by Geert Dancet 
and Manfred Rosenstock (sp95043) 
Attitudes to Anti-Trust 
Enforcement in the EU and US: 
Dodging the Traffic Warden, or 
Respecting the Law ? by Julian 
Mathic Joshua, (sp95044) 
L'application des regles 
communautaires en matière 
d'aides d'etat aux etablissements 
de credit, Projet d'article pour la 
revue "BANQUE", par Ronald 
Feltkamp et Nicola Pesaresi 
(sp950045) 
Conférence Internationale 
Antitrust: Règles, Institutions et 
Relations internationales: Politique 
de concurrence et développement 
des échanges: pour un 
renforcement significatif de la 
cooperation internationale, Rome, 
les 20 et 21 novembre 1995, Jean-
François PONS, Directeur Général 
adjoint (sp95046) 
Competition Policy in the Agro-
food sector, Internal Market Week 
in Sweden, 1995, The consumer in 
the Internal market - Goteborg, Nov. 
10 1995, Stephen Ryan (sp95047) 
La politique européenne de 
concurrence face aux évolutions 
récentes de la distribution, 
Colloque International a Seville, les 
24 et 25 novembre 1995, par Jean-
François PONS, Directeur général 
adjoint (sp95048) 
De verspreiding van de Europese 
Concurrentieregels buiten de 
Europese Unie, Stefaan Depypere 
(sp95049) 
Die Entwicklung eines 
wettbewerblichen europaischen 
Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktes, 
erschienen in OÖ Kraftwerke AG 
(Hg.) Aktuelle Rechtsprobleme der 
Competition Policy Newsletter ***** * * 
** ** 
*** 
o * - Volume 1 Number 6 · Autumn/Winter 1995 61 
> INFORMATION SECTION 
Elektrizitätswirtschaft 1995, 
Universitätsverlag ­ Linz 1995, 
Rüdiger DOHMS (sp95050) 
OPENING ADDRESS TO THE 
THIRD, EUROPEAN UNION 
JAPAN COMPETITION POLICY 
SEMINAR 22 NOVEMBER 1995, 
Tokyo, Japan, Delivered by Mr 
Karel Van Miert (sp95051) 
THIRD EUROPEAN UNION ­
JAPAN COMPETITION POLICY 
SEMINAR, 22 NOVEMBER 1995, 
Tokyo, Japan, Why do we need 
more cooperation in the field of 
competition policy ? Speech 
delivered by Mr Jonathan Faull 
(sp95052) 
THIRD EUROPEAN UNION ­
JAPAN COMPETITION POLICY 
SEMINAR, 22 NOVEMBER 1995, 
Tokyo, Japan, Scope of application 
of the competition rules of the 
European Union, Speech delivered 
by Mr Alexander Schaub, (sp95053) 
"EU Competition policy, the USA 
and the air transport sector" 
Speech by Mr Karel Van MIERT to 
the Sabre World Cconference '95 
DALLAS, 7­9/9/1995 
(SPEECH/95/160) 
Speech of Mr Karel Van MIERT at 
the "Verband Oeffentlicher Banken" 
­ Bonn­ Bad Godesberg, 19 October 
1995: "Competition policy and 
banking sector" (SPEECH/95/212) 
Analyse de l'arrêt de la Cour du 6 
avril 1995: Aff. Jntes C­241/91 Ρ et 
C­242/91 P: Radio Telefis Eeireann 
(RTE) et Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (itp) contre 
Commission (Magill) par Olivier 
Leurquin, (sp96001) 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS 
ON COMPETITION 
Unless otherwise indicated, 
these publications are available 
through the Office for Official 
Publications of the European 
Communities, 2 rue Mercier, 
L 2985 Luxembourg -
Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, or its 
sales offices (see last page).; 
use ISBN or Catalogue Number 
to order. 
LEGISLATION 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume 1A Rules 
applicable to undertakings, 
situation at 30 june 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
85, 86 and 90. catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) 
CM 29­93­AOl­xx­C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities, Addendum to 
Volume IA: Rules applicable to 
udertakings situation as of 31 
December 1994. catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) 
CM 88­95­436­xx­C 
Merger control in the European 
Union, catalogue No: (xx=language 
code; 9 languages) CV 88­95­428­
xx­C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume 2A Rules 
applicable to state aid, situation at 
31 december 1994; this publication 
contains the text of all legislative 
acts relevant to Articles 42, 77, 90, 
92 to 94. catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) 
CM 29­93­A02­XX­C 
Brochure concerning the 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings as contained in the 
EEA agreement and their 
implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority, CV­77­92­
118­EN­C 
Official Documents: Community 
Competition Policy in the 
Telecommunications Sector, a 
compedium prepared by DG IV­C­1; 
it contains Directives under art 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 and 
under the Merger Regulation as well 
as relevant Judgements of the Court 
of Justice. Copies available through 
DG IV­C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 
2968622, fax +322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) Ns 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories d' accords de 
distribution et de service de vente 
et d'après-vente de véhicules 
automobiles Copies available 
through DG IV­F­2 (tel. +322­
2951880, 2950479, fax. +322­
2969800) 
Notice on the application of the 
competition rules to the postal 
sector: Note de l'Unité B­2 du 
9/8/1992, disponible auprès du 
secrétariat de DG IV­F­2 (tel. +322­
2951880, 2950479, fax. +322­
2969800). 
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COMPETITION DECISIONS 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 
Catalogue numbers: 
* 64/72, in it, de, fr, ni: 
CM 76-92-996-xx-C 
* 73/80, in da, de, en, fr, it, nl: 
CM 76-92-988-xx-C 
* 81/85, 7 languages: CM79-93-792-xx-C 
* 86/88, 9 languages: CM 80-93-290-xx-C 
* 89/90, 9 languages: CV 73-92-772-xx-C 
* 90/92, 9 languages: CV 84-94-387-xx-C 
COMPETITION REPORTS 
European Community 
competition policy 1994, 11 
languages, (available on request 
through DG IV's Cellule 
Information) 
XXIV Report on competition 
policy 1994, 11 languages, CM-90-
95-283-xx-C 
XXIIIeme Rapport sur la 
politique de concurrence 1993, 9 
languages, CM 82-94-650-xx-C 
XXIIe Rapport sur la politique 
de concurrence: 1992, 9 languages, 
CM 76-93-689-xx-C 
XXIe Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence: 1991, 9 languages, 
CM 73-92-247-xx-C 
3ème rapport sur les aides d'Etat 
dans la Communauté européenne 
dans le secteur des produits 
manufactures et certains autres 
secteurs dans la Communauté 
européenne, 9 languages, 
CV 75-92-881-xx-C 
4ème rapport sur les aides d'Etat 
dans l'Union Européenne dans le 
secteur des produits manufactures 
et certains autres secteurs, 11 
languages, COM(95)365 
Older annual reports are also 
available on request. 
OTHER DOCUMENTS and 
STUDIES 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition, 
CV-87-95321-EN-C. 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in 
the Telecommunications Sector, 
CM-90-95-801-EN-C 
The effect of conglomerate 
mergers on competition; CM-59-
90-039-EN-C 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws, CM 90-95-089-EN-C 
L' Office de l'harmonisation dans 
le marche interieur, AH-89-95-
260-FR-C 
Information exchanges among 
firms and their impact on 
competition, CV 89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC-funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long-term 
competitiveness, 
CG NA-15-920-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector, 
CV 83-94-757-EN-C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European single 
market, CV 78-93-136-EN-C 
Copyright and information limits 
to the protection of literary and 
pseudo-literary works in the 
Member States of the EC, 
CM 75-92-049-EN-C 
Evaluation of the Impact of 
European Community Research 
Programmes upon the 
Competitiveness of European 
Industry: Concepts and 
approaches, CD NA-14-198-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control 
policy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, 
employment: The challenges and 
ways forward into the 21st 
century: White paper, 9 languages, 
CM 82-94-529-xx-C 
Growth, competitiveness, 
employment: The challenges and 
ways forward into the 21st 
century: "White paper" -Volume 
2 -Part C , CM NF-93-0629-A-C 
EG-Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie, 
CV 73-92-788-DE-C 
Competition policy in the new 
trade order: strengthening 
international cooperation and 
rules, CM 91-95-124-EN-C 
The impact of joint ventures on 
competition: The case of 
petrochemical industry in the 
EEC, CM 70-91 -491-EN-C 
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Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions 
publiques, C-184-94-735-FR-C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de 
l'acier de la Communauté: 
Rapport sur l'enquête 1993, 
CM 83­94­2963­A­C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de 
l'acier de la Communauté: 
Enquete 1992, 9 languages, 
CM 76­93­6733­A­C 
The effect of different state aid 
measures on intra-Community 
competition, CM 59­90­702­EN­C 
Study on the impact of 
liberalization of inward 
cross-border mail on the 
provision of the universal postal 
service and the options for 
progressive liberalization: Final 
report, CV 89­95­018­EN­C 
Green Paper on the development 
of the single market for postal 
services, 9 languages, 
CD NA­14­858­EN­C 
COST allocation and cross 
subsidies, CV 83­94­894­EN­C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European 
merger control: New lessons 
about collective dominance ? 
CM 89­95­737­EN­C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control 
policy, CM AR-94-057-EN-C 
The effects of intra-Community 
competition of export subsidies to 
third countries: The case of 
export credits, export insurance 
and official development 
assistance, CM 59­90­281­EN­C 
Impediments to parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals within the 
European Community, 
CM 73­91­489­EN­C 
Aid element of government R&D 
contracts, CM 70-91-314-EN-C 
Concurrence et cooperation dans 
le transport aérien en Europe, 
CV 74-92-815-FR-C 
European Economy, Supplement 
A, Recent economic trends, No 4 ­
04/94, State aid control in the 
context of other community 
policies, 9 languages, CM­AS­94­
004­xx­C. 
European Economy,; "Competition 
and integration ­ Community 
merger control policy", Supplement 
A nr. 3/95, 9 languages, 
CM AS­95­005­XX­C, 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st August to 31 December 1995 
ARTICLES 85, 86, 90 
(RESTRICTIONS AND 
DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
Legislation 
95/364/CE ­ Décision de la 
Commission, du 28 juin 1995, au titre 
de l'article 90 paragraphe 3 du traité CE, 
JO L 216, 12/9/95 
95/373/CE ­ Décision de la Commission, 
du 31 janvier 1995, relative à une 
procédure d'application des articles 85 et 
86 du traité CE (IV/33.375 ­ PMI­DSV), 
JO L 221, 19/9/95 
95/51/CE ­ Directive de la Commission, 
du 18 octobre 1995, modifiant la 
directive 90/388/CEE en ce qui concerne 
la suppression des restrictions à 
l'utilisation des réseaux câblés de 
télévision pour la fourniture de services 
de télécommunications déjà libéralisés, 
IO L 256, 26/10/95 
95/477/CE ­ Décision de la Commission, 
du 12 juillet 1995, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'aticle 85 du 
traité (BASF Lacke + Farben Ag et SA 
Accinauto ­ affaire IV/33.802), JO L 
272, 15/11/95 
95/489/CE ­ Décision de la Commission, 
du 4 octobre 1995, relative aux 
conditions imposées au second opérateur 
de radiotéléphonie GSM en Italie, JO L 
280, 23/11/95 
95/551/CE ­ Décision de la Commission, 
du 29 novembre 1995, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'article 85 
du traité CE (IV/34.179, 34.202, 216 ­
Stichting Certificatie 
Kraanverhuurbedrijf et Federatie van 
Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven), JO 
L 312, 23/12/95 
Proposition de règlement (CE) du 
Conseil sur les aides à la construction 
navale, JO C 304, 15/11/95 
Communications 
Communication relative faite en 
application de l'article 16 paragraphe 3 
du règlement (CEE) no. 3975/87 du 
Conseil ­ Affaire IV/35.545 ­
Lufthansa/S AS, JO C 201 5/8/95 
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Communication faite en application de 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
no. 17 du Conseil relative à la 
notification de l'affaire no. IV/35.436 -
Van den Bergh Foods, JO C 211, 
15/8/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
no. 17 du Conseil concernant l'affaire 
no. IV/34.799/C-3 - CBA, JO C 211, 
15/8/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du règlement 
du Conseil no. 17 concernant l'affaire 
no. IV/34.563 -Ecomet, JO C 223, 
29/8/95 
Communication relative à l'application 
des règles de concurrence de la 
Communauté européenne aux systèmes 
de virement transfrontaliers, JO C 251, 
27/9/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 12 par. 2 du règlement (CEE) 
no. 4056/86 concernant l'affaire no. 
IV/MAR/35.382 - Minoan Lines 
Shipping Company-Strintzis Lines 
Shipping Company, JO C 255, 30/9/95 
Communication fondée sur l'article 5 
par.2 du règlement (CEE) no. 3975/87 
du Conseil concernant l'affaire no. 
IV/35.087 - Premiair - accord conclu 
entre le Scandinavian Leisure Group 
AB et Simon Spies Holding A/S sur la 
création d'une entreprise commune de 
transports aériens, JO C 262, 7/10/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 par. 3 du règlement no. 17 
du Conseil concernant une demande 
d'attestation négative ou d'exemption 
en vertu de l'article 85 par. 3 du traité 
CE - Affaire no. IV/35.296 - Inmarsat-
P, JO C 304, 15/11/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 19 par. 3 du règlement No. 17 
du Consei relative à l'affaire IV/34.607 
- Banque Nationale de Paris - Dresdner 
Bank, JO C 312, 23/11/95 
Communication de la Commission sur 
l'application des règles de la 
concurrence au secteur postal et, 
notamment, sur l'évaluation de certaines 
mesures d'Etat relatives aux services 
postaux, JO C 322, 2/12/95 
Communication faite en application de 
l'article 5 du règlement (CEE) no. 
3976/87 du Conseil relatif à un projet 
de règlement modifiant le règlement 
(CEE) nO. 1617/93 concernant 
l'application de l'article 85 par. 3 du 
traité à certaines catégories d'accords, 
de décisions ou de pratiques concertées 
ayant pour objet la planification 
conjointe et la coordination des 
horaires, l'exploitation de services en 
commun, les consultations tarifaires our 
le transport de passagers et de fret sur 
les services aériens réguliers, et la 
répartition des créneaux horaires dans 
les aéroports, JO C 322, 2/12/95 
Communication, faite conformément à 
l'article 19 par. 3 du règlement no. 17 
du Conseil et à l'article 3 du protocole 
21 de l'accord sur l'Espace économique 
européen, relative à une demande 
d'attestation négative ou d'exemption 
en vertu de l'article 85 par. 3 du traité 
CE et de l'article 53 par. 3 de l'accord 
sur 1ΈΕΕ - Affaire no. IV/35.337 -
Atlas, JO C 337, 15/12/95 
Communication, en application de 
l'article 19 par. 3 du règlement no. 17 
du Conseil et de l'article 3 du protocole 
21 de l'accord sur ΓΕΕΕ, concernant 
une demande d'attestation négative ou 
d'exemption en vertu de l'article 85 par. 
3 du traité CE et de l'article 53 par. 3 
de l'accord sur ΓΕΕΕ ­ Affaire no 
IV/35.617 ­Phoenix, JO C 337, 
15/12/95 
Communication faite conformément à 
l'article 12 par. 2 du règlement (CEE) 
no. 4056/86 du Conseil concernant 
l'affaire no. 35.202 ­ Accord concernant 
l'exploitation en commun du service de 
transbordemnt entre Dragør et 
Limhamn, JO C 350, 30/12/95 
Information de la Commission 
européenne relative à sa politique en 
matière d'amendes pour infractions aux 
règles de concurrenc 
Avis 
Avis de la Commission concernant un 
projet de directive modifiant la directive 
90/388/CEE concernant les 
communications mobiles et personnelles, 
JO C 197, 1/8/95 
Notifications 
Notification préalable d'une entreprise 
commune (Affaire no. IV/35640 ­
Cummins­Wärtsilä), JO C 200, 4/8/95 
Notification d'un accord (Affaire no. 
IV/35.486 ­ La Poste (B)/Royale Belge), 
JO C 205, 10/8/95 
Notification d'un accord (Affaire no. 
IV/35.491 ­ La Poste (B)/Générale de 
Banque), JO C 205, 10/8/95 
Notification d'un accord concernant une 
entreprise commune (Affaire no. 
IV/35.625 ­ Saab AB/British Aerospace 
Defence Ltd), JO C 217, 22/8/95 
Notification préalable d'une entreprise 
commune (Affaire no. IV/35.635 ­
Nippon Electric/Schott), JO C 226, 
31/8/95 
Notification préalable d'une entreprise 
commune (Affaire no. IV/35.738 ­
Uniworld), JO C 276, 21/10/95 
Notification préalable d'une entreprise 
commune (Affaire no. IV/35.734 ­
Bayer/Monsanto), JO C 298, 11/11/95 
Notification d'un accord concernant une 
entreprise commune (Affaire no. 
IV/35.645 ­ Warner­Ishi Europe), JO C 
314,25/11/95 
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Notification d'une entreprise commune 
(Affaire no. IV/E-3/35841), JO C 347, 
28/12/95 
Notification préalable d'une entreprise 
commune (Affaire no. IV/35.855/F3), 
JO C 350, 30/12/95 
CONTROL OF 
CONCENTRATIONS/MERGER 
PROCEDURES 
Decisions 
95/354/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 14 février 1995, 
relative à une procédure d'application 
du règlement (CEE) no 4064/89 du 
Conseil (Affaire no. IV/M.477 -
Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer), JO L 211, 
6/9/95 
95/421/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 21 décembre 1994, 
déclarant la compatibilité avec le 
marché commun d'une concentration 
(Affaire no. IV/M.484 -
Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST), 
JOL 251, 19/10/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.596-
Mitsubishi Bank/Bank of Tokyo, JO C 
198, 2/8/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.616 -
Swissair/Sabena), JO C 200, 4/8/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.583 -
Inchcape plc/Gstetner Holdings PLC), 
JO C 201, 5/8/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.611 -
Dresdner Bank/Kleinwort Benson), JO 
C 207, 12/8/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.612 - RWE-
DEA/Enichem Augusta), JO C 207, 
12/8/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.618 - Cable 
and Wireless/VEBA), JO C 231, 5/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.581 -
Frantschach/Bischof + Klein), JO C 
238, 13/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.617 -
CLF/HBB), JO C 241, 16/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.568 -
EDF/EDISON-ISE), JO C 241, 16/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.625 - Nordic 
Capital/Transpool), JO C 243, 20/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.614 -
Generali/France Vie - France lard), JO 
C 244, 21/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.585 - Voest 
Alpine Industrieanlagenbau GmbH/Davy 
International Ltd), JO C 246, 22/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.613 -
Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/Munksjo 
AB), JO C 252, 28/9/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire IV/M.620 - Thomson-
CSF/Teneo/Indra), JO C 264, 11/10/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.622 -
Ricoh/Gestetner), JO C 264, 11/10/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.600 -
Employers Reinsurance Corp./Frankona 
Riickversicherungs AG) (Affaire no. 
IV/M.601 - Employers Reinsurance 
Corp./Aachener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft AG), JO C 272, 18/10/95 
Non-opposition à une cocnentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.640 - KNP 
BT/Société Générale), JO C 274, 
19/10/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.598 -
Daimler-Benz/Carl Zeiss), JO C 276, 
21/10/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.627 -
UAP/Sun Life), JO C 292, 7/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.615 - Rhône-
Poulenc Chimie/Engelhard), JO C 293, 
8/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.643 - CGER-
Banque/SNCI), JO C 293, 8/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.631 -
Upjohn/Pharmacia), JO C 294, 9/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.599 - Noranda 
Forest/Glunz), JO C 298, 11/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.630 -
Henkel/Schwarzkopf), JO C 298, 
11/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.644 - Swiss 
Life/INCA), JO C 307, 18/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.646 -
Repola/Kymmene), JO C 318, 29/11/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.659 - GE 
Capital/Sovac), JO C 322, 2/12/95 
66 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** ώ * ** ** *** ( ^ 
Volume 1 · Number 6 · Autumn/Winter 1995 
> INFORMATION SECTION 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.648 -
McDermott/ETPM), JO C 330, 8/12/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.656 -
Seagate/Conner), JO C 334, 12/12/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.665 -
CEP/Groupe de la Cité), JO C 338, 
16/12/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.544 -
Unisource/Telefónica), JO C 344, 
22/12/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.639 -
Montedison/Groupe Vernes/SCI), JO C 
347, 28/12/95 
Non-opposition à une concentration 
notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.669 -
Charterhouse/Porterbrook), JO C 350, 
30/12/95 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.578 
- Hoogovens/Klöckner)), JO C 243, 
20/9/95 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.551 
- ATR/BAe), JO 264, 11/10/95 
Non-applicabilité du règlement à une 
opération notifiée (Affaire no. IV/M.604 
- Albacom), JO C 278, 24/10/95 
Avis du Comité consultatif en matière 
de concentrations sur une proposition de 
décision dans l'affaire no. IV/M.477 -
Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer, JO C 232, 
6/9/95 
Notifications 
Affaire no. IV/M.581 -
Frantschach/Bischof + Klein, JO C 197, 
1/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.599 - Noranda 
Forest/Glunz, JO C 207, 12/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.623 - Kimberly-
Clark/Scott, JO C 212, 17/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.622 - Ricoh/Gestetner, 
JO C 215, 19/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.604 - Albacom, JO C 
219, 24/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.632 - Rhône 
Poulenc/Fisons, JO C 221, 26/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.628 - Generale 
Bank/Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
JO C 226, 31/8/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.631 -
Upjohn/Pharmacia, JO C 232, 6/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.640 - KNP BT/Société 
Générale, JO C 239, 14/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.608 - Ericsson/Ascom, 
JO C 241, 16/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.630 -
Henkel/Schwarzkopf, JO C 247, 23/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.615 - Rhône-
Poulenc/Engelhard, JO C 255, 30/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.643 - CGER-
Banque/SNCI, JO C 255, 30/9/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.644 - Swiss 
Life/INCA, JO C 258, 3/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.659 - GE 
Capital/Sovac, JO C 276, 21/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.656 - Seagate/Conner, 
JO C 278, 24/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.655 -
Canal+/UFA/MDO, JO C 290, 1/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.665 - CEP/Groupe de 
la Cité, JO C 292, 7/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.660 - RTS/CRA, JO C 
298, 11/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.666 - Johnson 
Controls/Roth Frères, JO C 298, 
11/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.639 -
Montedison/Groupe Vernes/SCI, JO C 
302, 14/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.669 -
Charterhouse/Porterbrook, JO C 309, 
21/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.664 - GRS Holding, 
JO C 309, 21/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.650 -
SBG/Rentenanstalt, JO C 314, 25/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.619 - Gencor/Lonrho, 
JO C 314,25/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.670 - Elsag 
Bailey/Hartmann & Braun AG, JO C 
314,25/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.673 - Channel/Five, JO 
C 317,28/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.674 - Demag/Komatsu, 
JO C 318, 29/11/95 
Avis du Comité consultatif en matière 
de concentrations sur l'avant-projet de 
décision concernant l'affaire no. 
IV/M.484 -
Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST, 
JO C 274, 19/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.646 -
Repola/Kymmene, JO C 260, 5/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.642 - Chase 
Manhattan/Chemical Banking, JO C 
260, 5/10/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.675 - Alumix/Alcoa, 
JO C 318, 29/11/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.621 - BLG/BAWAG, 
JO C 319, 30/11/95 
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Affaire no. IV/M.661 - Strabag/Bank 
Austria/Stuag, JO C 321, 1/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.662 - Leisureplan, JO 
C 321, 1/12/95 
Affaire no. 1V/M.668 - Philips/Origin, 
JO C 322, 2/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.567 - Lyonnaise des 
Eaux/Norhumbrian Water, JO C 322, 
2/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.678 - Minorco/Tilcon, 
JO C 322, 2/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.657 - Röhm/Ciba-
Geigy-TFL, JO C 324, 5/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.595 - BT/VIAG, JO C 
324, 5/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.676 - Ericsson/Ascom 
II, JO C 324, 5/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.677 - Skanska 
Fastigheter/Securum Forvaltning, JO C 
325, 6/12/95 
Affaire no. IV/M.680 - Kvaerner/Amec, 
JO C 325, 6/12/95 
Engagement de procédure (Affaire no. 
IV/M.639 - Gencor/Lonhro), JO 347, 
28/12/95 
Retrait de la notification d'une 
opération de concentration (Affaire no. 
IV/M.608 - Ericsson/Ascom), JO C 292, 
7/11/95 
STATE AID 
95/422/CECA - Décision de la 
Commission, du 4 avril 1995, relative à 
un projet d'octroi d'aides d'Etat par le 
Land de Bavière aux entreprises CECA 
Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH, 
Sulzbach-Rosenberg, et Lech-
Stahlwerke GmbH, Meitingen-
Herbertshofen, JO L 253, 21/10/95 
95/437/CECA - Décision de la 
Commission, du 1er février 1995, 
concernant une aide d'Etat de 
l'Allemagne à Georgsmarienhütte, JO 1 
257, 27/10/95 
95/438/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 14 mars 1995, relative 
aux aides à l'investissement accordées 
par l'Espagne à l'entreprise Piezas y 
Rodajes SA, fonderie installée dans la 
province de Teruel, Aragon, Espagne, 
JO L 257, 27/10/95 
95/455/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 1er mars 1995, relative 
aux dispositions en matière de 
réductions dans le Mezzogiorno des 
charges sociales grevant les entreprises 
et de prise en charge par le fisc de 
certaines de ces charges, JO L 265, 
8/11/95 
95/456/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 1er mars 1995 - Aide 
d'Etat C 1A/92 - Régime grec d'aide au 
secteur pharmaceutique financé à l'aide 
de taxes grevant les produits 
pharmaceutiques et d'autres produits 
apparentés, JO L 265, 8/11/95 
95/466/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 26 juillet 1995, 
concernant l'aide accordée par la 
Région flamande à la compagnie belge 
Vlaamse Luchttransportmaatschappij 
NV, JO L 267, 9/11/95 
95/524/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 7 juin 1995, relative à 
l'aide accordée par le gouvernement 
italien à l'entreprise Iritecna SpA, JO L 
300, 13/12/95 
95/547/CE - Décision de la 
Commission, du 26 juillet 1995, portant 
approbation conditionnée de l'aide 
accordée par la France à la banque 
Crédit Lyonnais 
Communication de la Commission faite 
conformément à l'article 93 par. 2 du 
traité CE aux autres Etats membres et 
autres intéressés concernant l'aide 
accordée en faveur du plan de 
restructuration de Seat SA, suite à la 
nouvelle notification de l'aide par les 
autorités espagnoles - Aide d'Etat C 
34/95 - Espagne, JO C 237, 12/9/95 
Communication relative à la coopération 
entre la Commission et les juridictions 
nationales dans le domaine des aides 
d'Etat, JO C 312,23/11/95 
Adoption des Aides d'Etat 
- C 50/94 (ex NN 85/93) - France, JO C 
200, 4/8/95 
- C 6/95 (ex NN 124/94) - Allemagne, 
JO C 201, 5/8/95 
- C 4/94, C61/94, C 62/94.NN2/95, NN 
3/95 etN 467/95 - Allemagne, JO C 
203, 8/8/95 
- Aide d'Etat (95-002 - Norvège, 
Autorité de surveillance AELE), JO 
C212, 17/8/95 
- C 44/93 (ex N 335/B/91) - Italie, JO C 
215, 19/8/95 
- C 16/95 (NN 50/94) - Allemagne, JO 
C 215, 19/8/95 
- C 59/94 (NN 125/94) - Italie, JO C 
220, 25/8/95 
- NN 56/94 et C 4/94 (ex NN 103/93) -
Allemagne, JO C 227, 1/9/95 
- C34/95 (NN 63/94 et N 222/95) -
Espagne, JO C 237, 12/9/95 
- C 54/94 ( ex NN 105/94 - Italie, JO C 
242, 19/9/95 
- C 19/95 - Allemagne, JO C 242, 
19/9/95 
- C 11/89 - Allemagne, JO C 251, 
27/9/95 
- C 56/94 (NN 86/93) - Espagne, JO C 
253, 29/9/95 
- C 65/94 (NN 79/93) - Italie, JO C 261, 
6/10/95 
- (NN 135/92) - France, JO C 262, 
7/10/95 
- C 7/95 (N 412/94) - Allemagne, JO C 
262, 7/10/95 
- C 22/94 (ex N 53/94) - Belgique, JO C 
263, 10/10/95 
- C 66/94 (ex NN 90/93) - Italie, JO C 
267, 14/10/95 
- C 2/95 (ex N 775/94 et N 776/94) -
Allemagne, JO C 271, 17/10/95 
- C 23/95 (NN 59/94) - Italie, JO C 271. 
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17/10/95 
­ C 60/94 ÍNN 29/93) ­ Grèce, JOP C 
278, 24/10/95 
­ C 8/95 (ex NN 111/93) ­ France, JO 
C 279, 25/10/95 
­ C 9/95 (ex NN 121/94) ­ Espagne, JO 
C 282, 26/10/95 
­ C 29/93 (ex N 431/93 ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 282, 26/10/95 
­ C 20/94 (NN 27/94) ­ France, JO C 
283, 27/10/95 
­ C 3/95 (ex NN 137/94) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 283, 27/10/95 
­ C 22/95 (ex N 219/95) ­ Irlande, JO C 
284, 28/10/95 
­ C 27/95 (NN 45/95) ­ France, JO C 
284, 28/10/95 
­ C 28/95 (ex N 167/95) ­ Grèce, JO C 
284, 28/10/95 
­ C 11/95 (ex N 777/94) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 289, 31/10/95 
­ C 18/95 (NN 103/94) ­ France, JO C 
289, 31/10/95 
­ C 20/95 (ex N 131/95° ­ Italie, JO C 
289, 31/10/95 
­ C 11/95 (ex N 777/94) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 289, 31/10/95 
­ C 18/95 (NN 103/94) ­ France, JO C 
289, 31/10/95 
­ C 20/95 (ex N 131/95) ­ Italie, JO C 
289,31/10/95 
­ C 29/95 (NN 93/94) ­ Italie, JO C 
290, 1/11/95 
­ C 38/92 ­ Italie, JO C 292, 7/11/95 
­ C 31/95 (ex NN 140/94) ­ Italie, JO C 
292, 7/11/95 
­ C 13/95 (NN 9/95) ­ Italie, JO C 293, 
8/11/95 
­ C 33/95 (ex NN 35/95) ­ Espagne, JO 
C 293, 8/11/95 
­ C 29/94 (ex NN 52/94) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 294, 9/11/95 
­ C 33/94 (N 654/93) ­ Italie, JO c 294, 
9/11/95 
­ C 24/95 (ex N 682/93) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 294, 9/11/95 
­ C 25/95 (ex NN 101/94) ­ Italie, JO C 
294, 9/11/95 
­ C 35/95 (ex NN 139/94) ­ Italie, JO C 
294, 9/11/95 
­ C 38/95 (NN 70/95, ex N 510/94) ­
Belgique, JO C 294, 9/11/95 
­ C 23/94 ­ France, JO C 295, 10/11/95 
­ C 12/95 (ex NN 31/94)­ Italie, JO C 
295, 10/11/95 
­ C 30/95 (ex NN 113/B/93) et E 7/95 ­
Italie, JO C 295, 10/11/95 
­ C 32/95 (NN 59/95) ­ Allemagne, JO 
C 295, 10/11/95 
­ C 40/95 (ex N 353/95) ­ Allemagne 
(Basse­Saxe), JO C 295, 10/11/95 
­ C 44/95 (E 16/95) ­ Espagne, JO C 
304, 15/11/95 
­ C 43/93 (ex NN 97/93) ­ France, JO 
C 309,21/11/95 
­ C 41/95 (ex NN 83/95) ­ Allemagne, 
JO C 312,23/11/95 
­ C 37/94 (NN 10/93) ­ Espagne, JO C 
313,24/11/95 
­ C 17/94 (ex NN 102/93) (ex N 335/91 
et ex N 337/92) ­ Italie, JO C 319, 
30/11/95 
­ C 28/93 (N 446/93) ­ Allemagne, JO 
C 327, 7/12/95 
­ C 43/95 (ex NN 73/94) ­ Italie, JO C 
327, 7/12/95 
­ C 39/95 (ex NN 47/95) ­ Italie, JO C 
344, 22/12/95 
Autorisation des aides d'Etat dans le 
cadre des dispositions des articles 92 et 
93 du traité CE ­ Cas à l'égard desquels 
la Commission ne soulève pas 
d'objection: 
JO C 251, 27/9/95; JO C 265, 12/10/95; 
JO C 266, 13/10/95; JO C267, 
14/10/95; JO C 272, 18/10/95; JO C 
276, 21/10/95; JO C 290, 1/11/95; JO C 
295, 10/11/95; JO C 298, 11/11/95; JO 
C 310, 22/11/95 (aides d'Etat N 
135/95); JO C 312, 23/11/95; JO C 318, 
29/11/95; JO C 324, 5/12/95; JO C 334, 
12/12/95; JO C 335, 13/12/95; JO C 
343, 21/12/95 
WRITTEN QUESTIONS 
E­99/95 de Manuel Porto (prix du 
papier journal) 
E­540/95 de Amedeo Amadeo 
(entreprises en difficulté) 
E­820/95 de Marie­Paule Kestelijn­
Sierens (concurrence déloyale) 
E­847/95 de Josu Imaz San Miguel 
(fermeture de l'entreprise TUDOR 
(Saragosse) en Espagne) 
E­965/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (transfer 
de technologies) 
Ρ­1391/95 Yiannis Roubatis (prix du 
papier journal) 
E­640/95 de Mark Watts (British Gas ­
Abus de position dominante aux termes 
de l'article 86 du traité) 
E­642/95 de Mark Watts (validité de la 
nouvelle politique des prix 
discriminatoires de British Gas) 
E­964/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (transfert 
de technologies) 
E­533/95 de Josu Imaz San Miguel 
(pratiques monopolistiques dans le 
secteur espagnol de l'électricité) 
E­836/95 de Glyn Ford (subventions 
d'Etat pour les producteurs norvégiens 
de produits de papeterie) 
E­963/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (transfer 
de technologies) 
E­1165/95 de Graham Mather ( accords 
de transfer de technologie) 
E­1553/95 de Francesco Baldarelli 
(accord entre Sabena et Swissair) 
E­971/95 de Amedeo Amadeo 
(concurrence) 
E­149/95 de Nel van Dijk (aide d'Etat 
dissimulée pour le chantier naval RDM) 
E­966/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (transfert 
de technologies) 
E­1045/95 de Nikitas Kaklamanis 
(condamnation de cimentiers grecs par la 
Commission) 
E­1076/95 de Sergio Ribeiro 
(délocalisation d'entreprises (Renault­
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Setúbal) et information des autorités 
d'un Etat membre (Portugal)) 
E­l 159/95 de Joaquín Sisó Cruellas ( 
projet de règlement concernant la 
distribution d'automobiles) 
E­1649/95, E­l650/95, E­l779/95 de 
Amedeo Amadeo (distribution dans le 
secteur automobile) 
E­l7714/95 de Riccardo Nencini 
(concurrence) 
E­1768/95 de Joaquín Sisó Cruellas 
(absence de notification d'aides d'Etat) 
E­1806/95 de Anne André­Léonard 
(renouvellement de la dérogation à l'art. 
85 du traité, accordée à United 
International Pictures ­ UIP ­ en 1989 
par la Commission) 
P­1977/95 de Peter Skinner (fusion des 
entreprises Glaxo et Wellcome au 
Royaume­Uni) 
E­l963/95 de Cristiana Muscardini 
(démantèlement des usines sidérurgiques 
Falck à Sesto San Giovanni) 
E­2260/95 de Susanne Riess­Passer 
(aide à la presse en Autriche) 
E­2106/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (coût du 
papier journal) 
P­2498/95 de Christian Rovsing (respect 
des règles communautaires de 
concurrence) 
E­2527/95 de Nel van Dijk (aide d'Etat 
dissimulée pour le chantier naval RDM) 
E­2330/95 de Glyn Ford (B­SKY­B et 
NIREX/Télétravail) 
E­2355/95 de Karla Peijs, Peter Pex et 
Bartho Pronk ( aides à la construction 
navale allemande) 
E­2499/95 de Amedeo Amadeo (prix 
des automobiles) 
COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL 
Affaires introduites devant la Cour 
Aff. C­264/95 Ρ Commission / Union 
internationale des chemins de fer (UIC) 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu le 6 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­14/93 
­Annulation de la décision 92/568/CEE 
de la Commission relative à une 
procédure au titre de l'art. 85 du traité 
CE ­ Distribution de billets de 
transports ferroviaires par les agences 
de voyages 
Aff. C­278/95 Ρ Siemens SA / 
Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(deuxième chambre), rendu le 8 juin 
1995, dans l'affaire T­459/93 ­ Recours 
en annulation de la décision 
92/483/CEE de la Commission relative 
à des aides accordées par la région de 
Bruxelles­ Capitale (Belgique) en faveur 
des activités de Siemens SA dans le 
domaine de l'informatique et des 
télécommunications ­ Erreurs de droit 
Aff. C­279/95 Ρ Langnese­Iglo GmbH / 
Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(deuxième chambre élargie), rendu le 8 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­7/93 
­Recours en annulation contre la 
décision 93/406/CEE de la Commission 
relative à une procédure d'application 
de l'article 85 du traité CEE contre 
Langnese­Iglo GmbH (affaire 
IV/34.072) 
Aff. C­280/95 Commission / Italie 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Défaut de s'être 
conformé à la décision 93/496/CEE de 
la Commission relative à l'aide d'Etat C 
32/92 (ex NN 67/92) ­ Italie (crédit 
d'impôt pour les transporteurs routiers 
professionnels) 
Aff. C­282/95 Ρ Guérin Automobiles / 
Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu le 27 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­186/94 ­
Arrêt constatant le non lieu à statuer sur 
un recours en carence et rejetant comme 
irrecevables les conclusions subsidiaires 
en annulation 
Aff. C­286/95 Ρ Commission / Imperial 
Chemical Industries pic (ICI) 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 29 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­37/91 ­
Annulation de la décision 91/300/CEE 
de la Commission relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 86 du 
traité CE (IV/33.133­D: carbonate de 
soude ­ ICI) 
Aff. C­287/95 Ρ Commission / Solvay 
SA 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 29 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­31/91 ­ Arrêt 
portant annulation de la décision 
91/298/CEE de la Commission, relative 
à une procédure d'application de l'rticle 
85 du traité CEE (IV/33.133 : Carbonate 
de soude) ­ Recevabilité d'un nouveau 
moyen ­ Conditions de l'authentification 
d'une décision adoptée par le collège des 
membres de la Commission 
Aff. C­288/95 Ρ Commission / Solvay 
SA 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 29 
juin 1995, dans l'affaire T­32/91 ­ (Voir 
affaire C­287/95 P) 
Aff. C­292/95 Espagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission du 6 juillet 1995 
prorogeant, avec effet rétroactif à partir 
du 1er janvier 1995, la décision du 23 
décembre 1992 relative à l'encadrement 
communautaire des aides d'Etat dans le 
secteur de l'automobile 
Aff. C­326/95 Banco de Fomento e 
Exterior, Sa / Amândio Maurício Martins 
Pechin e.a. 
Préjudicielle ­ Tribunal de Comarca de 
Lisboa ­ Interprétation de l'art. 59 et des 
art. 90, par. 1, et 92, par. 1, et 92, par. 
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1, du traité CE - Privilèges attribués par 
l'Etat à une banque portugais 
majoritairement détenue par des 
actionnaires publics 
Aff. C-339/95 Compagnia di 
navigazione marittima Sri e.a. / 
Compagnie Maritime Belge NV e.a. 
Préjudicielle - High Court of Justice 
(Queen's Bench Division) -
Interprétation de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
et des art. 1, par. 3, sous b), et 3, 4 et 
5, par. 5, du règlement (CEE) 
nu4056/86 du Conseil déterminant les 
modalités d'application des articles 85 
et 86 du traité aux transports maritimes 
- Compétences respectives de la 
Commission et d'une juridiction 
nationale appelée à exercer un contrôle 
judiciaire sur une sentence arbitrale -
Conférence maritime (SUNAG) réglant 
le transport "door-to-door" entre 
l'Europe et le Golfe arabe 
Aff. C-341/95 G. Bettati / Safety 
Hi-Tech Sri 
Préjudicielle - Pretura circondariale di 
Avezzano - Validité, au regard des art. 
3, 5, 30, 86, 92 et 130 R du traité CE, 
de l'art. 5 du règlement (CE) nu 
3093/94 du Conseil relatif à des 
substances qui appauvrissent la couche 
d'ozone en ce qu'il interdit 
inconditionnellement l'emploi des 
hydrochlorofluorocarbures (HCFC) 
comme moyen anti-incendie à partir du 
1er juin 1995 
Aff. C-343/95 Diego Calí & Figli Sri / 
Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA 
(SEPG) 
Préjudicielle - Tribunale di Genova -
Interprétation de l'art. 86 du traité CE 
au regard d'une entreprise chargée, par 
l'autorité du Port de Gênes, de la 
surveillance et de l'intervention en 
matière de pollution - Monopole de 
services non désirés et rémunérés 
suivant un tarif obligatoire 
Aff. C-353/95 P Tiercé Ladbroke SA / 
Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 18 
septembre 1995 dans l'affaire T-471/93 
- Refus d'annuler la décision de la 
Commission du 18 janvier 1993 rejetant 
la plainte de la partie requérante sous 
les art. 92 et 93 du traité 
Aff. C-355/95 P Textilwerke 
Deggendorf GmbH (TWD) / 
Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu le 13 
septembre 1995 dans les affaires jointes 
T-244/93 et T-486/93 - Recours en 
annulation contre les décisions 
91/391/CEE et 92/330/CEE relatives à 
des aides à l'entreprise requérante en ce 
qu'elles suspendent le versement d'aides 
autorisées jusqu'au remboursement 
d'aides illicites antérieures 
Aff. C-359/95 P Commission / 
Ladbroke Racing Ltd 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 
18 septembre 1995 dans l'affaire 
T-548/93 - Annulation de la décision 
de la Commission relative à une 
procédure d'application des art. 85 et 
86 du traité CE 
Aff. C-367/95 P Commission / 
Chambre syndicale nationale des 
entreprises de transport de fonds et 
valeurs (Sytraval) e.a. 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(quatrième chambre élargie), rendu le 
28 septembre 1995, dans l'affaire 
T-95/94 - Arrêt faisant droit au recours 
d'un concurrent contre le rejet, par 
la Commission, de sa demande de 
voir constater que la République 
française a enfreint les art. 92 et 93 du 
traité CE en octroyant des aides à 
l'entreprise Sécuripost 
Affaires introduites devant le 
Tribunal 
Aff. T-140/95 Ryanair Ltd / 
Commission 
Recours en annulation de la décision de 
la Commission d'autoriser le 
gouvernement irlandais à payer la 
deuxième tranche d'une aide en faveur 
de Aer Lingus, approuvée par décision 
du 21 décembre 1993. bien qye la 
condition de réduction de* coins de 50 
millions de livres irlanda»« patir an. 
prévue à Panicle 1er point m de ladite 
décision, n'ait pas été atteinte 
Aff. T-149/95 J. Richard D u o » / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission de clore la procédure 
d'application de l'article 93 paragraphe 2 
du Traité et d'approuver les aides 
accordées par le gouvernement italien 
aux entreprises publiques CMF SUD et 
CMF, sous forme d'apports publics de 
capital, suite aux engagements pris par 
les autorités italiennes 
Aff. T-150/95 BISPA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission déclarant conforme à 
l'article 3 de la décision de la 
Commission 3855/91/CECA du 27 
novembre 1991, instituant des règles 
communautaires pour les aides à la 
sidérurgie, l'aide accordée par le 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg à la 
société PROFILARBED aux fins de la 
construction d'une nouvelle installation 
électrique à Esch-Schifflange 
Aff. T-155/95 LPN e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission nu FC 94/10/65/005 relative 
à l'octroi d'un concours de l'instrument 
financier de cohésion pour un projet 
concernant la construction d'un pont sur 
le Tage dans la région de Lisbonne 
Aff. T-157/95 EAMM e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, publiée par communiqué 
de presse nu IP/95/558, de ne pas 
s'opposer à une aide prévue par les 
autorités britanniques pour la 
construction d'une usine de production 
de mozzarella en Irlande du Nord (aide 
nu N 451/95) 
Aff. T-175/95 BASF Lacke + Farben / 
Commission 
Competition Policy Newsletter ***** * * 
* * ** ** *** 
0 ^ Volume 1 Number 6 Autumn/Winter 1995 71 
» INFORMATION SECTION 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 12 juillet 1995, relative 
à une procédure d'application de l'art. 
85 du traité CE (IV/33.802 Lacke + 
Farben AG et SA Accinauto) ou, 
subsidiairement, annulation ou réduction 
de l'amende infligée à la requérante -
Obligation imposée contractuellement 
par BASF à Accinauto, son distributeur 
exclusif pour la Belgique et le 
Luxembourg des produits de repeinture 
pour voitures de la marque "Glasurit", 
de transférer à BASF les demandes de 
clients provenant de l'extérieur du 
territoire contractuel 
Aff. T-176/95 Accinauto / Commission 
Voir affaire T-175/95 
Aff. T-188/95 Waterleiding 
Maatschappij "Noord-West Brabant" / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission SG(95)D/8442 du 3 juillet 
1995, déclarant compatibles avec le 
marché commun, sur base de l'art. 92, 
par. 3, sous c), du traité et de l'art. 61, 
par. 3, sous c), de l'Accord EEE, les 
dispositions concernant les aides d'état 
contenues dans la loi néerlandaise sur le 
régime fiscal en matière de protection 
de l'environnement 
Aff. T-189/95 SGA / Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
décision ainsi que d'adopter des 
mesures provisoires suite à la plainte 
déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement de l'art. 85 du traité CE et 
de l'art. 3 point 11 du règlement (CEE) 
nu 123/85 de la Commission, et 
concernant les agissements de la société 
Peugeot auprès des concessionnaires de 
ses filiales étrangères afin de les 
empêcher d'accepter de vendre des 
véhicules aux intermédiaires français -
Recours en indemnité en réparation du 
préjudice prétendument causé par le 
comportement de la Commission 
Aff. T-190/95 Sodima / Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
décision suite à la plainte déposée par 
la requérante sur le fondement des art. 
85 et 86 du traité ainsi que du 
règlement (CEE) nu 123/85 de la 
Commission et concernant l'imposition 
par la société Peugeot d'un régime de 
concession incompatible avec les 
conditions d'exemption établies par 
ledit règlement - Recours en indemnité 
en réparation du préjudice prétendument 
causé par le comportement de la 
Commission 
Aff. T-193/95 Fintecna / Commission 
Annulation de l'art. 1, par. 4, de la 
décision de la Commission relative à 
une aide accordée par le gouvernement 
italien afin de faciliter la restructuration 
et l'assainissement de la société 
Iritecna, en ce qu'il fixe les conditions 
auxquelles est soumise l'autorisation de 
l'aide 
Aff. T-195/95 Guérin Automobiles / 
Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
décision suite à la plainte déposée par 
la requérante sur le fondement de l'art. 
85 du traité CE et du règlement (CEE) 
nu 123/85 de la Commission et 
concernant l'imposition par la société 
Nissan France d'un régime de 
concession incompatible avec les 
conditions dudit règlement - Recours en 
indemnité en réparation du préjudice 
prétendument causé par le 
comportement de la Commission 
Aff. T-199/95 Le Nouveau Garage e.a. / 
Commission 
Recours en carence tendant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
décision suite aux plaintes déposées par 
les requérantes sur le fondement de 
l'art. 85 du traité CE et du règlement 
(CE) nu 123/85 et concernant 
l'imposition par la société VAG France 
d'un système de distribution exclusive 
et sélective de véhicules automobiles 
des marques Volkswagen et Audi et de 
leurs pièces de rechange incompatible 
avec les conditions dudit règlement 
Aff. T-204/95 International Express 
Carriers Conference / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission SG (95) D/10794 rejetant la 
plainte déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement des art. 85 et 86 du traité CE 
(IV/32.791-Remail), relative aux 
entraves à la pratique du "remail" qui 
résultent des agissements des 
Administrations des postes de certains 
Etats membres 
Aff. T-16/91 RV Rendo e.a. / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision 91/50/CEE de 
la Commission relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traité CEE 
(IV/32.732 - IJsselcentrale (IJC) e.a.) -
Entraves aux importations et 
exportations d'énergie électrique aux 
Pays-Bas (affaire renvoyée par la Cour 
après annulation partielle de l'arrêt du 
Tribunal du 18/11/92) 
Aff. T-209/95 Windstar Sail Cruises e.a. 
/ Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission considérant l'aide accordée 
par le gouvernement français pour la 
construction du navire "Tahiti Nui" 
comme une aide au développement, dans 
le sens de l'art. 4, par. 7, de la directive 
(CEE) nu 684/90 du 21 décembre 1990, 
concernant les aides à la construction 
navale 
Aff. T-213/95 SCK e.a. / Commission 
Recours en indemnité - Responsabilité 
non contractuelle de la Commission 
découlant de sa prétendue violation de 
l'art. 6 de la Convention des droits de 
l'Homme et des principes généraux du 
droit au cours d'une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85, par. 1, du 
traité CE relative au marché des grues 
mobiles 
Aff. T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
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Commission concernant l'aide accordée 
par la région flamande à la 
compagnie aérienne belge 
Vlaamse Luchttransportmaatschappij 
NV (VLM) 
Aff. T-215/95 Telecom Italia / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission relative aux conditions 
imposées au second opérateur de 
radiotéléphonie GSM en Italie 
Coming up .... 
The following publications are under 
preparation by DG IV: 
EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter: Spring 1996, Summer 
1996, Autumn/Winter 1996. 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume IB 
Explanation of rules applicable to 
undertakings. 
Repertory of Commission 
Decisions in the Competition 
field: 1993 to 1994. 
Actes Forum Européen de la 
Concurrence. 
L' application des articles 85/86 
par les juridictions nationales 
Recueil des décisions sur les aides 
d'Etat 
Brochure sur la politique de la 
concurrence dans le Marché 
unique (concernant les 
art.85,86,90 et le règlement sur les 
concentrations) 
Brochure sur la politique 
concernant les aides d'état 
Brochure concernant des sujets 
présentant un intérêt pratique 
pour l'industrie de la 
Communauté et plus 
particulièrement les PMEs 
Video: Introduction to 
competition policy 
New procedure for 
the dissemination of 
Merger decisions 
These decisions will be available: 
- in paper form through the document 
delivery procedures of the Office for 
Official Publications of the European 
Communities and its sales agents; 
- in electronic form, through the 
CELEX database containing 
Community legislation and case law. 
The announcement of these decisions 
in the Official Journal series C will 
contain the appropriate Catalogue 
Number (necessary to order the paper 
version) as well as the appropriate 
CELEX document number (necessary 
to consult the electronic version 
online). 
Several gateways provide access to 
CELEX in the countries indicated. 
Interested parties that are not CELEX 
users and would like to obtain access 
to the system, please contact these 
gateways directly. 
For countries not yet covered by the 
network of gateways it is possible to 
access CELEX through the 
EUROBASES host; to obtain an 
access contract and a price list please 
contact them at the following address: 
EUR-OP, Eurobases, (OP/4C, 2, rue 
Mercier, L-2985 Luxembourg; tel. 
+(352) 2929 42053, fax. +(352) 2929 
42025. 
Dealing with the Commission 
notifications, complaints, 
inspections and fact-finding 
powers. 
XXV Report on competition 
policy 1995. 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume 3A 
International aspects of 
competition policy. 
In conformance with the rules that 
apply on public access to 
Commission documents (see 
Commision decision of 8 February 
1994 on public access to Commission 
documents (94/90/ECSC, EC, 
Euratom) in OJ L 46 of 1810211994 
p. 58), a new system of 
disseminating Commission's Merger 
Decisions based on Articles 6 (1) a) 
and b) of Regulation 4064/89 will be 
implemented as of the 1st of March 
1996. 
A list of other organisations 
distributing CELEX under licence 
either online or on CD-ROM is also 
included. 
For more information about CELEX 
or to receive an updated list of 
gateways and distributors please 
contact: EUR-OP, Information, 
Marketing & Public Relations, 
(OP/4B), 2, rue Mercier, L-2925 
Luxembourg; tel. +(352) 2929 42455 
fax. +(352) 2929 42763 
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A short manual for extracting Article 
6 (1) a) and b) decisions from 
CELEX is available on request 
through DG IV's Cellule Information. 
EUR-OP's Official Gateways* 
* Databases offered: ABEL, APC, 
CELEX, ECLAS, EUROCRON, 
INF092, OIL. RAPID. SCAD, 
SESAME. TED 
BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Outlaw Informationssysteme GmbH 
Matterstockstr. 26/28 D-97080 
Würzburg tel. (49-931) 296 62 00 
Fax (49-931)296 62 99 
DANMARK 
Schultz Information 
Herstedvang 10-12 DK-2620 
Albertslund tel (45) 43 22 72 62 
Fax (45) 43 63 19 69 
GREECE 
Helketec 
7, D. Aeginitou Street GR-115 28 
Athens tel (30-1) 723 52 14 
Fax (30-1) 729 15 28 
ESPANA 
Sarenet 
Parque Tecnológico, Edificio 103 E-
48016 Zamudio (Vizcaya) tel (34-4) 
420 94 70, Fax (34-4) 420 94 65 
ICELAND 
Skyrr 
Háaleitisbraut, 9 IS-108 Reykjavik 
tel (354-5) 695 100 
Fax (354-5) 695 251 
IRELAND 
InterGate 
71 Talbot Street Dublin 1 
tel. (353-1) 836 49 03 
Fax (353-1) 855 15 09 
ISRAEL 
Trendline 
12 Yad-Harutzim St. Tel-Aviv 67778 
tel. (972-3) 638 82 22 
Fax (972-3) 638 82 88 
ITALIA 
Cerved S.p.A. 
Via A. Staderini, 93 1-00155 Roma 
tel (39-6) 225 911 
Fax (39-6) 225 913 09 
NORGE 
Vestlandsforsking Fossetunet 3 N-5800 
Sogndal tel (47) 57 67 61 50 
Fax (47) 57 67 61 90 
OSTERREICH 
EDV Ges. m.b.H. Hofmühlgasse 3-5 A-
1060 Wien tel. (43-1) 599 07 277 
Fax (43-1) 599 07 250 
PORTUGAL 
Telepac Rua Dr. Antonio Loureiro 
Borges 1 Arquiparque - Miraflores P-
1495 Lisboa tel. (351-1) 790 70 00 
Fax (351-1) 790 70 43 
SCHWEIZ/SUISSE/SVIZZERA 
Schweizerische Zentrale für 
Handelsförderung (OSEC) 
Stampfenbachstrasse 85 
CH-8035 Zürich, tel (41-1) 365 54 54 
Fax (41-1) 365 54 11 
SUOMI/FINLAND 
VTKK Information Service Ltd 
Espoontori B 
SF-02770 Espoo tel (358-0) 457 23 43 
Fax (358-0) 457 37 56 
SVERIGE 
Sema Group InfoData AB 
PO Box 34 101 Fyrverkarbacken 34-36 
S-100 26 Stockholm 
tel. (46-8) 738 50 00 
Fax (46-8) 618 97 78 
UNITED KINGDOM 
CONTEXT Electronic Publishers 
Grand Union House 20, Kentish Town 
Road London NW1 9NR 
tei. (44-71)267 89 89 
Fax (44-71) 267 11 33 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
Eurobases (Eur-Op) 
c/o European Commission 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
tel (352) 2929-42053 
Fax (352) 2929-42025 
ABEL, APC, CELEX, ECLAS, 
EUROCRON, 
INF092, OIL, RAPID, SCAD, SESAME 
ECHO 
B.P. 2373 
L-1023 Luxembourg 
tel (352) 34 98 12 00 
Fax (352) 34 98 12 34 
TED 
74 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** ir ir 
ir ir 
** ** 
V ^ ^ Volume 1 Number 6 · Autumn/Winter 1995 
> INFORMATION SECTION 
Other distributors of 
the Celex databases 
BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Dr Otto Schmidt KG 
CD-ROM 
Unter den Ulmen 96­98 D­50968 Köln 
tel (49­221) 937 38 Ol 
Fax (49­221) 937 38 902 
Juris (HOST) 
Gutenbergstrae 23 
D­66117 Saarbrücken 
tel (49­681)586 60 
Fax (49­681) 586 62 39 
ESPANA 
ICEX (GATEWAY) 
Paseo de la Castellana, 14 
E­28046 Madrid 
tel (34­1) 349 61 00 
Fax (34­1)431 61 28 
FRANCE 
L'Européenne des données (HOST) 
164ter rue d'Ageusseau 
F­92100 Boulogne­Billancourt 
tel (33­1) 46 05 29 29 
Fax (33­1) 46 05 42 55 
GREECE/ 
Intrasoft 
c/o Databank (HOST) 
124 Kifissias Ave. GR­115 26 Athens 
tel (30­1) 64 94 830 
Fax (30­1) 64 90 012 
ITALIA 
Cedis s.r.I. 
CD-ROM 
Palazzo E/2 Milanofiori 
1­20090 Assago (M) 
tel (39­2) 824 14 51 
Fax (39­2) 825 41 33 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (HOST) 
Via Damiano Chiesa 24 
1­00144 Roma 
tei (39­6) 345 02 46 
Fax (39­6) 330 83 38 
Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria 
(HOST) 
Via Barberini 36 
1­00187 Roma 
tei (39­6) 487 07 93 
Fax (39­6) 474 19 84 
NEDERLAND 
EPMS 
CD-ROM 
Postbus 1059 NL­6201 BB Maastricht 
tei (31­4457)2275 
Fax (31­4457) 2148 
Informatiebank 
CD-ROM 
Postbus 1188 
NL­1000 BD Amsterdam 
tel (31­20)512 86 66 
Fax (31­20)512 86 09 
NORGE 
Lovdata (HOST) 
Radhusgaten 7B 
N­0141 Oslo 
tel (47­22) 41 82 00 
Fax (47­22)41 81 80 
PORTUGAL 
Ministerio da Justiça (HOST) 
Direcçaõ-Geral dos Serviços 
Av Casal Ribeiro 16 ­ 16A 
Ρ­1096 Lisboa 
tel (351­1)57 56 00 
Fax (351­1) 355 72 08 
SUOMI/FINLAND 
Ministry of Justice (HOST) 
BOX 620 
SF­13111 Hämeenlinna 
tel (358­17)622 31 
Fax (358­17)622 3698 
SVERIGE 
SEMA GROUP InfoData AB (HOST) 
PO BOX 34 101 
S­100 26 Stockholm 
tel (46­8) 738 50 00 
Fax (46­8)618 97 78 
UNITED KINGDOM 
CONTEXT Electronic Publishers 
CD-ROM 
Grand Union House 
20 Kentish Town Road 
London NW1 9NR 
tel (44­71) 267 89 89 
Fax (44­71)267 11 33 
FT Profile (HOST) 
Financial Times Information 
Fitzroy House 
13­17 Epworth Street 
London EC2A 4DL 
tel (44­71) 825 8000 
Fax (44­71) 825 7999 
ILI 
CD-ROM 
Infonorme London Information 
Index House 
Ascot Berks SL5 7EU 
tel (44­344) 874 343 
Fax (44­344) 29 11 94 
Knight-Ridder Information (HOST) 
Haymarket House 
1 Oxendon Street 
London SW1Y 4EE 
tel (44­71)930 55 03 
Fax (44­71)930 25 81 
UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
Lexis­Nexls (HOST) 
9443 Springboro Pike 
Dayton, Ohio 45401 
tel (1­513)865­7325 
Fax (1­513) 865­6949 
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More Information ... 
The Directorate General for Competition (DG 
IV) receives many requests with specific 
questions. While it is impossible, given the 
resources available, to investigate and reply 
individually to each one of them, we will do our 
best to reply as soon as possible. In order to 
better inform the public on Competition Policy, 
DG IV produces several publications, 
available through the Office for Official 
Publications of the European Union (see catalog 
on p. 62). We also publish three times a year the 
"EC Competition Policy Newsletter", available 
free of charge. Finally, we can provide copies of 
speeches by the Competition Commissioner and 
by officials from the Directorate General. Please 
address your questions to : 
European Commission, Directorate General TV-Competition, Cellule Information, 
C150 00/158, Rue de la Loi 200 Wetstraat, Bruxelles B-1049 Brussel, Belgium. 
fax(+322) 29 55437 E-Mail: Internet: info4@dg4.cec.be X.400: c=be;a=rtt;p=cec;ou=dg4;s=info4 
The members of the Cellule INFORMATION will endeavour to answer your enquiries. If they are unable to 
do so they will find someone who can. They will not, however, answer questions pertaining to ongoing cases. 
Cases covered in this issue 
Anti­trust Rules 
Commission Decisions 
10, 17 FNK/SCK 
10 ORGANON (Mercilon/Marvelon) 
11,18 ATR/British Aerospace 
12 ATLAS/PHOENIX 
13 Global Mobile Satellite Systems 
13 ETSI 
13 Pelikan/Kyocera 
Court Judgements 
14 C­415/93 URBSF e.a. c/ J.M. Bosman 
20 C­19/93 Rendo NV e.a. ν/ Commission 
22 T­34/93 Société Générale ν/ Commission 
23 T­7/93 Langnese­Iglo v/ Commission 
23 T­9/93 Schöller Lebensmittel ν/ Commission 
26 T­548/93 Ladbroke Racing ν/ Commission 
Mergers 
Commission Decisions 
30 
30 
31 
31 
32 
32 
33 
Orkla/Volvo 
ABB/Daimler Benz 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol 
Crown Cork and Seal/Carnaud MetalBox 
Kimberly­Clarke/Scott Paper 
Gencor/Lonrho 
Repola/Kymmene 
Liberalisation & State Intervention 
Commission Decisions 
37 Omnitel Pronto Italia 
38 Vebacom 
39 British Midland (Aéroport de Bruxelles­National) 
© ECSC-ECE-EAEC, Brussels · Luxembourg, 1994 
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